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Foreword
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this Occasional Paper is that it is the first systematic study of the peace
process in the Middle East by a South Asian scholar. For many years, both Indians and Pakistanis have viewed
the Middle East as an “intractable” or “difficult” region and have boasted that whatever its problems, South
Asia—especially the core dispute between India and Pakistan—was, comparatively speaking, under control.
Three things have challenged this assertion. First, the successive near-conflicts between Islamabad and New
Delhi in 1987 and 1990 not only brought the region to the edge of war, they introduced a nuclear component
into regional strategy. Second, the dampening effect of the Cold War on regional disputes seems to have
disappeared from South Asia. While the great powers remain concerned over the possible outbreak of war
between India and Pakistan, the region has been delinked from larger strategic issues and regional policy makers
are increasingly on their own. Finally, regions can be usefully viewed in comparative perspective, and here Dr.
Ahmar’s study points out the sharp difference between the long, tortuous, and difficult “road to peace” being
followed in the Middle East and the absence of the simplest dialogue that has come to characterize the
India–Pakistan relationship since the early 1990s.
Dr. Ahmar’s study will serve as both a benchmark and a road map. It succinctly characterizes the bitter and
unproductive dialogue between India and Pakistan as it exists today. However, through its comparison with the
Middle East peace process, it suggests the direction that Delhi and Islamabad might take. There are many points
of difference between the Middle East peace process and a possible South Asia peace process (and Dr. Ahmar
examines these carefully), but there are also points of similarity. There are even opportunities open to Indians
and Pakistanis that are not available in the Middle East. For example, Israel is the only functioning democracy
in the Middle East. The Israelis cannot fully trust decisions made by the leaders of states whose power rests on a
weak base and who might be deposed at any time. However, in South Asia both India and Pakistan are
democratic states. If and when they reach a point where they are ready for significant negotiations over critically
important political and strategic differences (Kashmir being the most important, but not the only one), then two
factors will come into play.
First, as democracies, such an agreement would have to receive widespread support ensuring that when
governments change, basic policy will continue. We have seen this in Israel, where even the hawkish Likud has
continued to engage in negotiations with its Arab neighbors.
Second, democracies do not go to war with each other for practical reasons. Over time, they become
intertwined in complex ways: their businessmen, scholars, journalists, politicians, and cultural artists
interacting regularly. Not much of this has occurred (yet) in the Middle East, but it is quite evident in the case of
two democracies that were once bitter foes, the United States and Japan. If wisdom prevails, both India and
Pakistan will open up enough to allow a degree of mutual contact at the grassroots level—the establishment of
“lobbies” if you will—that will provide both direction and ballast when the relationship enters rough water.
We all try to learn from our own mistakes. Statecraft consists of learning from the mistakes (and successes)
of others. Dr. Ahmar’s monograph provides a first glimpse from a South Asian perspective of how another
region has managed to overcome a similar legacy of partition, ethnic and religious conflict, extremist ideology,
stereotyping, and poverty. I am confident that a new generation of India and Pakistani leaders will weigh the
advantages of cooperation, against its risks; to this end they will find this study to be an invaluable guide.
Stephen Phillip Cohen
Director, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament,
and International Security
Professor of Political Science and History
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
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Abstract
The Arab–Israeli peace process has reduced the possibility of another war in the Middle East. For the first time
since its inception as a sovereign state Israel is at relative peace with all of its neighbors except Syria and
Lebanon. The PLO–Israeli accord has resulted in the granting of self-rule to the Palestinians of the West Bank
and Gaza. Extremist Israeli and Palestinian groups want to reverse the peace process, but they also realize the
difficulty of that task. Compared to the Arab–Israeli peace process, in South Asia the Indo–Pakistan standoff on
the Kashmir dispute can only worsen the regional security environment. The core of this paper is to examine
similarities and differences in the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pak peace processes and to suggest lessons that New
Delhi and Islamabad can learn from the methodology of peace-making in the Middle East.
Both the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pak conflicts resulted in the outbreak of several international wars, promoted
arms races, external intervention and mediation, and the launching of various peace initiatives. Important
dissimilarities between the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pakistan peace processes are the absence of a strong
foreign—particularly U.S.—interest in South Asia, the absence of nuclear deterrence in the Middle East, and the
presence of a nuclear capability in India and Pakistan. The question of losing time, urgency, and incentives on
the part of Israel and Arab countries and the unacceptability of the costs of confrontation by New Delhi and
Islamabad also account for differences in the two peace processes.
Yet India and Pakistan can learn several lessons from the Arab–Israeli peace process. These are: the “land for
peace” formula as applied in the resolution of Arab–Israeli conflicts; the role of the official elites in Israel and
the Arab countries for peace-making; the role of back channel negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Oslo;
the presence of mutual stakes for peace for Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians; the
marginalization of core issues; the emphasis on strengthening direct communication by building mutual
confidence and trust; and the effective involvement of influential powers in the peace-making process. If the road
to peace in the Middle East has passed through Amman, Cairo, Jerusalem, Oslo, and Washington, in South
Asia it must pass through Islamabad, New Delhi, and Srinagar.
1The Road to Peace in South Asia:
Lessons for India and Pakistan from the Arab–Israeli Peace Process
Moonis Ahmar
Introduction
In the post-World War II period two regional conflicts seemed as intractable as the Cold War itself, those of the
Middle East and South Asia. From the decolonization of the two regions to the present day both regions have
witnessed the outbreak of wars;1 proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons; foreign involvement;
successful and aborted peace processes; external mediation for conflict management (CM) and resolution; the
adoption of military and non-military confidence-building measures (CBMs); terrorism, ethnic and religious
discord; the surge of extremist religious elements; and the encouragement of local conflicts by the regimes in
power. Given these facts, the task of peace-making in the Middle East and South Asia has had repeated setbacks
and failures, but despite negative trends the course of peace-making in the two regions has also seen several
breakthroughs in avoiding wars and resolving some of their conflicts.
After years of stalemate following the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, the peace process in the Middle East has now
reached a decisive stage. Breakthroughs in the Middle East peace process could be understood in terms of steps
taken for Arab–Israeli normalization like the Camp David accord of September 1978, the Egyptian–Israeli peace
treaty of 1979, the PLO–Israeli accord of September 1993, and Jordanian–Israeli agreement of 1994.2 A
significant breakthrough in the Middle East peace process occurred on 24 September 1995 when Israel and the
PLO reached an accord to transfer West Bank areas to the Palestinian authority.3 I  the South Asian case such a
process has not yet been launched successfully.4 While the peace process in the Middle East is not free from
challenges and contradictions and the threat of rupture in the PLO–Israeli accord still exists, the possibility of a
war between Israel and its Arab neighbors has substantially declined. In the post-Rabin period,5 b th Israel and
the PLO seem to be determined to continue with the peace process. The threats and challenges to the Middle
East peace process are not insignificant. These emanate from the acts of hard-liners in Jewish and Palestinian
communities like the terrorist attacks launched by Hamas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and the assassination of
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an ardent Israeli opponent of the peace process. It has been feared by some
Palestinian sources that Israel may retaliate against the Hamas and Al-Jihad sponsored terrorist attacks by
                                                
1. The Arab–Israeli wars were fought in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 (between Israel and Lebanon). India and Pakistan fought
wars with each other in 1948, 1965, and 1971. There was also a war between China and India in 1962 and from 1980–88. Pakistan was
indirectly involved in fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by supporting Mujahideen groups. Since 1985 in Siachen and 1990 in
Kashmir, India and Pakistan have been involved in a proxy war.
2. Alon Pinkes, “Peace with Jordan,” The Jerusalem Post 3 September 1994. Also see Michal Yudelman and David Makovsky, “A
Project of Peace,” The Jerusalem Post 25 September 1993.
3. As specified in the 400–page document, Israeli troops withdrew from the main Palestinian population centers two weeks after the
signing of the accord. The total withdrawal period was stated to take six months. Israeli troops are expected to withdraw entirely from
populated areas; in rural areas, Israelis and Palestinians will share authority. Israel will retain total control of Jewish settlements, military
bases, and unpopulated areas. Furthermore some Israeli forces will remain in the center of Hebron to protect the 450 Israeli settlers, but
the Palestinian police will have overall responsibility for security. As a result the Palestinian authority will control 30 percent of the West
Bank’s territory, but will be in charge of an overwhelming majority of its Arab population. The PLO agreed to revoke within two years
articles of the Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. Israel also agreed to free all women, as well as men Palestinian
prisoners who were sick, young or elderly, or had completed two-thirds of their sentence. Elections under an international monitoring will
be held to choose an eighty-two member Palestinian Council from the West Bank and Gaza twenty-two days after the troops withdraw
from populated areas. See editorial, “The West Bank Peace Plan” The New York Times 26 September 1995. Also see news item, “Israel
and PLO Reach Accord to Transfer West Bank Areas,” The New York Times 25 September 1995. Among the front line states only Syria
and Lebanon have not signed peace treaties with Israel.
4. Theoretically speaking, the only positive step which India and Pakistan have taken so far to avoid war and settle their disputes
peacefully is the Simla agreement of July 1972. However, the Simla agreement has failed to end New Delhi–Islamabad conflict on the
Kashmir dispute.
5. The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Israeli extremist Yagil Amir on 4 November 1995 demonstrates the
risks involved in the Middle East peace process. See news item, “A Stunned Israel Mourns and Honors its Fallen Leader,” The New York
Times, 6 November 1995; editorial, “The Rabin Assassination,” The New York times, 6 November 1995; and Frank Rich, “Jew Against
Jew,” The New York Times, 8 November 1995.
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reconsidering the planned withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron—the last Palestinian city under occupation.6
At stake is the future of peace in the Middle East. The final statement, issued on 13 March 1996 on the occasion
of an international conference held in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt, condemned all acts of terror in all its abhorrent
forms, including terrorist attacks in Israel, and expressed full support for the Middle East peace process.7
Despite these threats and challenges, the accord signed by the PLO and Israel on 24 September 1995 has
provided an opportunity to further strengthen the peace process in the Middle East. At the same time, the
India–Pakistan standoff on the Kashmir dispute could, at the worst, lead to the outbreak of a fifth war in South
Asia and plunge the region into a state of persistent instability and disorder and even see the use of nuclear
weapons.
This paper has five sections. Section One will elaborate the objectives of this study and give a brief
overview of the idea of a peace process. In Section Two a detailed study of the Middle East peace process is set
forth as it may be of interest to the readers from South Asia and may help them understand the origins and
development of the Arab–Israeli peace process. Section Three discusses the India–Pakistan relationship and a
possible peace process between the two countries; this may be useful to those who are not familiar with South
Asia and the linkages between the two peace processes. Section Four compares the two peace processes and
Section Five contains concluding remarks and a series of policy recommendations.
The key question this study seeks to address is, what are the lessons for India and Pakistan to be drawn from
the Arab–Israeli peace process? Surprisingly, no study has compared the peace processes in these two regions.8
When Arabs and Israelis can agree to resolve their conflicts peacefully, can Indians and Pakistanis (particularly
the moderates in both societies) follow a non-violent and non-military path to the resolution of their disputes?
Because the results of the Middle East peace process are now apparent, this is the opportune time to analyze the
similarities and differences between the two cases. Doing so might provide some insight and guidance to those
who wish to bring about rapprochement between the two South Asian adversaries.
Today, South Asia is regarded as an area of intractable conflict. The question arises, what lessons are to be
gleaned from the Middle East experience? Specifically, do the origin, substance, and management of the Middle
East peace process—and perhaps similar processes elsewhere—have any relevance for India and Pakistan? Both
regions have a history of wars, abortive peace processes, and deep-rooted misperceptions entrenched in past
animosities; yet there is also hope for a tension and conflict-free environment. By comparing the two regions,
can one contribute to the emerging dialogue in South Asia? This study will also discuss the connection of the
Helsinki process in Europe to the peace processes in the Middle East and South Asia.9 The study will further
examine the likely receptivity of Indians and Pakistanis toward an Arab–Israeli peace process and both their
critical and positive feelings regarding the possibility of a comparable process in South Asia.
Additionally, the study intends to shed light on the methodology of CM and conflict resolution (CR), the
role of CBMs, and the roles of external players for mediation of the arms race and of media and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in peace-building efforts as well as the domestic political obstacles to a peace process.
To summarize, the following questions will be addressed:
• In the Middle East, what traumatic events energized the peace process between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, and what developments may lead to rapprochement between India and Pakistan?
• What role was played by key individuals uch as Sadat, Begin, Arafat and Rabin in the Middle East peace
process and what is the likelihood of personalities playing a similar role in South Asia?
                                                
6. Ori Nir, “Don’t Corner Arafat” The New York Times, 1 March 1996. According to Ori Nir, Arafat has always maintained his power
by driving a wedge between his rivals. To that end, he is trying to co-opt Hamas’ political faction, to tame it into a loyal opposition. At the
same time he has arrested some Hamas military leaders on charges of terrorism.
7. See Reuters, 13 March 1996; Ori Nir, ibid.
8. A comparative study of détente between Israel and Egypt, the United States and China, and East and West Germany was made by
the United States Institute of Peace. For further information see Tony Armstrong, Breaking The Ice (Washington DC: The U.S. Institute
of Peace, 1993).
9. Moonis Ahmar, The Applicability of Helsinki Model in the South Asian Security Framework (Ph.D. thesis, University of Karachi,
1990), p. 500.
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• Is the emerging leadership in India and Pakistan as receptive to the ideas of peace-building and CR as their
counterparts in the Middle East? How far does the domestic opposition to peace processes in the two
regions affect the task of peace-building?
• How would the methodology and expertise used in the Middle East peace process (e. g., shuttle diplomacy
or secret talks) be useful if applied in the India–Pakistan context?
• Do governmental and non-governmental actors in India and Pakistan see prospects for a Middle Eastern-like
peace settlement and to what extent does public opinion play a role in this regard?
• How successful were CBMs in the Arab–Israeli case? Why have they not been successful in India and
Pakistan?
• Did the nuclear factor reate problems or opportunities in the Middle East peace process and will it shape a
similar peace process in South Asia?
• How have post-Cold War developments, especially the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, affected the peace processes in the Middle East and
in the India–Pakistan subcontinent?
What is a Peace Process?
A peace process is a mechanism or a set of negotiations where the parties involved attempt to avoid war or a
war-like situation and wish to settle conflicts peacefully by using techniques such as diplomacy, bargaining,
secret negotiations, tradeoffs, and mediation. Peace is considered as an end in itself and such techniques are used
to achieve that end. A peace process is an exercise where groups or countries with conflicting interests seek to
avoid further confrontation through negotiations.
Conflicts threatening regional or international peace and security require their peaceful management and
resolution. However, in order to launch a viable peace process it is essential that the parties involved should
have substantial political will and determination and should be above suspicion to manage disputes through
dialogue. Hence a peace process should largely be indigenous in nature with possible external assistance if
desired by the parties concerned.
There are three important elements of a peace process: people, governments, and the international
community. Sometimes people may influence the course of events and force the governments and the
international community to launch a peace process. This may happen with the mobilization of people under
peace groups or the worsening of domestic condition. Many times, governments can change things and
contribute to the peace process. The international community (primarily powerful states) also has a power to
influence things in a peace process provided it has an interest in that particular situation. For a successful peace
process it is essential that at least people and governments should have a strong yearning for peace. Support
from the international community is considered a plus point for any peace process. Since the attitude of the
governments of India and Pakistan is not supportive for a peace process, the international community cannot do
much. If people of the two countries assert their position for the peaceful resolution of disputes then in that
situation the international community can play its role and compel the governments in New Delhi and
Islamabad to launch the peace process.
The resolution of a conflict is somewhat an ideal goal in a peace process. While the participants in the
process may have an idealized vision of a quick road to peace in reality they need to aspire to a step by step
management of the conflict. The impracticality of CR is noticeable in several peace processes, like those in
Cambodia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, South Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan where conflicts have not been
promptly resolved but have simply been managed to prevent further escalation.
Perceptions for peace and war are changing in the post-Cold War era. One can witness the outbreak of new
conflicts as well as the management and resolution of old ones.
A peace process needs to send a clear message to the world that its participants have serious intentions to
resolve their conflicts. They must also show that they realize the risks of derailing the peace process through the
politics of confrontation and understand the benefits if they move in the direction of peace-building. A peace
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process is sometimes launched as a result of extraordinary internal or external factors as was the case with the
initiation of the Madrid peace process between Arabs and Israelis following the Gulf War and the end of the Cold
War. In rare cases a peace process may be launched in the absence of compelling circumstances, like those
between China and Vietnam and Malaysia and Indonesia. In these two cases, the parties did not have much to
lose by maintaining the non-reconciliatory status quo, but the leadership followed the path of reconciliation.
There are several examples of peace processes: Korea, 1951 to 1954; Indochina, 1969 to 1973; Cambodia,
1986 to 1992; South Africa, 1990 to 1994; Afghanistan, 1982 to 1988, during the Soviet military occupation;
the Middle East between Egypt and Israel from 1977 to 1979, the PLO and Israel from 1991 to date, Israel and
Jordan from 1991 to 1994, and Israel–Syria from 1991 to date; Northern Ireland, since 1994;
Bosnia–Herzegovina, 1992 to date; and South Asia between India and Pakistan since 1972—the signing of the
Simla accord—to date, with numerous ups and downs along the way. In all these cases, strong internal and
external conditions compelled the participants to show substantial political will to initiate dialogue and reach an
agreement. When either party was reluctant to go for talks—as in the case of the white minority regime of
South Africa; Serb, Muslim, and Croat warring factions in Bosnia; or Israel and its Arab neighbors, including
Palestinians—substantial external and domestic pressure was exerted to abandon rigid positions.
Many times during the course of talks the peace process threatens to break down when participants are
unwilling to end the stalemate. Therefore, it is essential that there should be strong external interest and a
sufficient local desire—as has been the case with the Arab–Israeli but not the India–Pak conflicts—to sustain a
peace process. A peace process may be divided into various levels: for example, the return of Sinai was a major
peace process between Egypt and Israel followed by other peace processes like the normalization of bilateral
relations and the signing of a peace treaty. The limited autonomy granted to the Palestinians living in the West
Bank and Gaza is a major peace process between Israel and the PLO followed by other peace processes such as
the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza, the status of Jerusalem, and so forth. In case of
India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute could be called the core of peace process between the two countries
followed by other peace processes in Siachen, the nuclear issue, and Wuller Barrage. For the smooth sailing of a
peace process it is essential that the parties involved should keep a balance among different levels of the process.
Sometimes, the parties involved in a peace process decide to freeze the core issue and focus on less intractable
problems. This is true in the case of the PLO and Israel. For the PLO, the core of the Arab–Israeli conflict has
been the Israeli occupation of the whole of Palestine. But the PLO realized that it cannot seek the destruction of
Israel and form an independent Palestinian state at the same time. Therefore, it changed its position on the core
issue and agreed to recognize Israel and accept the autonomy formula for the West Bank and Gaza. With a change
in the PLO position, an important obstacle in the Arab–Israeli peace process was removed and both the PLO and
Israel agreed to launch the peace process at different levels ranging from mutual recognition of each other and
limited autonomy to the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to a time-framework for the final settlement of
Jerusalem. In the case of India and Pakistan, the peace process has gotten stuck over the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan consider talks on Kashmir as one important level of the peace process. India is not ready to give so
much importance to the Kashmir dispute and suggests talks on other issues namely economic cooperation,
Siachen, and so forth. Examples of various peace processes prove the fact that a hard and rigid stand adopted by
either party involved in the peace process may block any effort for a breakthrough. This has been true in case of
the Afghan peace process, 1980 to 1988; the South African peace process, 1990 to 1994; and the peace process
in the former Yugoslavia, 1991 to date.
Perceptions of personalities involved in a peace process also play a key role for the success or a failure of
any initiative. Sometimes, personalities involved in a peace process start negotiations with deep-rooted
suspicions but eventually develop an objective and less parochial approach to the management of the conflict.
This happened in the case of Sadat and Begin, Arafat and Rabin, and Mandela and De Klerk; all had strong views
on substantive issues but as a result of a process they adopted a moderate position.
Defining the concept of a peace process, Harold Saunders, a U.S. expert on Middle Eastern affairs and the
architect of such a process in the Middle East says that
the peace process is more than conventional diplomacy and negotiation. It encompasses a full range of
political, psychological, economic, diplomatic, and military actions woven together into a comprehensive
effort to establish peace between Israel and its neighbors. Progress toward peace depends on breaking down
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the barriers to negotiation and reconciliation—the other walls. If we ignore the politics of breaking down
these barriers, the mediator and negotiator may never have a chance.10
. . . the phrase “peace process” probably has no definition in the literature of political science or
international relations. We (Americans) coined it in 1974–75 using it perhaps imprecisely at first because we
needed a short-hand expression. Kissinger’s shuttles and the mediated agreements held the headlines and
public attention, but the negotiations were not all that was happening during those trips.”11 He rightly
identified one major impediment to the peace process when he says that “the other walls that block the way
for peace are often barriers in human perception and feeling that are all too infrequently addressed by the
diplomatic option papers.12
The Middle East Peace Process
The Middle East peace process is as old as the emergence of Arab–Israeli conflicts. The Arab rejection of the UN
partition plan of 1947 and the subsequent Arab–Israeli wars augmented the need to launch a peace process in the
Middle East. Israel’s drive to gain legitimacy and the Arab ambition to destroy Israel thwarted any hope for peace
in the region. The defeat of Arab states in the 1967 war with Israel gave the PLO an opportunity to increase its
terrorist attacks against Jewish interests. The 1973 war proved the inability of Egypt and Syria to get back their
territories. As a result, the Middle East peace process took a new turn and divided the Arab Camp. Egypt’s solo
flight in 1977 and subsequent events proving the marginalization of the PLO changed the complexion of the
Middle East peace process. The old camp composed of Iraq, Syria, and Libya maintained a rejectionist stand vis-
à-vis Israel whereas the new camp consisting of Egypt, the PLO, and Jordan favored peace with Israel.
Currently, the Middle East peace process is divided into a bilateral and multilateral track. The bilateral track
includes negotiations between Israel and Jordan, Israel and the PLO, and Israel and Syria, whereas the
multilateral track includes negotiations concerning environment, water, security and economy.
The Arab–Israeli Conflicts
The core of the Arab–Israeli conflict is the Palestinian problem and the feeling of mistrust held by Arabs and the
Israelis against each other. Historically, the course of confrontational politics in the Middle East was shaped by
the following events:
• the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration in 1917;
• the demise of the Ottoman empire in the aftermath of World War I;
• the granting of Palestine as a mandate by the League of Nations to Britain;
• the influx of Jews into Palestine in the post-World War I period;
• the massacre of millions of Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II;
• the UN partition plan of 1947;
• violence in Palestine between local Palestinians and Jewish settlers;
• the creation of Israel and its rejection by the Arabs;
• the intensification of the Palestinian refugee problem;
• the outbreak of the first Arab–Israeli War in 1948; and
                                                
10. William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy And The Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 3. Also see, Harold H. Saunders, The Oth r Walls: The Arab–Israeli Peace Process In a Global
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• the outbreak of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War resulting in the Israeli occupation of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and
the West Bank including the city of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
Non-acceptance of Israel in the Arab world and the Israeli drive to gain maximum security at the expense of
the local Palestinian inhabitants and its Arab neighbors created walls of suspicion and hatred. The Arab–Israeli
conflict was then defined in terms of psychological barriers loaded with feelings of insecurity and mistrust. As
compared with the period from 1950 through the 1980s, in the 1990s the hostile attitudes and perceptions of
Israelis and Arabs about each other have changed, but not significantly. Deep down there still exist feelings of
insecurity, rejection, and paranoia. But the urge for peace has gained ground between Arabs and Israelis because
of the heavy price of confrontation and the benefits of cooperation. Over the years the Arab–Israeli conflict has
broadened to two levels: conflict on the state level and a second conflict at the level of people. Harold Saunders
describes the nature of conflict between Arabs and Israelis as follows:
The Arab–Israeli conflict has pitted two peoples—Jews and Palestinian Arabs—against each other within the
larger conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab states. Over the years, perceptions of the strife have
changed. Neither the people-to-people conflict nor the state-to-state conflict can be ignored. I underscore the
human center of the conflict because the most deeply rooted barriers to peace lie there. States will not resolve
their conflict until the two peoples with claims to the same land resolve theirs. The Arab states cannot accept
Israel until the Israeli–Palestinian dimension of the conflict has been justly and compassionately addressed.
The conflict that had lasted for more than two decades between two peoples, Jews and Palestinian
Arabs—between two national movements—became the Arab–Israeli state-to-state conflict.13
According to Saunders, because the Jewish experience has included rejection and traumatic persecution, the
yearning for acceptance is especially strong in Israel. The Israeli attitude also reflects war weariness and isolation
and the growing view that long-term security will depend on developing reciprocal political relations with their
neighbors. The Israeli people search every Arab statement and move for implied acceptance or rejection of the
Jewish state.14 In some ways, the search for an Arab–Israeli–Palestinian peace is part of the Jews’ own struggle
for peace within themselves. In Israeli eyes, the overriding problem is to secure the future of Israel and the
Jewish people.15 Practically speaking, they judge that Israel cannot incorporate the 1.3 million Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza together with the 0.7 million in pre-1967 Israel without diluting the Jewish character of
Israel. If Israel incorporates that Arab population, Arabs will constitute a minority of almost forty percent. If
they are given the right to vote, they will eventually turn Israel into a secular, bi-national state. If they are not
given the right to vote, they will be repressed or expelled by methods that will violate Judaic values.16
Tracing the sense of insecurity prevailing among Israelis and their expectations of their Arab neighbors,
Saunders is of the opinion that people who want to approach Israel must make it plain that (1) they recognize
the unique suffering of the Jewish people, particularly in the Nazi Holocaust; (2) they accept Israel as a state in
the Middle East with the right to engage in pursuits and relationships with neighbors that are normal to states at
peace; (3) Israel’s security can be assured in those relationships; and (4) they are prepared to negotiate peace on a
reciprocal basis. This position must be communicated convincingly to the Israeli body politic.17
It seemed accurate to suggest in mid-1985 that perhaps three-quarters of the Palestinians—or at least a
significant number of those living in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, pre-1967 Israel, the PLO headquarters in
Tunis, and elsewhere—were moving toward a more pragmatic position. They seemed ready to take the first step
toward peace with Israel, but difficult issues still constrained their leaders. One division of the movement
reflected the amount of face-to-face experience different Palestinians had with Israelis: with their military
government, their soldiers, their economy, their settlers, and even with their lawyers, their university
community, a few of their journalists, and some private individuals seeking peace. They also had a more
pragmatic sense of their real choices in negotiating an end to Israeli military occupation.18 The fundamental
                                                
13. Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls, pp. 7–8.
14. Ibid., p. 39.
15. Ibid., p. 40.
16. Ibid., pp. 41–42.
17. Ibid., p. 51.
18. Ibid., p. 54.
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position since 1947 among Palestinians (among other Arabs) rejected the partition of Palestine and the
establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine. After the 1967 War, Palestinians began to move toward
acceptance of partition and toward recognition of Israel’s existence in part of Palestine (that is pre-1967 Israel)
on the condition that the Palestinians could have a state of their own in the other part of Palestine, that is the
West Bank and Gaza.19
It was in the context of conflict at popular and state levels that problems of peace-making in the Middle
East were discussed by the experts on Arab–Israeli conflict. Once Israel felt relatively secure in the post-1967
period and the Arab states, along with PLO, realized serious flaws in their approach vis-à-vis Israel, the
obstacles to the peace process in the Middle East were identified and gradually removed. Hectic diplomatic efforts
by the United States for mediation in the post-1973 period led to a breakthrough in rigid official positions
adopted by Israel and some Arab countries. But it took several years to narrow the level of misperception and
mistrust between Israelis and Arabs at the official level and to gain enough support, both in Israel and in the
Arab world, to launch a peace process. The 1973 Arab–Israeli War facilitated the Middle East peace process but
the opportunity to reach a comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis was reached because of intransigent
positions adopted by the parties concerned. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Camp David accord
in 1978 would break ice between Israel and the PLO, Israel and Jordan, and Israel and Syria. Even now,
especially in the light of terrorist bombings in Israel in February and March 1996, peace between the PLO and
Israel is fragile and exposed to serious challenges. This is also true for the future peace prospects between Israel
and Syria.
The Palestinian Viewpoint. The PLO’s viewpoint on the Middle East peace process is in contrast with other
Palestinian groups. PLO and Hamas represent two different schools of thought among Palestinians: the former
believes in a pragmatic approach to deal with Israel and the latter adheres to the principle of resistance with Israel
unless an independent Palestinian state is created and the state of Israel is liquidated. According to Palestinian
Rajni Sourani, Director of the Gaza Center for Rights and Law:
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been a history of war, suffering, gross violations of human rights, and
grave breaches of humanitarian and international law. It has also been a history of attempt after attempt at
resolution and peaceful settlement. These range from the very first Peel Commission Report in 1937 to the
UN Partition Plan and UN Security Council Resolution No. 181 (1947), UN Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338
(1973), to the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt (1978), and finally to the present
settlement.20
. . . these agreements entirely reflect the political imbalance between the two parties. All Israeli interests
have been guaranteed (and I include Israeli security), including the settlements, and the use of natural
resources. Palestinian rights, such as the inalienable right to self-determination and economic independence,
have been completely ignored or postponed. While those Palestinian rights remain in doubt, Israeli
violations of international law continue unchecked, changing the geographical and demographic landscape.
Settlements continue to be built, particularly in Jerusalem, and natural resources are being exploited. One can
anticipate that as the landscape changes over the next five years, within the context of ensuring Israeli
interests the task of asserting Palestinian rights will become much more difficult.21
Expressing the feelings of a majority of Palestinians about the PLO–Israeli accord, Rajni Sourani further
says that
in the political context of the aftermath of the Gulf War and the Intifada, the Madrid conference commenced in
March 1991, working around the framework of UN Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Because of the
apparent imbalance in power among the negotiating parties, the Palestinians within the Occupied Territories
became divided, not because of their indifference to peace in principle, but because some of them believed
that the settlement would lead to an unjust and unfair solution of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. However,
There can be no doubt that these agreements (Oslo and Cairo) have transformed the political climate in the
Middle East. The history of Gaza entered a new phase on May 18, 1994, at about 2:00 am, as the last Israeli
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troops left military headquarters in the center of Gaza City. What has followed has been an interesting
example of the inter-relationship between the human rights of the individual, and national human rights.22
The views of Rajni Sourani are balanced and are neither supportive of the official PLO line nor close to
Hamas, a radical Palestinian organization that rejects peace with Israel unless a Palestinian state is created. Rajni
Sourani has only expressed the feelings of mistrust and unhappiness present among some sections of the
Palestinian community about the peace process and that the future of PLO–Israeli relations also depends on the
removal of such feelings. The same is true in the case of opposition to the peace process expressed in Israel.
Sourani’s views represent a large popular Arab–Palestinian school of thought that sees Israeli and Arab
rapprochement as an outcome of momentous events such as the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars, the Camp
David accord, the Israeli attack over Lebanon, the declining power of PLO, the Iran–Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and the outbreak of the Gulf War, the Soviet disintegration, the Madrid peace conference, the secret
Oslo talks, and the signing of the PLO–Israeli accord. Such a school of thought also believes that U.S.
involvement influenced the course of peace process in the Middle East to the advantage of Israel and to the
disadvantage of the Palestinians, and that the same U.S. pressure can make Israel understand the need for a just
peace in the Middle East based on the creation of an independent and secular Palestinian state. While Israel,
Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO are not in a state of war any more, there are people in all these countries who are
unhappy with the peace process. Hamas and some other Palestinian groups view the PLO–Israeli autonomy deal
as a betrayal to the cause of Palestine. In Israel, hard-line groups like the opposition Likud party consider peace
with the PLO contrary to the interests of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and a threat to Israeli security. In its
essence, the Arab–Israeli peace process is hostage to the pressures from the extremist elements of the two sides,
and the protagonists of the Arab–Israeli peace process need to remove the major obstacles in this regard. They
have already claimed the lives of two architects of peace, Sadat and Rabin, and have threatened to hit more
targets if the peace process is not reversed.
The Israeli Perception. Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination has exposed a sharp division in Israeli society on the
matters of war and peace with the Palestinians. After a series of Hamas launched terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem that killed fifty-eight people in February and March 1996, hard-line Jewish groups, compelled to keep
a low profile after Rabin’s assassination, have again assumed an assertive role . They are demanding restoration
of Israeli authority over the West Bank and Gaza and a firm policy to provide security to the Jewish people
against a growing terrorist menace in Israel. For its part Arafat’s Palestinian Authority has arrested 350 Islamic
suspects, including four of the thirteen men on Israel’s most wanted list. Its security forces have conducted
house-to-house searches in Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Gaza, where they raided Hamas’ bastion, Islamic
University.23
In Israel there are both pro-Palestinian and anti-Palestinian feelings. While the former has argued to award
fair treatment to Palestinians living under Israeli occupation the latter resents the way recent Israeli governments
have dealt with the Palestinian demand for independence or autonomy. Israeli hard-liners not only reject limited
self-rule for the Palestinians of Gaza and some West Bank towns, but they also want to expel all Palestinians
from Israel and replace them with Jewish settlers. On the settlement issue, the Rabin government was under
immense extremist pressure not to accept the PLO’s demand for independent status. Israeli perceptions on the
Palestinian issue are mostly determined by past Arab–Israeli relations, the Israeli sense of insecurity vis-à-vis
their Arab neighbors, and their total rejection of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in East
Jerusalem. On this last issue no Israeli, moderate or extremist, is so far willing to compromise. The opposition
Likud party is especially firm in denying Palestinians a sovereign status and is against returning the Golan
Heights to Syria.
On the question of a Palestinian homeland, a section of Israeli people still hold the view that the homeland
is neither the West Bank nor Gaza but Jordan. Any Palestinian state should be formed in Jordan and not in the
Israeli-controlled Arab areas. Even the limited self-rule granted by Israel to the Palestinians for Gaza and the
West Bank is viewed with suspicion by many Israelis.
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Joseph Alpher, Director of the Israel–Middle East Office of the American Jewish Committee in Jerusalem,
explains the moderate Israeli position on the Palestinian problem by saying that their “position derives largely
from a healthy respect for Israel’s deterrent capabilities: most of the Arab states and the PLO have concluded that
it would be counterproductive to pursue a war option even to maintain the status quo.”24 On the questi n of
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan heights, Israelis are unwilling to agree unless solid security guarantees are
given by Syria. Furthermore, there exists a substantial gap in Israeli–Palestinian perceptions on vital issues
such as the future status of the so-called autonomous areas of the West Bank and Gaza, Jewish settlements,
security matters for Israel emanating from the autonomy accord with the PLO, sharing of water resources, and
trade relations. On the question of settlements, the Israeli position is clear: if the Muslim Arabs and Palestinians
can live in Israel as Israeli citizens, why cannot Jews live in Gaza and the West Bank? Theoretically, the PLO is
committed to establishing a secular political order in its controlled areas. What has happened now is the rise of
Islamic Palestinian militant groups, primarily Hamas, with hostility vis-à-vis Jewish settlers. But as a result of
a landslide victory for the PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat in elections held to select members of Palestinian
authority in the West Bank and Gaza on 20 January 1996, it will be easier for the PLO to deal effectively with
militant elements.25 Yasir Arafat got 88 percent of the vote in the presidential contest. His Fatah Party has
sixty-six members of the new eighty-eight member Palestinian Council.26 Arafat is now an elected Palestinian
leader and has a legitimate position. This development may further boost the Middle East peace process.
The change in Israeli and Palestinian perceptions for peace and cooperation is mostly limited to the official
level, whereas popular images about each other are primarily based on bitter experiences and stereotypes. Tables
1 through 3 cover the different aspects of Arab–Israeli relations, particularly the Palestinian–Israeli perceptions
on the peace process.
There are two important points that need to be discussed in the light of the following tables. First, after
years of mutual bitterness and hostility, many Arabs and Israelis have realized the futility of sticking to rigid
positions. The stakes for maintaining the status quo were too high. Pragmatism demanded that for a secure
future both Arabs and Israelis should abandon their intransigent positions and follow a balanced approach in their
relations. This led them to pay the price for reconciliation. If suspension of the “Intifada,” recognition of Israel,
and abrogation of the anti-Israeli clauses from its charter were the price the PLO agreed to pay, Israel also paid a
TABLE 1 Issues in Israeli–Palestinian Relations
Issues Israelis Palestinians
Mutual threat perception On decline Still prevailing
Enemy image (at the official level) On decline On decline but suspicions prevail
Enemy image (at the popular level) Exists Exists
Sense of insecurity Prevailing to a large extent Prevailing to a large extent
Unequal relationship Intact Critical
Role of leadership (official) Reasonable Reasonable
Role of militants On rise On rise
Influence of foreign actors for peace Acceptable Acceptable
Support for dialogue Linked with checks on terrorismIn existence
Need for peaceful coexistence Acceptable with conditions Acceptable with conditions
Building of trust and confidence Marginal Marginal
Demand for an independent Palestinian stateOpposed but changing Supportive
Demand for an autonomous status for Gaza and
the West Bank
Acceptable with conditions Acceptable as a last option
Perceptions on peace process Less optimistic Not very optimistic
Role of media Not very responsible Not very responsible
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TABLE 2 Issues in the Arab–Israeli Peace Process
Issues Israeli Perception Arab Perception
Land for peace concept Relative consensus Consensus
Confidence-Building Measures Consensus Consensus
Accepting U.S.-Third party mediation Consensus Consensus
Autonomy for the Palestinians of Gaza and the West BankRelative Consensus Relative Consensus
An independent Palestinian state Negative Positive
Signing of Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Not supportive Consensus
Return of Golan heights to Syria Relative consensus Consensus
Return of East Jerusalem to Palestinians Not supportive Consensus
Maintenance of territorial status quo Consensus Partial consensus
Influence of hard-liners Increasing Increasing
The issue of terrorism In agreement Disagreement
Refugee problem Applicable Applicable
Role of media Reasonable Reasonable
Role of third generation for peace Less positive Less positive
Domestic pressure for peace Significant Significant
Perceptions of official elite for peace Positive Positive
Perceptions of unofficial elite for peace Less positive Less positive
similar price by recognizing the PLO, which was hated in Israel as a terrorist organization and still disliked by
the hard-liners in that country; granting autonomy to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza; and by
offering Syria a pullout from the Golan Heights. It is up to historians to decide whether the Arab–Jewish
reconciliation is unjust or the result of compelling circumstances. Second, despite the Arab–Israeli peace
process, a drastic change has not occurred in their perceptions of each other. Both continue to express mistrust
and suspicion, and both look for “conspiracy theories” to discredit each other’s positions. Realistically speaking,
this type of a situation is not unpredictable. The shift from an adversarial to a cordial relationship is always a
difficult process. In the case of Arabs and Israelis, it is not possible for them to embrace each other and forget
the bitterness of the past. What is possible is for them to evolve a relationship based on pragmatism. Arabs and
Israelis cannot destroy each other. They tried in the past but failed. The lesson they have learned is that of
coexistence and modification in the “enemy image.”
TABLE 3 Israeli–Palestinian Perceptions on the Peace Process
Issues Israelis Palestinians
A sense of defeat among Palestinians Exploited Accepted as a reality by moderates
The role of Intifada A source of embarrassment Exploited
The U.S. pressure Significant Reasonable
Impact of Gulf War and Soviet disintegrationAdvantageous Disadvantageous
Feeling of mutual acceptance Reasonable Reasonable
Role of moderate groups Becoming weak Becoming weak
Economic factor Significant Significant
Question of settlements Supportive Opposed
Acceptability of each other Reasonable (at the official level)R asonable (at the official level)
Support for a pragmatic approach Reasonable (at the official level)R asonable (at the official level)
Mutual stakes in the peace process High High
Following a pragmatic approach Supportive (at the official level)Supportive (at the official level)
Desire for a secure future Significant Significant
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The notion of an “enemy image” between Israelis and Palestinians is different when it comes to popular and
official feelings. While Israel has been interested mainly in seeking legitimacy from Arabs and Palestinians, it
belatedly realized that it cannot achieve that objective without agreeing to alter the status quo. Arabs and
Palestinians think they cannot get back their territories from Israel unless they are pragmatic by granting
recognition to the Jewish state. The compromise formula was to grant mutual acceptance and respect so as to
end the state of war between Israel and Egypt, Israel and the PLO, and Israel and Jordan. It is still difficult to
foresee the replacement of decades old hostility with the feelings of cordiality. But, as far as the stakes for Arabs
and Israelis in sustaining the peace process are concerned, these are sufficient to prevent any major negative
change, at least in the short run. The conference held to discuss anti-terrorist measures in Sharm-el-Sheik in
March 1996 tried to reassure the sustenance of the Middle East peace process.
The Middle East peace process could achieve more credibility if the gap in perceptions between elites and
masses on critical issues of that process were narrowed. An important lesson of the Arab–Israeli peace process is
that while the powerful institutions in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the PLO (like the military, the bureaucracy,
and the ruling political elites) have extended their support to the peace process, such support may be in jeopardy
in the future if strong popular feelings remain in contradiction with official positions.
The Middle East Peace Process: Ideal and Reality
In the Middle East, the mechanisms for the peace process included, among other elements, the cessation of
hostile propaganda, establishment of communication links between the military and political leaders of Israel
and the front-line Arab countries and the PLO, external mediation, secret negotiations, and the adoption of
various CBMs to create a positive environment for a dialogue. In reality, however, the problem existed in deep-
rooted mistrust and suspicion between Israelis and Arabs. As long as misperceptions were not reduced and
psychological feelings of insecurity remained intact, the gap between ideal and reality in the Middle East peace
process prevented any major breakthrough in the area of peace-making.
The 1973 Arab–Israeli War is considered as a landmark because it proved two things. First, Israel was not
invincible in terms of its defense and security and second, despite breaking the myth of Israel’s invincibility,
Egypt realized that it could not get back its territories by force, and that it would have to seriously negotiate
with Tel Aviv for return of the Sinai. Anwar Sadat’s desire for peace with Israel also matched with the U.S.
objective to act as a mediator between the two countries and to strike a deal that could neutralize Cairo as a
threat to Israel’s security. The “land for peace” model was considered appropriate in the case of Egypt and Israel.
It served as a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process and received widespread support from U.S. policy
makers, in the Middle Eastern Arab countries, and later on in Israel.
The Middle East peace process was defined by William B. Quandt, a U.S. scholar on Middle Eastern affairs:
Sometime in the mid-1970s the term peace process began to be widely used to describe the U.S.-led efforts to
bring about a negotiated peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The phrase stuck, and ever since it has
been synonymous with the gradual, step-by-step approach to resolving one of the world’s most difficult
conflicts. In the years since 1967 the emphasis in Washington has shifted from the spelling out of the
ingredients of “peace” to the “process” of getting there. Much of U.S. constitutional theory focuses on how
issues should be resolved—the process, rather than on substance—what should be done.27
There was no short cut to peace between Israel and the Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel and its Arab
neighbors on the other. For years the peace process remained stagnant and pessimism prevailed in the Arab
world and in Israel. Even now, despite the signing of treaties and agreements between Israel and Egypt, Israel and
the PLO, and Israel and Jordan (a peace treaty between Israel and Syria is also possible), the process faces
challenges. However, what is remarkable is the commitment to peace made by nearly all the governments
(Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and PLO) of the region. Such a commitment may be the result of U.S. pressure or
realistic assumptions of the situation by the Arabs and the Israelis. Yet the resolution to achieve relative peace,
despite historical and psychological feelings of insecurity, is a major asset of the Middle East peace process.
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As mentioned earlier, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War was a watershed in the Arab–Israeli relations,28 but Quand
is of the opinion that
the stage was set for the contemporary Arab–Israeli peace process by the 1967 Six–Day War. Until then, the
conflict between Israel and the Arabs had seemed almost frozen, moving neither toward resolution nor toward
war. The ostensible issues in dispute were those left unresolved by the armistice agreements of 1949. Then it
had been widely expected that those agreements would simply be a step toward final peace talks. But the
issues in dispute were too complex for the numerous mediation efforts of the early 1950s, and by the mid-
1950s the Cold War rivalry between Moscow and Washington had left the Arab–Israeli conflict suspended
somewhere between war and peace. For better or worse, the armistice agreements had provided a semblance of
stability from 1949 to 1967.29
Nevertheless, the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli Wars were considered as crucial for peace in the Middle East. More
so the substantive and procedural elements of the peace process were laid out and tested in the years between the
1967 and 1973 Wars. The 1973 War set the stage for the launching of the peace process of the mid-1970s. The
war ended with passage of Resolution 338 in the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, the peace process of the
1970s was influenced by the experience of the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli Wars. Table 4 describes the
similarities and gaps in ideal and actual in the Middle East peace process.
TABLE 4 Ideal and Reality in the Middle East Peace Process
Israel Arab Countries
Third Party Mediation for the Settlement of Conflicts
Ideal In agreement In agreement
Reality Supportive Supportive
An Independent Palestinian State
Ideal Disagreement Agreement
Reality Hostile Supportive
Implementation of PLO–Israeli Accord
Ideal In agreement In agreement
Reality Less supportive Supportive
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Regional Disarmament
Ideal In agreement In agreement
Reality Less supportive Supportive
Confidence-Building Measures at Various Levels
Ideal In agreement In agreement
Reality Supportive Supportive
Land for Peace Concept
Ideal Disagreement Agreement
Reality Less supportive Supportive
Return of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians
Ideal Disagreement Agreement
Reality Hostile Supportive
Secret Diplomacy
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Less disagreement Less disagreement
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Notwithstanding the launching of the Arab–Israeli peace process, there still exists a wide gap between the ideal
eventual lasting peace and the practical results achieved so far. The ideal and reality of the peace process in the
Middle East has three important features. First, the identification of major issues in the Arab–Israeli conflicts by
the parties concerned but difficulties that occurred in implementing the understanding reached for the solution of
these problems. Second, the question of political will needed to be exercised by Egypt, Israel, the PLO, and
Jordan to settle their conflicts through negotiations. However, when it came to practice they provided several
excuses to prolong the implementation of agreements (for example the Camp David accord and PLO–Israeli
autonomy accord). Third, the removal of obstacles to negotiations by these parties through secret talks but their
failure to take people into confidence. In the cases of the Golan Heights and Jewish settlements in the West
Bank, anything negotiated secretly lacks credibility because it has little popular support. Therefore, ideal and
reality in the Arab–Israeli peace process have an important element of national interests of the countries
involved. Even if the governments express theoretical adherence to the management and resolution of conflicts,
in practical terms the existence of popular support to that effect is marginal.
The gap between the ideal of a peaceful negotiated settlement and the bitter reality of a divided region was
bridged to some extent because of the keen interest taken by Washington, and the role of moderate elements in
the Arab world and in Israel. The U.S. involvement made it possible for Israel and its Arab neighbors to enter
and sustain the peace process. Once the stage was set for making a deal based on tradeoffs, the practical side of
the Middle East peace process began to produce positive results. According to Harold Saunders:
in the peace efforts since 1967, the peacemakers have moved back and forth between two general approaches.
Neither one is inherently better; each may be appropriate at different stages of the peace process. But it is
useful to look at each for the opportunities it may offer. One approach is to seek agreement first through
mediation or negotiation on the principles that will govern a settlement and then to work out the detailed
arrangements for implementing the basic agreement. Resolution 242 itself is a negotiated statement of the
broad principles of a settlement. The advantages of this approach are that it can give detailed negotiations
credibility, and break the stalemate that prevents them from beginning. It would also remove the hidden
agendas from negotiation. The disadvantages are that political bodies are sometimes not able to make
decisions on large principles unless they know how these can be implemented and that principles
implemented without details spelled out are subject to multiple interpretations.30
The turning point in the Middle East peace process came in 1977 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
paid a dramatic visit to Israel and offered peace to the leaders of that country in return for the Arab territories
captured during the June 1967 Arab–Israeli War. Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem was like turning an ideal into
a reality. The five Arab–Israeli agreements signed between 1974 and 1979 culminating in that treaty were in
sharp contrast to the deadlock since 1949 and demonstrated that an Arab–Israeli settlement might be possible.
The prospect of another Arab–Israeli war diminished as Egypt and Israel made peace. While states that rejected
peace with Israel continued to speak with a loud voice, the moderate states (in contrast to their stance in the
early 1970s) seemed ready by the end of the decade to accept the existence of the Israeli state and to make peace
on conditions they regarded as just. The United States remained in the center as the mediator of the five
agreements signed while Europe and the Soviet Union, from their separate perspectives, waited for the U.S.
efforts to reach a stalemate.31
On 20 November 1977 when President Sadat spoke in Jerusalem before the Israeli Parliament and to a
watching world he presented a negotiating position which the Israelis did not want to hear—withdrawal to 1967
borders, a Palestinian state, and an Arab role in East Jerusalem. At the same time, he carried another, more basic
message to the people of Israel and delivered it to them face to face at the seat of their government: Egypt
accepts Israel and is ready to make peace with Israel. This second message the Israelis did hear—and wanted to
hear. Sadat’s visit became the act of statesman changing the political environment and was not mainly the act of
a negotiator.32 By going to Israel despite fearing retaliation from hard-line Arab states and threats to his own life
Sadat emerged as the first leader in the Arab–Israeli conflict who tried to transform an ideal into practice.
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Sadat set forth his own diagnosis of the obstacles to peace in the following words:
Yet there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of
suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action,
deed or decision. A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this
psychological barrier which I described in official statements as constituting 70 percent of the whole
problem. Today, through my visit to you, I ask why don’t we stretch out our hands with faith and sincerity so
that together we might destroy this barrier?33
In May 1985 in Washington, King Hussein of Jordan spoke of the same barriers using other words:
The Lebanese tragedy has caused both Israelis and Palestinians to reassess the validity of their previous
policies. Both are now considering, simultaneously, the need for a negotiated peace. Each is skeptical. The
Palestinians need hope. The Israelis need trust. It is important for all of us to provide hope and trust they
need. If we fail to do so, hope will surely turn to deeper despair and trust to invincible suspicion. The dangers
for all of us, including them, will be much worse than before.34
It took Arab and Israeli leaders several years to bridge the gap in their perceptions on the Middle East peace
process. Right from Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in the mid-1970s to Warren Christopher’s peace tours in
mid-1990s, the United States has maintained its active involvement in resolving Arab–Israeli conflicts. It is true
that contradictions in the Middle East peace process affected the credibility of the Israeli–Palestinian dialogue but
there is no short or long term threat of collapse of the peace process. Years of pessimism have been replaced
with optimism and the gap in ideal and reality in the Arab–Israeli peace process is not as wide any more.
The Role of Secret Diplomacy
Secret diplomacy in the Middle East peace process is based on the determination of the parties concerned not to
hold very high expectations from diplomatic initiatives and talks and to carry on with low-profile interaction.
The secret talks held in 1993 between Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams in Sarpsborg, 100 kilometers
from Oslo, are an important example in this regard. Apart from the United States, members of European
Community and Canada also had encouraged Israel and the PLO to initiate unpublicized talks. In an atmosphere
of pessimism that prevailed in the Middle East after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, secret diplomacy became an
important vehicle for bridging divergent perceptions between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
The U.S. role in secret diplomacy has been an important factor in the Middle East peace process. For
instance, the four agreements signed by Egypt and Israel after the 1973 War in January 1974, September 1975,
September 1978, and March 1979 were the outcome of weeks of personal discussion with Israeli and Egyptian
leaders by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, from 1974 to 1975, and President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, from 1977 to 1979. Publicly acknowledged tripartite meetings of senior U.S., Egyptian, and
Israeli officials occurred in January and July 1978 making a crucial contribution to the success of the Camp
David Conference in September 1978. Yet, starting in 1977, intensive indirect Egyptian–Israeli dialogue
through the United States was given a very important boost from periodic direct secret meetings between senior
Israeli and Egyptian officials. To Israel, these were more important in assessing Egyptian intentions than the
mediated messages from the United States.35
Secret diplomacy led to another breakthrough in the Middle East peace process when Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat paid a surprise historic visit to Israel in November 1977. Prior to Sadat’s visit to Israel, secret
talks between Egyptian and Israeli officials were held to pave the way for the formal holding of talks between
the two countries. The PLO–Israeli accord and the Jordanian–Israeli agreement were also the result of years of
secret negotiations in Morocco, Norway, and Sweden. Talks in Oslo and elsewhere paved the way for an
understanding for peace between Israel and the PLO. The importance of the Oslo Accord and the Cairo
Agreement lies in the fact that they have set the agenda of talks for the next five years. They set in motion a
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certain dynamic for peace—which undoubtedly led to a great sense of relief in the Occupied Palestine Territories,
hence the scenes of jubilation at the time particularly in Gaza. Yet it is a peace within narrow parameters and
strict limitations. The final outcome will, it seems, be largely determined by the forces that created the Oslo
Accord: that is, the international powers involved, Israeli political strength, and Palestinian political weakness.
It is therefore vital that other forces be incorporated in order to influence that outcome.36
Oslo Talks: The Unforeseen Peace Process
The impact of PLO–Israeli secret negotiations in Oslo was significant. But, for some analysts on Middle
Eastern affairs the Oslo back channel negotiations could be called as the unforeseen or forgettable peace process.
For a long period of time, Israel had imposed an official ban on its people having contacts with the PLO. Such
a ban was a major impediment in holding direct talks between the PLO and Israel. The ban was formally lifted
by the Israeli Knesset in November 1992.
The idea to hold secret back channel talks between the PLO and Israel was conceived by Terge Larsen, a
Norwegian sociologist and head of the Oslo-based Institute for Applied Social Sciences. Larsen met with Yossi
Beilin, then a member of the opposition Israeli Labor party in the midst of the 1992 Israeli elections. In their
meeting both Larsen and Yossi expressed their doubts as to whether progress could be achieved in the
Washington peace talks between the Israeli and Palestinian delegation from the West Bank and Gaza. Both agreed
that direct talks between Israel and the PLO were a prerequisite for peace. They also agreed to create a secret back
channel to circumvent the Israeli ban on contacts with the PLO by including Faisal Hussaini who, although not
formally a member of the PLO, was considered the organization’s leading representative in the occupied
territories.37 Jan Egeland, then Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway, led a delegation to Israel on 9 September
1992. In his meeting with Israeli leaders Egeland offered his country’s services for Israel and the PLO to hold
talks in Norway. Jan had a personal interest in helping the PLO and Israel hold direct negotiations; his doctoral
thesis had focused on Norway’s potential role as an intermediary in the resolution of bilateral disputes. The Oslo
talks were launched on 20 January 1993 and continued till July 1993. The core team of negotiators from the
Israeli side were Yair Hirschfeld, a senior lecturer on Middle East Affairs at Haifa University, and Ron Pundik,
an expert on Jordan at Hebrew University; and from the PLO side, Abu Alaa, an expert on coordinating talks
with Israel, and Maher al-Kurd, a member of PLO chairman Yasir Arafat’s office and longtime associate of Abu
Alaa. The draft of Declaration of Principles was prepared by Hirschfeld and Abu Alaa.38 To a large extent the
talks in Oslo were kept secret, and both the PLO and Israeli negotiating teams enjoyed the confidence of their
respective governments. In case of Israel, Prime Minister Rabin was not convinced of the utility of Oslo talks
but later on was persuaded by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to render his support in this regard. Although
Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst kept his American counterpart informed about the back channel
negotiations going on in his country, the U.S. response was also not that enthusiastic. In fact, the PLO–Israeli
accord was reached as a result of the Oslo peace process and not primarily by the U.S. diplomacy. The Oslo
model is very useful for understanding the role of back channel negotiations in the Middle East peace process.
The credence given to the secret talks in the Middle East peace process is understandable. They were
considered essential when direct contacts between Israelis and Arabs were considered too risky or had failed to
produce positive results. Media publicity and the failed expectation from direct talks compelled the two parties to
maintain secrecy in their negotiations.
Interestingly, back channel negotiations between the PLO and Israel had also taken place in London and
Rome apart from secret talks in Oslo. Participating in these meetings were Nizar Amar, at one time senior
member of the PLO’s Force 17 commando group; Ahmed Khalidi and Yazid Sayegh, two UK-based Palestinian
academics with PLO affiliations; Shlomo Gazit, former head of Tel Aviv’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies;
Ha'aretz Aryeh Shalev, a senior research associate at the same Center; and Ze’ev Schiff, Ha'aretz’s military
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commentator who eventually replaced Shalev. The first of four rounds of talks took place in London from 8 to
10 October 1992. In order to circumvent the Israeli ban on contacts with the PLO officials, talks were held
quietly with minimum third-party participation during the off-hours of an academic conference on Middle East
security issues held under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.39 The purpose of that
meeting was to familiarize the two sides with each other’s security thinking.
The process of back channel negotiations is still going on but with a different focus. It is now centered on
the Israeli–Syrian agenda for peace and on ensuring the proper implementation of PLO–Israeli and
Israeli–Jordanian accords.
An important lesson to be learned from the secret diplomacy conducted between Israel and Egypt, and later
on between the PLO and Israel, is that despite deadlocks the lines of communications among the negotiating
parties were kept open. In a professional manner the Arab and the Israeli negotiating teams kept discussing
methods to narrow down their differences step by step. A similar exercise between India and Pakistan is going
on at the governmental level but infrequently and with slow results and, unlike the Arab–Israeli case, those
participating in track-II dialogues from Indian and Pakistani have been disowned by their respective government.
The U.S. Involvement
The United States—like Canada, China, and Russia, and the members of the European Community, the Non-
Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Arab League—is an important player in the
Middle East peace process. The only difference is that U.S. involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict has been of
a high profile nature. Contrary to the India–Pakistan peace process, the U.S. involvement in the Middle East
peace process is as old as the emergence of Arab–Israeli hostility. The long-standing U.S. commitment to the
security of Israel, its strategic interests in the Middle East, and its close relations with some of the conservative
or moderate Arab regimes of that region have put the United States in a mediator position. Hence the feeling in
most of the front-line Arab states and of the Palestinians that the road to peace in the Middle East passes
through Washington, D.C.
For Israel, U.S. support was essential to counter the Arab–Palestinian threats to its security and for the
moderate Arabs and Palestinians, the U.S. influence over Israel provided a sufficient basis for asking for a fair
deal brokered by Washington. Washington’s involvement in the Middle East peace process became significant in
the post-1973 Arab–Israeli War period. According to Quandt:
the basic U.S. position adopted in 1967 has remained remarkably consistent. For example, each U.S.
president since 1967 has formally subscribed to the following points:
• Israel should not be required to relinquish territories captured in 1967 without a quid pro quo from the Arab
parties involving peace, security, and recognition. This position was summarized in the formula “land for
peace,” and embodied in the UN Resolution 242, applies to each front of the conflict.
• East Jerusalem is legally considered to be an occupied territory whose status should eventually be settled in
peace negotiations. Whatever its final political status, Jerusalem should not be physically re divided.
Reflecting the legal U.S. position on the city, the U.S. embassy has remained in Tel Aviv, despite promises
by many presidential candidates and also the move made in the U.S. Congress to shift the embassy to
Jerusalem.
• Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 armistice lines—the “green line”—are obstacles to peace. Until 1981
they were considered illegal under international law, but the Reagan administration reversed position and
declared they were not illegal. But Reagan, and especially Bush, continued to oppose the creation of new
settlements. No U.S. funds are to be used by Israel beyond the green line.
• However, Palestinian rights may eventually be defined, they do not include the right of unrestricted return to
homes within the 1967 lines; nor do they entail the automatic right of independence. All administrations
have opposed the creation of a fully independent Palestinian state, preferring some form of association of
the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. Over time, however, the Jordanian option—the idea that Jordan should
speak for the Palestinians—has faded, and since 1988 the United States has agreed to deal directly with
Palestinian representatives.
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• Israel’s military superiority (reinforced by its technological edge) against any plausible coalition of Arab
parties has been maintained through U.S. military assistance. Each U.S. administration has tacitly accepted
the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons, with the understanding that they will not be brandished and can be
regarded only as an ultimate deterrent, not as a battlefield weapon. U.S. conventional military aid is
provided, in part, to ensure that Israel will not have to rely on its nuclear capability for anything other than
deterrence. With minor adjustments, every president from Lyndon Johnson to Bill Clinton has subscribed to
each of these positions.40
The U.S. Role
From the June 1967 Arab–Israeli War until the Israeli–PLO accord of September 1993, U.S. policy in the
Middle East peace process revolved around three basic principles: first, a guarantee of the security of Israel;
second, no recognition of the PLO unless it renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel; and third, support for the
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. When the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right
to exist, the United States changed its policy and began talks with the PLO.
A statement issued by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on 20 March 1980 could best serve as a model for U.S. policy on the Middle East consistently followed by all
U.S. administrations. According to Cyrus Vance the United States has made clear the following principles about
its Middle East policy:
• Unwavering support for Israel’s security and well-being.
• A long-standing commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the Middle
East, including Israel’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
• U.S. support for Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts as the foundation of a comprehensive
peace settlement.
• The belief, confirmed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David, that negotiations are necessary for the purpose of
carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolution 242 and 338.
• The U.S. conviction, shared by Egypt and Israel, that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of
the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.
• “Our firm position” is that we will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not
recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.41
The methodology of the peace process in the Middle East had enormous input from the U.S. side. In the
1970s, the U.S. strategy in the Middle East came to be called as “step-by-step diplomacy.” Harold Saunders
describes how Kissinger:
showed Arabs and Israelis how they could break the problem down into negotiable pieces, evolving
agreements that would build confidence and would change the political environment and counting on
implementation to provide the new starting point for next steps. Step-by-step agreement . . . can make
possible negotiation tomorrow of points that could not have been negotiated yesterday. . . . The inherent
weakness of any step-by-step process remains that which the Arabs have identified, that any party can drop
out when it has gained what it wants. When a party drops out, however, it must recognize that it disrupts,
perhaps for a long time to come, the larger process on which ultimate peace and security depends.42
Saunders goes on to note that the United States argued that
peace is never made but is always in the making. Like other human relationships, peace must be constantly
tended, nurtured, and developed. President Sadat had stated that peace as the normalization of relations is “for
the next generation.” If any cultural gap divided Americans and many of our Arab colleagues, excluding the
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Egyptians, in search for peace before 1985, it was U.S. failure to communicate convincingly that peace-
making is a process, not a precisely defined achievement. The Arabs wanted to see the destination; we
[Americans] argued that the destination would be defined in the process. As one Jordanian told me [Saunders]
in October 1978, ‘We are a desert people. When we leave on oasis, we need to know where the next oasis is.
That’s why there is no place in our vocabulary or our culture for the U.S. concept of a negotiating process.’43
Given the deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion between Arabs and Israelis, Saunders and other U.S. experts on the
Middle East rightly suggested to them that they adopt the step-by-step approach in the peace process. They also
realized that, in view of the complicated nature of Arab–Israeli conflicts, immediate results cannot be
accomplished out of the negotiations and that the fears of Israelis and hopes of Arabs about their future should
be redressed and understood in a true perspective.
The Arab, particularly the Egyptian, loss of faith in Soviet support further deepened the U.S. involvement
in the Middle East peace process. For the Arab states, there was a widespread feeling that while the Soviet
Union could sell them arms and help them in international forums, only the United States could assist them in
achieving the political goals they were seeking in a Middle East settlement, chiefly Israeli withdrawals from the
Occupied Territories. These perceptions led most Arab leaders to rely on the United States to the point that they
had become overconfident in the U.S. ability to bring about results and “deliver” Israel. All principal Arab states
believed that the United States, not the Soviet Union, was the key to progress on the peace front.44 During his
first year in office, President Carter focused on arranging for resumption of the Middle East Peace Conference in
Geneva to negotiate a comprehensive peace. In his second year he focused on ways of translating Sadat’s visit to
Jerusalem into concrete agreements and practical progress toward peace. That year witnessed the unique
negotiations at Camp David and the beginning of negotiations on the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. The third
year saw ratification of the peace treaty and the beginning of negotiations on autonomy for the Palestinian
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.45 Remarking about the Egypt–Israeli normalization process, Carter said,
“There are still great difficulties that remain and many hard issues to be settled. The questions that have brought
warfare and bitterness to the Middle East for the last thirty years will not be settled overnight. But we should all
recognize the substantial achievements that have been made.”46
In November 1975 the Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee invited the Ford
Administration to send a witness to hearings on the Palestinian problem. In a prepared statement cleared well in
advance with Kissinger, Saunders expressed the views of U.S. officials then engaged in the peace process:
We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into
account in the negotiation of an Arab–Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the
Arab–Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition
of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be
possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider
themselves Palestinians.47
The Israeli government and the Israeli lobby condemned this statement that was the first comprehensive one
made by the United States on the subject and thereby gave it wide currency in the Arab world. The Israelis
declared that the heart of the conflict was not the Palestinian problem but the Arab refusal to accept Israel. In
1978 at Camp David, and in the Knesset’s subsequent endorsement, Israel itself agreed to “negotiations on the
resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”48
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For the United States the economic cost of Israeli–Egyptian peace has been substantial. Since the peace
treaty was signed, the U.S. Congress has allocated more than $5 billion a year to the two countries. In special
circumstances, additional sums have been offered.49 The United States may also agree to provide substantial aid
to Israel and Syria if they reach a peace agreement. The peace process, with an increasing emphasis on the
substantive elements of future peace agreements, is likely to be a priority for President Clinton, his foreign-
policy team, and future U.S. administrations in Washington. Their understanding of the basic issues of the
Arab–Israeli conflict and their ability to learn from experience will be the keys to whether presidents become
statesmen. If they do, they stand a good chance of contributing to the long-sought goal of Arab–Israeli peace.50
Table 5 brings to light important features of the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process.
To summarize the U.S. involvement in the Arab–Israeli peace process, two important points are worth
discussion. First, the Arabs, despite possessing immense mistrust and antagonism against the United States saw
reason in seeking U.S. mediation for resolving their conflicts with Israel. Arabs wanted to get back their
territories. Egypt in particular, after feeling uncomfortable with Moscow on the question of supplying
sophisticated weapons and experiencing repeated debacles in getting back the Sinai peninsula from Israel by
military means, was not willing to sustain an endless policy of confrontation with Tel Aviv and desired to use
U.S. influence for striking a deal with Israel based on the “land for peace” formula. The United States obliged
Cairo and, in return, were able to establish a strong foothold in Egypt and neutralize its threat to Israel. With the
decline of Arab nationalism and the weakening of the Soviet role in the Middle East, a majority of the Arab
states saw no reason for blocking the U.S. peace initiatives in the region. The Gulf War and the Soviet
disintegration weakened the Arab demand to organize a UN-sponsored international conference on the Middle
East. By participating at the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, Arab states, no matter how reluctantly,
accepted a U.S. instead of a UN leadership role in the Middle East peace process.
Second, in the process of mediation between Israel and Egypt and then between Israel and the PLO, the
United States was able to establish substantial goodwill and credibility among its former adversaries. The United
States provided technical expertise and incentives to the Arab–Israeli negotiating teams and through its
diplomatic involvement kept significant pressure on both of the teams for a peace accord. The U.S. involvement
in the Syrian–Israeli peace talks going on in Maryland is another example of U.S. mediation in the Arab–Israeli
conflict. If the talks are successful the United States will get the credit of resolving another complicated dispute
in the Middle East. The popular feelings in Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine may be against the U.S. sponsored
peace process but a wide section of the elite is not willing to reverse the peace process and resume confrontation.
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TABLE 5 The U.S. Role in the Middle East Peace Process and Level of Support by the Parties Involved
U.S. Role Israel
Front-Line Arab States
and Palestinians
Strategic interests Relatively high High
Shuttle diplomacy Supportive Supportive
Influence of Zionist lobby in the United StatesSupportive Critical
Camp David accords In agreement Still criticized in some circles
Opposition for an independent Palestinian stateIn agreement Critical
Land for peace Partial support Supportive
Economic assistance Significant Less significant
Military assistance High Not very high
Support for the U.S. role High High. Criticized by the hard-liners
Role of U.S. media Supportive Critical
Impact of Intifada on U.S. public opinion Criticized Appreciated
Future prospects for the U.S. role Significant Less significant at the popular level
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The U.S. consideration of the Middle East peace process was not entirely based on the security of Israel or a
quid pro quo between Arabs and Israelis on granting an autonomous status to Palestinians. It also included a
covert desire to deny Moscow or any other party a major role in the region. For long time, both Washington and
Tel Aviv had opposed the idea to hold a UN-sponsored international conference on the Middle East. Fearing the
mobilization of support for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab occupied areas from the majority of the
members of the proposed conference and the fragility of the Israeli position in any such conference, both the
United States and Israel supported a peace initiative outside the UN ambit. In the post-Gulf War and the post-
Soviet disintegration period, the U.S. role in the Arab–Israeli peace process appeared dominant. In a well-
calculated move, the United States with the tacit support of Israel, Egypt, and conservative Arab states, initiated
the Madrid talks that eventually led to the signing of the PLO–Israel autonomy accord in September 1993.
Non-U.S. Role. From the Suez crisis of 1956 until the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, the Soviet Union maintained a
high profile role in the Middle East peace process. Siding with Arabs and Palestinians, Moscow’s policy on the
Arab–Israel disputes conflicted with U.S. support to Israel. By providing Arabs substantial support in the UN
Security Council and with sophisticated weapons and training, the Soviet Union gained a significant foothold in
core Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It also developed close ties with various Palestinian
emancipation groups, particularly the PLO. The erosion of Soviet influence in the Middle East began with the
expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972 and the subsequent tilt of Cairo in favor of the United States.
By the late 1970s, Moscow had lost considerable influence in the Middle East and its role in the regional peace
process dwindled.
Despite its Cold War rivalry with the United States, the Soviet Union joined Washington in facilitating de-
escalation of tension in the Middle East. Joint U.S.–Soviet initiatives included the UN Security Council
Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967; the Big Two Talks in 1969 and 1970; the Brezhnev–Nixon summits of
1972 and 1973; the Geneva Conference in 1973; and the Madrid peace conference in 1991.51 Soviet
disengagement from the Middle East took place during Gorbachev era, during his tenure the United States had a
free hand to launch its initiatives for peace. From the June 1967 Arab–Israeli War to the Gorbachev era,
the Soviets tried to either construct joint peace initiatives with the United States or to obstruct U.S.
exclusionary moves by supporting Arab radicals in the Middle East sphere. Gorbachev, however, as part of
his new thinking in foreign policy and his new approach to regional conflicts in particular, initiated two
important changes in this strategy. On the one hand, since 1985 Moscow broadened its options by opening a
dialogue with a greater variety of Middle East actors beyond the members of the radical club. On the other
hand, Gorbachev demonstrated greater willingness than his predecessors to forcefully press traditional Soviet
allies toward moderation.52
The Soviet participation in the Madrid peace talks was only symbolic in nature.53 The key non-regional
participant was the United States. In the post-Soviet disintegration period, Moscow’s policy in the Middle East
peace process came close to that of the United States. With the Russian recognition of Israel, Moscow
abandoned its decades old anti-Israel position and adopted a policy of moderation vis-à-vis the Jewish state.
Over a period of time, initiatives taken by the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the
Organization of Islamic Conference, the European Community, Russia, Canada, China and some other African,
Asian, and Scandinavian countries were submerged under the growing U.S. role in the Middle peace process.
Washington successfully preempted Soviet initiatives for the resolution of Arab–Israeli conflicts and the UN
proposal to hold an international conference on the Middle East. By 1990–91, because of the changed
international political scene the United States was in a position to effectively deny other states their role in the
peace process. This led to the holding of the Madrid peace conference in October 1991 and the signing of the
PLO–Israeli accord in Washington in September 1993.
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The lesson to be learned from the failure of the non-U.S. role in the Middle East peace process is that other
participants lacked the influence parallel to Washington’s on Israel and important Arab countries. In order to
initiate a viable peace process, the interested parties should have the will and the capability to accomplish the
desired results. It is true that the non-U.S. participants also contributed a lot in the Middle East peace process
but in the end they gave way to a dominant U.S. role. The Soviet Union could have been a match to the U.S.
role but by late 1970s it had lost its leverage in the region. It had lost Egypt, its support to Syria was not
sufficient to deter the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and its support for the PLO became a victim of inter-
Arab politics. Most important, by 1980s the Soviet capability to support overseas allies suffered heavily for
economic reasons. Because of the consistent U.S. opposition to the UN proposal for an international conference
on the Middle East, any non-U.S. initiative was blocked.
Confidence-Building Measures and the Middle East Peace Process
As with other cases of conflict reduction and management in different parts of the world, in the Middle East
peace process CBMs were first viewed with suspicion and mistrust by the majority of policy makers, academics,
and intelligentsia. However, contrary to South Asia, CBMs eventually had a considerable impact on the
Arab–Israeli peace talks.
CBMs were tested in the Middle East peace process at several times and at several levels. The process had
been launched during the post-1973 Arab–Israeli War period, continued after the signing of the Camp David
accord, and reached its climax during the Madrid and Washington peace talks. CBMs made a lot of difference in
breaking down the walls of suspicion and mistrust at the official level. All the required techniques of CBMs,
including track-I and track-II diplomacy, easing of travel and trade restrictions, cooperation in the areas of water
resources and the environment, external mediation, and talks on disarmament and arms control have been used
between Israel and the Palestinians and with most of the former and current front-line Arab states.
As rightly pointed out by an Israeli expert on Middle Eastern affairs, Mark Heller:
to a large extent, CBMs played a potentially vital role in shaping Israeli attitudes on the substantive core of
Arab–Israeli relations, to the point where they are almost certainly a precondition for progress in the
resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. This reality explains the growing interest in exploring the
possibility of applying elements of the Helsinki–Stockholm model of confidence and security building to
the Arab–Israeli context.54 However, the Middle East has been unable to create a broad-ranging and
overreaching confidence-building regime or system similar to that which applies to Europe.55
As far as the United States was concerned, although supportive of the approach of CBMs, it had not been
able to promote any breakthrough at the popular level in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the United States could
play a role by bringing the parties together and could then help generate the CBMs that would bridge the gaps
among them and thereby help assure the success of the process. It could also help to create a more friendly and
positive regional environment by dealing with collateral issues, such as water resources and arms control. This
conceptualization later became a part of the Madrid peace process with its simultaneous bilateral and multilateral
tracks.56
The United States recognized the value of CBMs in the Arab–Israeli peace process, first utilizing them
during the Nixon administration. It became clear to Washington that the absence of confidence can preclude
negotiations while its existence will not in and of itself make negotiations “happen.” But confidence is difficult
both to create and to sustain. Confidence remains an intangible factor, difficult to identify and to quantify. As
Kissinger negotiated the disengagement agreement of 1974 and the Sinai II agreement of 1975, CBMs of various
types were included in the process and in the agreements. CBMs, albeit initially without using the appellation,
were seen as both appropriate and necessary in the U.S. effort to convince the parties to participate in the
process and to reach agreement. Thus CBMs proved essential to the Middle East peace process and got not only
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U.S. support but also support from the European Union, Russia, the Scandinavian states, and many Middle
Eastern countries.
The United States has seen CBMs as an important element of the Arab–Israeli process. In an address before
the Middle East Institute on 12 October 1990 Dennis Ross, a former head of the Department of State’s Policy
Planning Staff and a leading player in the U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, said: “We believe that CBMs of
the sort we developed with the Soviets in Europe could be pursued between Israel and her Arab neighbors to
reduce the risk of war and miscalculation and to lay the basis for their political engagement.” He did not
elaborate.57
The United States sought to use two approaches to CBMs: first, to get the parties to initiate them for each
other and second, to propose its own CBMs. Therefore, the United States would seek to encourage the parties to
take mutual CBMs. For example, Secretary of State James Baker suggested to Israel that it could freeze building
settlements in the occupied territories in exchange for a relaxation by Arab states of the Arab economic boycott
against Israel. But, each side preferred the first move to be made by the other and neither was prepared for such
far-reaching concessions.58 It has been suggested that the United States can provide a variety of CBMs to the
parties involved. For example, for Jordan and the Palestinians the United States could provide an improved
quality of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, an end to settlement building, and less military pressure in the
occupied territories. There could be limits on the arms races (both conventional and non conventional) and there
are possibilities of demilitarized zones as well as water sharing. The idea of a goodwill gesture remains a part of
the process.59
In May 1992, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, William Harrop, suggested that Israel should make a goodwill
gesture to Damascus because Syria had announced that it would enable Syrian Jews to travel freely. Harrop said
“I think it falls very much under the category of what we call in the peace talk ‘CBMs’. I would be happy to see
a response of some kind come one way or another from Israel.” The Israeli response ran the gamut but a central
theme was that this was not a matter of CBMs but instead a humanitarian requirement that did not deserve a
response.60 Confidence building provided by the parties to each other, or by the United States for the parties, or
forced by the United States on the parties to provide to each other, must be public in nature and public oriented.
Confidence building provided by elites to elites satisfies them and are useful to them for thinking in terms of
pursuing a process, but for the elite to “sell” CBMs to the broader constituencies they must be public and
provided as a means of facilitating the peace process by the individuals directly involved. The public must be
convinced that the opponent has provided sufficient measures to enable the public to accept the concessions of
their negotiators in the peace process. The U.S. role in this regard can be crucial.61
It has been suggested that the United States could provide documents and formal accords and potentially
construct an “international regime” for the region. This process was used with some successes in Sinai II and the
Camp David accords, as well as the Egypt–Israeli peace treaty. In keeping with a time-honored tradition of
utilizing the media to provide various insights into the thinking of policy makers, the United States might
“leak” to the media the ideas of concepts or guarantees that the parties might seek to instill confidence in their
needs and which the United States might not be able to provide in a more formal manner. Washington might
provide the technical means to help ensure the confidence of the parties in the process through such measures as
hot lines and satellite surveillance by which it provides information to the parties to help reassure them about
the intentions and actions of the other.62
In the course of reducing tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors it was proposed that the United
States might encourage humanitarian gestures on such issues as prisoners of war and other captives. The former
was used with the Hamas deportees as a mechanism to restart the post-Madrid negotiation’s ninth round in
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Washington.63 Confidence-building measures remain an important component of any CR process. But it might
be useful to suggest that in the Arab–Israeli peace process they have often taken an oblique rather than specific
form. The United States has provided the venue, the personnel, the aid and assistance, and the guarantees
including the presence of forces in the region.64
CBMs can also help alleviate a number of important political-military concerns and thus enhance bilateral
and regional stability. This worked between Israel and Egypt. CBMs can also help prevent crises from
developing (crisis prevention). CBMs aimed at reducing the danger of military accidents, mistakes, or
miscalculations would include active third party (U.S. or UN) involvement in addition to buffer zones. These
were important and worked with the Egypt–Israel disengagement agreement of 1974 and the Sinai II accords. A
declaratory policy not to resort to the threat or use of force to resolve future conflicts is a form of crisis
management. Sinai II and the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty are examples of this form of crisis management. CBMs
could also address some of the basic causes of conflict inherent in an adversarial relationship and lead to a longer-
term stability. Thus, for instance, U.S. monitoring of the Sinai buffer zone helped to assure the predictability of
the actions of Egyptian and Israel military forces in the Sinai II agreement. The peace treaty included additional
and longer-range methods of stabilization.65
Hard-liners, who consistently oppose confidence building as a principal approach to the study of CR, argue
that the need is for resolving the issues rather than for confidence building, because the resolution of issues is
the best and perhaps the only way to build confidence that is lasting and of permanent value. Confidence
building is argued to not be valuable because it does not deal with the substance of the conflict, and substance
always means the issues that keep the parties in the conflict apart. Hence the conclusion from this approach is
that the time and energy invested in confidence building is wasted and can be invested with greater effect in CR
in the classic sense, namely issue-oriented processes. Yet one has seen that in many cases this approach just
does not work in the rough-and-tumble of the real world.66 The Is aelis and the Palestinians established a
committee explicitly dedicated to CBMs, and thereby underscored the popularity of the concept.67
The results of CBMs in the Middle East peace are mixed. Despite normalization in Israeli–Egyptian,
Israeli–PLO, and Israeli–Jordanian relations, Arabs and Israelis have not become trusted friends. Nor has the
deep-rooted suspicion and mistrust been replaced with mutual confidence and trust. What has happened as a result
of CBMs is the evolution of some tolerance between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors and the
establishment of working relations between negotiators for the two sides. Interestingly, enough confidence has
been established at the official level to do business with each other. At the popular level, mistrust and suspicion
still impede the process of normalization.
The relative success of CBMs in the Middle East has much to do with change in the Arab, Palestinian, and
Israeli perceptions toward their conflicts; their willingness to talk on disputed matters; the foreign, particularly
U.S. involvement; and a general realization in the region that the adversarial relationship will not benefit anyone
and that the no-war and no-peace situation should be replaced with normal ties. An important lesson which can
be learned from the role of CBMs in the Middle East peace process is that the entire mechanism achieved
credibility with the signing of Sinai II agreement between Egypt and Israel. It was a major test case and the
subsequent CBMs reached between Israel and Egypt, Israel and the PLO, and Israel and Jordan expressed the
presence of trust and confidence amidst an environment of general suspicion and ill-will. In the case of the
Arab–Israeli conflicts, despite having misconceptions in many circles, CBMs became a necessity because of two
reasons: urgency and incentives. The fear of losing time and resources if they (Arabs and Israelis) failed to reach
a settlement and the assurance of benefits (primarily by the United States) if they arrived at a settlement helped
and sustained the process of CBMs in the Middle East. Needless to say, circumstances played a vital role in
evolving mutual trust and confidence among the governing elites of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine. The
success of treaties signed between Israel and the PLO and Israel and its Arab neighbors will require the exercise
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of substantial confidence and trust. For future Arab–Israeli ties CBMs are also essential. The CBMs listed in
Table 6 form an integral part of Arab–Israeli normalization process.
Breakthrough in the Syrian–Israeli Relationship,
Israeli Concessions to the PLO, and the Nuclear Factor
Syrian–Israeli Rapprochement. Today, Israel is at peace (at least officially) with its major former adversaries:
Egypt, Jordan and the PLO. But the road to peace in the Middle East is still not smooth and is flawed with
numerous pitfalls. Syria is now the only front-line Arab state68 which has not entered into peace agreement with
Israel and hence is technically in a state of war with the Jewish state. Therefore, the focus of the U.S.-led peace
process in the Middle East is now on an early rapprochement between Syria and Israel. As far as Lebanon is
concerned, the perception is that if Syria and Israel sign a peace treaty, Lebanon which is under the influence of
Damascus will automatically follow the same course. On these grounds, peace between Israel and Syria is
considered essential for the completion of the Middle East peace process, and the U.S.-sponsored talks launched
between Damascus and Tel Aviv in Maryland in late December 1995 centered on reaching a formula on the
Golan Heights. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres speaking before a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on
12 December 1995 appealed to Syria to join him in concluding a Middle East peace. However, he asserted that
“the Golan Heights is the only mountain we have. I am not prepared to give it away for skim milk.”69 Peres
gave a clear message to Damascus that the return of Golan Heights can only be made possible by a quid pro quo
and unilateral withdrawal was out of the question.
The bone of contention between the two countries is the Golan Heights. For a long period of time Syria
maintained a position of not negotiating a peace agreement with Israel unless the latter returned the Golan
Heights. Israel had annexed the Golan heights during the course of the June 1967 War and has refused to talk to
Syria unless annexation was recognized by Damascus and Syria signed a peace treaty.
Over the months, both Israel and Syria have softened their positions. As Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres said in Jerusalem on 25 May 1995, Israel will give up the entire Golan Heights as the price for a peace
treaty with Syria that would end war in the Middle East. He further said that “one has to make a decision. The
price is the price that we also paid to Egypt. It does not have to be identical, but there are no illusions here.
There is no Syrian I know who is prepared to be less than an Egyptian. To remain on the Golan Heights is to
give up on peace. And once Israel has come to terms with Syria, the basis for the end of war in the Middle East
is established.”70 It was announced by the Clinton administration on 24 May 1994 that “Syria has made an
important concession and has agreed to discuss the future of security arrangements on the Golan Heights based
on principles demanded by Israel. Syria had abandoned its insistence that the two countries withdraw their troops
an equal distance from the Golan Heights.”71 Earlier, Syria was demanding that Israel withdraw from all of the
Golan Heights and Israel was demanding that Syria consent to a full-fledged peace with full diplomatic relations
and trade. Syria originally demanded that Israel withdraw from the Golan Heights in one year, but is now willing
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TABLE 6 Important CBMs Reached as a Result of Prolonged Negotiations among Israel, the Arab States, and the PLO
Date Agreement
1974 Egyptian–Israeli and Syrian Israeli disengagement of forces agreement
1975 Sinai II agreement between Egypt and Israel
1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel
1979 Signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel
1993 Singing of a peace treaty between Israel and the PLO
1994 Singing of a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel
1995 Singing of a treaty between Israel and the PLO on expanding self-rule in the West Bank
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to give the Israelis up to eighteen months. Israel had proposed a three-stage withdrawal over five to eight years.
Israel now says it is willing to withdraw in two stages over three years and eight months.
A survey conducted by Haifa University on behalf of Israel Radio revealed that a majority of Jewish
residents in the Golan heights are not prepared to leave, even for compensation. Only 12 percent of the 250
families questioned said they would be willing to abandon their homes in return for appropriate compensation.
The overwhelming majority, 85.5 percent said they would not be prepared to live on the Golan under Syrian
sovereignty. Only 7.5 percent would consider such a possibility. Their survey revealed that 55 percent believe
that an agreement would be reached with Syria within the next five years that would involve some form of
withdrawal. The poll found that 52 percent of those questioned had discussed with their families the possibility
of having to leave the Golan, and 11 percent of this group had gone so far as to investigate the possibilities of
receiving compensation, or to look for new jobs and homes.72
Concessions Given to Palestinians. As a gesture to the Palestinians on 22 May 1994 the Israeli government
suspended its plan to confiscate 140 acres of land in largely Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem. However,
expressing fears of Palestinian terrorism after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the West Bank an
Israeli newspaper editorial said that “It is only natural that Israelis are concerned about Yasir Arafat’s ability to
curb terrorism. Unlike some government doves who see in the withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza a goal
in itself, a way to end a distasteful ‘occupation,’ most Israelis want to know that the areas evacuated by the IDF
(Israeli Defense Forces) will not turn into springboards for terrorist activity. Events like the bombing in Ramat
can increase doubts about the wisdom of leaving ever-larger areas under Arafat’s control.”73 ccording to an
Israeli writer, David Makovsky:
although it may not like to admit it, Israel is discovering that the road to Arab North Africa and the Gulf states
runs through Gaza and Damascus. Senior Israeli Foreign Ministry officials in Jerusalem say normalization
with countries in those regions is stalled because it is being linked to progress with two core parties: the
Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Syria. While Israelis still resent the fact that normalization is
conditional or subject to concessions to the Palestinians and Syrians, they have come around to admitting
that diplomatic efforts to bypass the two have failed. Palestinians note that the Israeli normalization drive
began with the Oslo accord. While some Arab leaders favor normalization, according to analysts there is
resistance among the people. Many Arabs fear Israel is a growing political, technological, and economic
power bent on controlling them. Some Arabs point to the fact that Israel’s gross national product is at least
equal if not greater than that of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians combined.74
Question of Water Resources. A major source of discord between Israel and the Palestinian authority is over the
distribution of water resources. Israel derives 80 percent of its 600 million cubic meters of water annually from
three aquifers that originate in Judea and Samara. The Western aquifer which flows from under the Samaritan
hills to the coast forms the main supply to the Greater Tel Aviv region and produces 350 million cubic meters
of water per year. Israel’s agriculture minister Ya’acov Tsur fears that the Palestinians will drill new wells in the
northern and western aquifer and disrupt the flow of water to Israel. The Palestinians have long argued that water
and land are inseparable and have refused to consider cooperation on developing new water resources.75
Successful talks between Israel and the PLO, between Israel and Syria, and between Israel and Jordan over the
fair distribution of water resources will provide sufficient credibility to the Arab–Israeli peace process.
Status of Jerusalem. Another source of controversy between Israel and the PLO is the future status of the city of
Jerusalem. Unlike hard-line Israeli elements who want Jerusalem to remain as an integral part of Israel, it has
been suggested by some moderate Israeli groups that the city should be recognized as sacred by the followers of
the three major religions in the region, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Signed by many hundreds of
prominent Israelis, the petition called “Our Jerusalem” notes that Jerusalem belongs alike to Israelis and
Palestinians, to Moslems, Christians, and Jews; that the city is a mosaic of all the periods and religions that
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enriched the city from antiquity; and that an open and united Jerusalem must be the capital of the two states
living side by side. West Jerusalem must be the capital of Israel, East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine.76
Realizing the economic and political costs involved in maintaining permanent control over the West Bank
and Gaza, it was wise on the part of Israel to offer limited autonomy to the Palestinians in these two areas.
Maintaining military control over Gaza and the West Bank would have denied Palestinians their legitimate rights
while their absorption in Israel would have raised the problem of a significant Palestinian minority. Thus, the
award of limited autonomy to the Palestinians is a first step toward partition. It is also a step toward the belated
implementation of the 1947 UN partition plan of Palestine.
The Nuclear Factor. The vulnerability of Arab states vis-à-vis Israel’s nuclear capability is considered as a
determining factor in the Arab–Israeli peace process. Arab ambition to get back occupied areas from Israel by
military means proved to be unattainable because of Tel Aviv’s strategic superiority in the Middle East, both
conventional and nuclear. Therefore, the nuclear deterrent of Israel is not only a source of chagrin in the Arab
World but has also been a cause of Arab readiness to enter into peace treaties with Israel.
Concerning nuclear disarmament in the Middle East, in his meeting with the visiting Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak in April 1995, President Clinton said that “he would support efforts to rid the Middle East of
nuclear weapons after peace is achieved there.” Mubarak responded by saying that “we have no problem with the
United States.” Earlier, Egypt had refused to sign the renewal of the NPT document unless reciprocated by
Israel.77 Israel has not confirmed or denied that it has a nuclear arsenal, but Israel is believed to have some two
hundred nuclear weapons. Despite Israel’s ambiguous position on its nuclear capability, the issue of nuclear
disarmament could gain priority in the Arab–Israeli normalization process. At some later stage, the Arab
countries may get U.S. support for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in the Middle East.
Unresolved issues like the Golan Heights, Jewish settlements, the future of Jerusalem, conflict over water
resources, Israel’s security corridor in Southern Lebanon and its nuclear status will determine the future course of
the Middle East peace process. Talks on the Golan heights and Jewish settlements are going on. Based on the
success achieved in these talks, the issues of Jewish settlements and nuclear proliferation may also be dealt with
accordingly.
The issues discussed above are highly relevant in the context of making the Arab–Israeli peace process more
credible and successful. Without the Syrian–Israeli rapprochement, a settlement on Jerusalem, an accord on water
resources, and an understanding on the nuclear issue, the Middle East peace process would remain vulnerable to a
breakdown. The history and politics of the Arab–Israeli peace process has proved that the best methodology of
resolving conflicts is the “land for peace” formula applied through the step-by-step approach and by external
mediation. However, even after the settlement of core and peripheral issues in Arab–Israeli conflicts one cannot
predict conflict and tension-free relations between the two people because the historical, religious, and cultural
discords between Arabs and Israelis are hard to settle. What will happen is the pragmatic coexistence of Arabs
and Israelis despite their aversion for each other. If Israel and its Arab neighbors cannot be good friends, they
could be partners in peace and human progress. Because of challenges and problems like the assassination of
Yitzhak Rabin and the role of hard-liners in Israel, and most of all, the insecurity brought by Hamas terrorism,
the Arab–Israeli peace process will have to deal with some tough issues in the days to come. In the following
pages, it will be interesting to examine why the Indo–Pak peace process has not produced positive results and
how the two countries can learn lessons from the Arab–Israeli peace process.
The India–Pakistan Conflicts
Like Israel and its Arab neighbors, India and Pakistan have a history of unresolved conflicts, wars, and successful
and unsuccessful peace processes. But unlike the Middle East where wars led to talks for the resolution of
conflicts and peace-building, wars between India and Pakistan did not lead in that direction. Instead, after each war
there occurred some positive developments (i.e., the January 1966 Tashkent Agreement and the July 1972 Simla
Accord) but these were short-termed and replaced with renewed tensions.
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To some extent the balance-sheet of Indo–Pak relations is not that disappointing. The two countries did
manage to settle some of their conflicts: division of assets, evacuation of property, distribution of river water
(the Indus Water Treaty of 1960), demarcation of the Rann of Kutch Boundary in 1969, and Salal Dam
agreement in 1978. But such achievements failed to reduce feelings of insecurity, fear, and hostility. Other
agreements reached in the 1980s and 1990s—such as the agreements on non-attack of each other’s nuclear
installations in 1988, cultural and communication in 1989, air and space violations in 1991, notification of
military exercises in 1991, chemical weapons in 1992, and the conduct of each other’s diplomats in 1992—were
aimed to build confidence between the two neighbors, but so far have failed to normalize India–Pakistan ties to
the level of mutual trust and cordiality. The Kashmir dispute and to a lesser extent the other unresolved conflicts
like the nuclear issue, Wuller Barrage, and Sir Creek, have derailed the India–Pakistan normalization process.
Moreover, the nuclear issue is another irritant in India–Pakistan relations and requires resolution. From
Pakistan’s point of view, the Kashmir dispute is a major cause of tension in South Asia and the nuclear issue is
an effect of that cause. The two wars fought between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 produced two accords,
Tashkent in January 1966 and Simla in July 1972, and provided opportunities for CM and resolution. In both
cases the Kashmir dispute was accepted as a major source of tension and both New Delhi and Islamabad pledged
to seek a peaceful resolution of that conflict.
Is there a demand for peace in India and in Pakistan? Unlike the Arab–Israeli case where the parties
concerned belatedly realized the urgency for peace, there exists no such situation in South Asia. Inasmuch,
efforts in the area of CR and war avoidance could not go beyond offers made by New Delhi and Islamabad for the
No-War Pact, Non-Aggression Pact, and Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In the Middle East, Arabs and
Israelis did not interact so frequently in military and non-military areas as Indians and Pakistanis but they did
manage to reach agreements on substantive issues. This fact is evident from the history of contacts, initiatives,
proposals, agreements, and accords reached between India and Pakistan on different issues including the main
source of tension, the Kashmir dispute. This difference in the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pak peace process raises an
important question: why have India and Pakistan, despite several agreements and accords on resolving some
difficult issues, so far failed to reach an understanding on the Kashmir dispute? As mentioned earlier, Israel and
the Arab states, despite a deadlock in their peace talks, managed to achieve a breakthrough on substantive issues
and unlike New Delhi and Islamabad did not allow mutual mistrust and suspicion to overwhelm their efforts for
a settlement.
The longest spell of peace between India and Pakistan, from 1971 to date, did not yield a cessation of
hostilities. In fact, the absence of war in South Asia is like a no-war and no-peace situation. Unlike the Middle
East, where tremendous pressure was exerted by the United States on Israel and the Arab countries to establish
normal ties, no such factor exists in the case of India and Pakistan so far. Their strategically fragile position has
further encouraged them to escalate their hostility to dangerous proportions.
One exception in the recent past to continuous hostile ties between India and Pakistan was the friendly
gesture expressed by Islamabad to New Delhi in 1994 when Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sent
mangoes to her Indian counterpart Narasimha Rao and forty other prominent leaders, ministers, and civil
servants. Some opposition parties of Pakistan raised a hue and cry when the “mango diplomacy” was reported in
the press. The Foreign Office justified that step by calling it a usual affair. The exchange of seasonal fruits and
fruit juices between leaders of India and Pakistan is more or less routine. Once in the early 1980s, then President
of Pakistan General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq sent mangoes to Indira Gandhi. She responded by sending him
bottles of choice leechi juice. Ms. Bhutto’s gesture came at a time when the two countries were making front
page news by manhandling and expelling each other’s diplomats. Benazir Bhutto in one of her interviews with
the BBC, claimed that “when she was in power four years ago [1989], she helped the Indian government of
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in controlling the activities of Sikh separatists in East Punjab. She helped the
Indian government in this regard on the principle of non-interference in each others internal affairs. If Pakistan
had not provided help to Mr. Gandhi then East Punjab would have become a separate land. But we gave them
help on the principle that we will not interfere in the affairs of others. We made it clear at that time that Jammu
and Kashmir is not an Indian territory and according to international law it is a disputed territory.”78
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Notwithstanding the nuclear issue—an area of considerable concern for the United States—there is no other
factor comparable with the nuclear issue that could be seen as motivating for external powers to play a mediator
role for the resolution of India–Pakistan conflicts. Therefore, peace initiatives in South Asia have yet to take
off. Table 7 will help the United States understand different issues in the Indo–Pak peace process.
The Kashmir Dispute
From Islamabad’s point of view, a breakthrough in the India–Pakistan standoff on the Kashmir dispute is
considered essential for peace in South Asia. However, the perceptions of New Delhi and Islamabad sharply
differ on this matter. For Pakistan, Kashmir is the core issue and should be settled according to the UN Security
Council resolutions passed in 1948 and 1949 which would require the holding of a plebiscite under the UN
supervision and providing the people of Jammu and Kashmir a choice of joining either India or Pakistan.
Ironically, earlier India had supported the UN Security Council resolution calling for a plebiscite but later on it
changed its stand. Now it considers the area of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control as an integral part of
India, having given a constitutional basis to its control. India disagrees with Islamabad that the settlement of
Kashmir dispute and peace in South Asia are interlinked. The result is a standoff on the Kashmir dispute.
Political violence in the Indian controlled parts of Kashmir are a source of embarrassment for New Delhi.
Confrontation between the Indian security forces and the Muslim Kashmiri Mujahideen groups has cost India
not only physical and economic losses79 but also diplomatic isolation in the Muslim world. India is now
caught in a trap in Kashmir, even if it wants to get out of that quagmire it cannot.
Like Kashmir, the Palestinian problem was a source of hostility between Arabs and Israelis. It was a cause
of wars and continued animosity in the Middle East. But learning from past mistakes and failures and utilizing
opportunities for peace, Israelis and Palestinians were able to break the stalemate in the Middle East peace
process and reach an autonomy accord in September 1993. This has not happened in the case of the Kashmir
dispute where both India and Pakistan are bogged down in an endless state of hostility.
There are three schools of thought in the context of discussing the Kashmir dispute. The first is the
nationalist, the second is the religious, and the third is secular. The Nationalists led by the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF) want independent status. They are against Indian and Pakistani domination and want to
restore the “Kashmiriyat” or the true honor of the people of Kashmir. The religious elements led by the Hurriyat
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TABLE 7 Issues in the India–Pakistan Peace Process
Issues Indian Perception Pakistani Perception
Kashmir as a core conflict Disagreement Agreement
Kashmir as a peripheral conflict Agreement Disagreement
Land for peace formula Disagreement Agreement
An independent Kashmir Disagreement (at official level)Disagreement (at official level)
Autonomous Kashmir Partial agreement (at official level)Partial agreement (at official level)
Maintenance of status quo on KashmirAgreement Disagreement
Confidence-Building Measures Agreement Partial agreement
Third party mediation Disagreement Agreement
Conditional signing of NPT Agreement Agreement
Maintenance of territorial status quoAgreement Disagreement
Secret diplomacy Not successful Not successful
Impact of media Partly negative Partly negative
Role of third generation for peace Positive Positive
Domestic pressure for peace Becoming significant Becoming significant
Perceptions of official elite for peaceNot positive Not positive
Perceptions of unofficial elite for peacePositive Positive
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Conference want annexation with Pakistan. They see religion as a common bond between the Muslim majority
of Kashmir and Pakistan. Parallel to the Islamic groups are the Hindu Kashmiri supporters of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) and Shiv Sena who want to end Kashmir’s special status as granted in article 370 of the
Indian Constitution and want a formal annexation of that territory with India. The secular minded Kashmiris
belong to the Jammu and Kashmir National Congress and other Indian secular parties like Congress and
National Front. In a battle for supremacy over Jammu and Kashmir the important players are the nationalists
and the Islamists. However, the alliance between nationalists and secularists may outweigh Islamists.
In a press statement, the Chairman of JKLF, Amanullah Khan suggested three alternative solutions to the
Kashmir crisis. His first suggestion envisages the divided Jammu and Kashmir state reunited after simultaneous
and complete withdrawal of all Indian and Pakistani armed forces and civil personnel and placed under UN
supervision for three to five years. After the supervision period, the state would hold democratic elections and
the verdict of the people, whether to be an independent state or become an integral part of Pakistan or India,
would be respected. The second alternative entails holding a conference of twenty to thirty representatives from
different sections of society and militant leaders in a neutral country. They would discuss the issue from all
angles and evolve a unanimous, or nearly so, formula to solve the issue on the basis of the Kashmiris’
unfettered and freely expressed will. This would then be placed before the governments of India and Pakistan and
the international community for implementation. The third suggestion involves tripartite talks for the
representatives of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir under the auspices of an influential international organization.
The Kashmir delegation would comprise representatives of all the three political schools of thought: pro-
independence, pro-Pakistan, and pro-India. This could lead to a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem.80
Most of these alternatives are similar to the one adopted for the agenda of the PLO–Israeli peace talks in Oslo
and eventually led to their incorporation in the PLO–Israeli accord of September 1993. The alternatives
suggested by the JKLF’s chief are now widely shared by a number of Kashmiris, Indians, and Pakistanis and
seen as a counter to the religious extremist groups and the best face-saving formula to settle the dispute on the
basis of a quid pro quo.
On 9 February 1996, four leading Kashmiri resistance leaders expressed their readiness to enter into a
dialogue with the Indian government without the participation of Islamabad aimed at solving the Kashmir
dispute, if India would not put any pre-conditions for such talks. In a statement read out at a press conference in
Srinagar on 9 February, Babar Bader, the self-styled supreme commander of the Muslim Janbaaz Force; Syed
Imran Rehai, a former divisional commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen; Ghulam Mohiuddin Lone; an ex-naib-e-
amir allah of the Muslim Mujahideen; and Bilal Lodi, a former commander-in-chief of Al-Buro, said that “we are
ready for talks at any forum or table with the Government of India as it [India] should concede that Kashmir is a
historic and political problem.”81 Their statement was immediately condemned by Mirwaiz Moulvi Umar
Farooq, chief of the pro-Pakistan All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The reason for the hostile reaction of
Hurriyat leader against the statement was his fear that holding talks between Kashmiri Muslim militants and
New Delhi without Pakistan’s inclusion would put the unity of APHC at stake. Already the thirty-five-party
Hurriyat Conference was feeling it difficult to prevent a split in its rank. If the Indian government and former
Kashmiri militants agreed to launch negotiations, it would be a setback to the APHC. These former militants
could join hands with other moderate Kashmiri leaders to reach a deal with New Delhi and pave the way for
holding the much delayed state elections in Jammu and Kashmir.
Day by day, the official position adopted by New Delhi and Islamabad on the Kashmir dispute is losing
credibility. Pakistan is not willing to compromise on the UN Security Council resolutions calling for a
plebiscite and India is not ready to stop calling Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India.
India and Pakistan feel that time is on their side and are unwilling to adopt a realistic approach to resolve
their conflicts. The feeling in India that Kashmir is not an issue in its relations with Pakistan and the perception
in Pakistan that ties with New Delhi cannot be improved unless the Kashmir dispute is resolved according to the
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UN Security Council resolution account for the extreme positions taken by the two sides. India are Pakistan are
not willing to make a down payment for any deal and want to accomplish their own objectives. For the
management and resolution of conflicts it is essential that flexibility is expressed by the parties concerned on
substantive issues. For a long period of time, Egypt and Israel, the PLO and Israel, and Jordan and Israel had
refused to make a down payment for launching a peace process. They fought wars and used other non-peaceful
means in an effort to accomplish their objectives, but could not succeed. Israel and the Arab countries, including
the PLO, had to make a down payment by granting mutual recognition and agreeing on a “land for peace”
formula for a viable peace in the Middle East. In India and in Pakistan no one is willing to make a down
payment. Recognition is not an issue in Indo–Pak conflicts. Both countries have diplomatic relations since their
inception as independent states in 1947, but they are unwilling to resolve their conflicts, particularly Kashmir,
by following a step by step approach. As a first step toward peace, the two countries need to agree to make a
down payment such as the restoration of the pre-1984 position in the Siachen Glacier, controlling negative
propaganda against each other, practically demonstrating their policy of non-intervention and non-interference in
each other’s internal affairs, launching meaningful talks on the Kashmir dispute, granting of general amnesty to
Kashmiri militants by India, withdrawing Indian and Pakistani troops from their respective parts of Kashmir and
putting these areas under UN control for ten years, holding elections in Kashmir to elect the members of the
constituent assembly, holding talks between the members of the constituent assembly and India and Pakistan to
determine the future status of Kashmir, substantially cutting defense expenditures, relaxing the movement of
people between India and Pakistan, agreeing not to use nuclear weapons against each other, withdrawing
missiles from each other’s borders, and so forth. India and Pakistan will have to make several down payments
before reaching a final settlement of their conflicts. That process may take ten to fifteen years or more. The
experiences of various models of conflict management and resolution has shown that among adversaries the
peace process is always in stages. No party can demand 100 percent of concessions from the other party.
The absence of a framework for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute has derailed the Indo–Pak peace
process, prolonging the cold war between the two countries at the expense of progress and development.
Pakistan’s insistence on self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir according to the UN Security
Council resolutions and India’s refusal to change the status quo have failed to claim genuine support from the
majority of the concerned people and is increasing frustration at various levels. The continuous diversion of
scarce resources to militarization (including the expensive war in Siachen) is also related to the failure to settle
the Kashmir dispute. Domestic security problems like the deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan’s
urban Sindh are also connected with the India–Pakistan standoff on the Kashmir dispute.
Given the emotional attachment of Islamabad and New Delhi to Kashmir, no Indian or Pakistani
government can risk changing their “Kashmir policy.” This has led to a stalemate in Indo–Pakistan relations.
The feeling in India that New Delhi has regained ground in the Valley and the pro-Pakistan elements are losing
in terms of popular support may either provide an opportunity for the Indian government to seek a just
settlement with the Mujahideen groups or it may lose that opportunity. New Delhi also feels that by holding
elections in the Valley, it can regain legitimacy on the Kashmir issue in international circles. The problem in
South Asian countries is they only believe in seeking a temporary solution for a political problem. Resorting to
the use of force or holding controversial elections are successful in quelling armed uprisings but they do not
resolve the root cause of popular unrest. Recent examples of this are the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, the
Northern Ireland problem, the Sikh agitation in Punjab, the Muslim uprising in the Valley of Kashmir, and the
Mohajir movement for greater autonomy in Urban Sindh. If the Indian government fails to launch a credible
political process by involving the majority of the people of the Valley, its success vis-à-vis armed Mujahideen
may be temporary. The Valley could again explode and create fresh tension between India and Pakistan.
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta correctly sees the fragile nature of Indian and Pakistani
regimes as a major cause of their deadlock over Kashmir: “when the governments in power in India and Pakistan
are transparently weak, and political parties are posturing before or after their national elections, a bilateral
meeting on Kashmir, even at the summit-level could, at best, only initiate CBMs. It is unlikely to end in a
substantive resolution of the problem.”82 Mehta also feels that “various elements in Pakistan, the officer corps
and the intelligence agencies, would like to avenge the defeat in Bangladesh and be tempted to give more
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supportive bolstering to the insurgents and so paralyze and then, see severed the Indian control and connection
with the valley. But those holding ultimate governmental responsibility could not be unaware that escalating the
militancy could trigger a war with India with unpredictable consequences and perhaps no realization of the
national goal of Kashmir’s accession to the state of Pakistan.”83 However, Mehta is not correct in saying that
only the officer corps and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan would like to “avenge the defeat in Bangladesh.”
The perception in Pakistan is that the average Pakistani, engaged in any profession, is still unwilling to
exonerate New Delhi’s role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and it is logically right to see India bleed
in Kashmir or in any other domestic crisis. This is the crux of Indo–Pak problem: the legacy of the past is so
deep that even after several years perceptions have not changed. For many Pakistanis it is difficult to say if the
dismemberment of India will satisfy their mind set and open a new chapter of friendship and cooperation in
South Asia. But for Pakistanis the public acceptance by India of mistakes made during the 1971 East Pakistan
crisis and its pledge not to intervene in Pakistan’s internal affairs may heal some wounds and create conducive
conditions for normalization in the subcontinent. New Delhi and Islamabad can learn lessons from the example
of the PLO–Israeli accord. Begin and Sadat, Arafat and Rabin, and Hussein and Rabin accepted their past
mistakes and agreed to initiate a new era of peace and friendship in the Middle East. This may seem to be
difficult in the case of India and Pakistan, but it is not impossible.
For India, the core issue with Pakistan is not Kashmir but the economic challenges faced by the two
countries. Here India gives importance to the normalization process without attaching significance to the
resolution of the Kashmir dispute, suggesting the enhancement of bilateral trade and relaxation of restrictions on
people-to-people interaction.
In the course of submitting a moderate Indian response to the Kashmir dispute, Jagat Mehta suggests that
the challenge for India is to restore the faith at least for the more responsibly motivated in a democratic
political order that would permit the preservation of the distinct personality of Kashmir. This difficult task
tells first and foremost on the Government of India, and the Governor, but its implementation rests with the
officialdom down the line in the state machinery and the agencies of the central government functioning in
Kashmir. But when much of the population is alienated, what is required is simultaneous and not sequential
steps to launch a credible political initiative and combine it with socio-economic developmental initiatives
that are striking for their differences with the past. We can learn from the negative experience of the United
States in Vietnam and El Salvador, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, France in Algeria and the positive one
of the British counter-insurgency operation in Malay (in fifties). The lesson is that fire-power and security
operations alone are never effective unless there is the parallel track of a policy to regain the confidence of
the broad mass of the people. The new pacification and development approach must go hand in hand with an
honest revival of democratic liberties including the right of peaceful protest, non-violent demonstration, the
restoration of freedom to the local press to report and articulate criticism and more autonomy in the programs
of the local television stations.84
Mehta is not wrong in suggesting to Indian authorities that they should handle insurgency in Kashmir in a
political manner, that economic reforms should be introduced to reduce a sense of deprivation among the people
of that area. But in the past New Delhi tried several times to pacify Muslim resentment in Kashmir but failed.
This time it may not succeed either. The solution to the Kashmir dispute is not entirely the need for
socioeconomic and political reforms but also the right of the Kashmiris to self-determination. The method to
reach that stage will require the examination of several options ranging from an independent Kashmir, to holding
a plebiscite as envisaged in the UN Security Council resolutions, to UN control over that area for five or ten
years. Any solution that tries to maintain the status quo in favor of either India or Pakistan at the expense of
Kashmiris will not have the support of the people of Kashmir.
For less hawkish Indians and Pakistanis, Kashmir is not a major issue; what is important is the worsening
of domestic political and economic conditions. A Pakistani living in Sindh or Baluchistan is not much
concerned with what is going on in Kashmir. To him, the main areas of concern are the growing ethnic strife
between Pakhtuns and Baluch in Baluchistan and the worsening of law and order situation in urban Sindh,
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particularly in Karachi, and the ethnic tension between native Sindhis and Muhajirs, who migrated from India at
the time of partition in 1947 and settled mostly in the urban areas of Sindh.
Pakistan has accused India, which New Delhi denies, of fighting its Kashmir War in Karachi in order to
destabilize the situation in urban Sindh so Pakistan cannot sustain its support to anti-Indian groups in Kashmir.
In December 1994, suspecting New Delhi’s involvement in the Karachi disturbances, Pakistan asked India to
close its Consulate in Karachi. India responded by asking Pakistan to cut its diplomatic staff in its High
Commission in New Delhi—Pakistan had earlier closed down its consulate in Bombay.
Some Indian writers reject any linkage between Karachi and the Kashmir problem, but the official and non-
official Pakistani perceptions are more or less the same and is based on the assumption that New Delhi wants to
neutralize the pressure of Pakistan supported Mujahideen groups in the Indian controlled parts of Kashmir by
exploiting the MQM (Mohajir Quami Movement)-Government tussle in Karachi. Sushant Sareen outlined the
Indian perception:
As far as the question of destabilizing Pakistan is concerned, most commentators in Pakistan are convinced
that the Indians are fishing in the troubled waters of Sindh to pay back Pakistan for its principled stand on
Kashmir and for the political, moral and diplomatic support extended by it to the Mujahideen in Kashmir.
Although one cannot deny that the present civil-war like situation in Karachi confers indirect tactical and
diplomatic advantage on India, it would be false to suggest that it has been fostered by India. The unpalatable
truth is that the rulers of Pakistan have done such a great job of creating a mess in Sindh that there is no need
for the Indian government to get involved. And even at this point of time when it is most tempting for India
to retaliate against Pakistan for the insurgencies that have been sponsored from across the border, it is
neither in India’s interest nor within her capability to cause another break-up of Pakistan.85
On 29 July 1994 a Pakistani English newspaper, The Nation, reported that “according to intelligence
sources, the government is under tremendous pressure to close down the Indian Consulate General in Karachi
because of its alleged involvement in RAW sponsored activities. These intelligence sources say, the government
has been told that the activities of RAW are on the rise in Sindh and that many RAW agents are operating from
inside the Indian Consulate General in Karachi. These sources say that RAW agents are operating in Sindh using
the cover of the Indian Consulate, and over the years built up a strong reservoir of contacts in the commercial
and political sections to recruit agents.”86 O  26 December 1994 in Islamabad Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary,
Najmuddin Sheikh, said that “we have been constrained to take this decision because of clear and fresh evidence
of India’s involvement in the planning, instigation, and execution of acts of terrorism and violence in Karachi
and of the propagation of disaffection and propaganda against the unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of
Pakistan that is in violation of international law.”87 On the basis of these charges, Pakistan asked New Delhi to
close its consulate in Karachi immediately and withdraw its twenty-member staff within next ten days. A
spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Office told journalists during the weekly briefing that “if there is a terrorist
state in South Asia, it is none other than India. Currently India is promoting terrorism in the Sindh province of
Pakistan. The All India Radio devoted sixteen hours daily addressing the Sindhis and promoting secessionism
from Pakistan. This campaign of propaganda by AIR is contrary to Indian recognition of Pakistan as a state and
its respect for Pakistan’s unity and territorial integrity.”88
Like their counterparts in Sindh and Baluchistan, Indians living in the south and east of their country do not
have major stakes in Jammu and Kashmir. Because of their proximity, they are more interested in the affairs of
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Recently, New Delhi has increasingly come under pressure from moderates to amend
its current position on Kashmir and follow a pragmatic line of action. The holding of track-II dialogue under the
auspices of private Indian and Pakistani citizens represents an attempt to establish an effective peace lobby in
South Asia to counter hawkish elements.
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Domestic conflicts have stongly affected the Indo–Pak peace process but in the Arab–Israeli context one
doesn’t see as much linkage between the exploitation of domestic conflicts and a negative impact on the peace
process. Ethnic and political tensions in Israel and in some of the front-line Arab countries did not have a direct
affect on efforts for the Arab–Israeli normalization and thus could not be used by the vested interest groups.
Peace Process Between India and Pakistan: Ideal and Reality
Politically, the Middle East and South Asia are different regions but their unresolved conflicts provide an
opportunity for a comparative study of the peace processes in the two areas. Unlike the Middle East, the peace
process in the India–Pakistan subcontinent has not gone beyond hypothetical description. In recent years for
every two steps forward there have been four steps backward. In the Middle East, the agreements signed between
Israel and Egypt were implemented to a large extent. There is some problem in the implementation of the
PLO–Israeli accord. Progress on the Israeli–Jordanian agreement is satisfactory and an accord between Syria and
Israel is expected in the near future. But to a large extent, in the Middle East difference in ideal and reality was
not very wide. This has not been the case with India and Pakistan where not only wide segments of the
populations, but also the elites of the two countries are so far indifferent to the idea, let alone the necessity of a
peace process.
Ranging from the role of personalities to the holding of track-II talks, there exists sharp difference in the
methodology of peace-building in the two regions. Table 8 depicts the enormous differences between the ideal
and the reality in the India–Pakistan peace process.
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The table shows that in almost all issues India and Pakistan have said one thing but in reality have not
hesitated in breaking their commitments. This has led to a credibility gap in Indo–Pakistan relations and the two
countries are not taken seriously by the outside world when they subscribe to non-intervention in each other’s
internal affairs, nuclear non-proliferation, or promotion of regional cooperation. The gap between the ideal and
reality is primarily the result of the immense mistrust and suspicion prevailing between the two countries and
the inability of the two governments to control their hawkish elements. In the case of CBMs or resolution of
the Kashmir dispute, Prime Ministers Narasimha Rao or Benazir Bhutto could not do much because they were
unwilling to take the risk of antagonizing hard-liners. They felt insecure and vulnerable from numerous domestic
problems and were not in a position to alter the status quo.
South Asian Perceptions on the Arab–Israeli Peace Process
What are the attitudes and perceptions of Indians and Pakistanis about the Middle East peace process? Do they
see any relevance for that process in the South Asian context? Is there a possibility of change in Pakistan’s
policy vis-à-vis Israel and how will it affect Islamabad’s security perception of India?
For a long period of time, India and Pakistan maintained a consistent pro-Arab policy. In the United
TABLE 8 Ideal and Reality in the India–Pakistan Peace Process
India Pakistan
Non-intervention and non-interference in each
others internal affairs
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation Violation
Disarmament and arms control
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation Violation
Transparency in military CBMs
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation Violation
Promoting regional cooperation under South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation Violation
Promoting people to people interaction
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Supportive Violation
Support to the UN resolutions on Kashmir
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation in the case
of Jammu & Kashmir
Supportive
Confidence-Building Measures (military)
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation Violation
Confidence-Building Measures (non-military)
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Supportive Violation
Third party mediation for the settlement of disputes
Ideal Disagreement Agreement
Reality Violation Supportive
Fair treatment of diplomats
Ideal Agreement Agreement
Reality Violation Violation
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Nations, in the Non-aligned movement, and in other international forums, both countries supported the
Palestinian cause and demanded the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab occupied areas. However, in the post-Gulf
War era and in the post Soviet period the Indian policy vis-à-vis Israel began to change. It first led to the
launching of low-key contacts with Tel Aviv and then the establishment of full diplomatic relations. India’s
policy toward Israel thus came closer to that of the United States. Based on a pragmatic assessment of the
changing nature of Middle East peace process, New Delhi abandoned its anti-Israeli rhetoric and began to build a
close rapport with Tel Aviv.
Unlike India, Pakistan has not changed its Israel policy. Despite the PLO–Israeli accord and further
breakthroughs in the Middle East peace process, Islamabad has maintained the status quo on its Israel policy.
Table 9 highlights the main aspects of past and present positions of India and Pakistan on the Middle East peace
process.
Given post-Cold War events and the recent developments in the Arab–Israeli scene, India and Pakistan are
still in the process of groping toward a policy on the relevance of the Middle East experience in resolving their
own unsettled conflicts. Pakistanis reluctantly support the PLO–Israeli accord but also point out the unjust
aspects of that deal. Indians support the Middle East peace process but are opposed to the application of a similar
model in South Asia, particularly a third-party (U.S.) involvement.
The perceptions of moderate and extremist Indians about the Middle East peace process have two important
facets. First, new relations between Israel and Arab countries have proved the relevance of direct talks to settle
conflicts. Second, the Kashmir dispute could only be settled on the basis of the autonomy formula envisaged for
the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Indians reject the possibility of a U.S. or any other external role to
settle the India–Pakistan conflicts. According to a leading Indian strategic analyst, K. Subrahmanyam:
The Americans for the last two years have been singing praises about the merits of the Mideast peace process.
And now that an Israeli–PLO accord has emerged, although without much of their effort, they are likely to
press on India the same prescription to solve the Kashmir problem. The Pakistanis strain all their nerves to
get the Americans involved in subcontinental issues, whether it is Kashmir, the nuclear question or human
rights. After the spectacular show staged on the White House lawns, viewed via satellite TV all over the
world, it is to be expected that all visiting U.S. policy makers, academicians, public dignitaries and even
many of our own people will advertise the proved remedy of a U.S.-sponsored peace process for
India–Pakistan problems.89
He further asked that: what are the real lessons to be learned from the Israeli–Palestinian accord? The first
lesson that stands out is that direct negotiations among adversaries are more effective than a multilateral process
with mediators who have their own axes to grind. Second, such direct talks undertaken in secret without the
glare of publicity are more productive than much publicized sessions where delegates tend to posture for the
benefit of their respective constituencies back home. One concludes that a dialogue between the two countries
will proceed better if it is conducted away from the glare of publicity, in secret, and continuously by high-
powered envoys nominated by the heads of the governments. Just as Israel and the PLO recognized that they
were stalemated and neither was in a position to win, India and Pakistan have to recognize that they cannot go to
war because of the nuclear factor. One of the major factors that propelled the PLO to come to terms is the cut in
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TABLE 9 India–Pakistan Perceptions on the Middle East Peace Process
Issues India Pakistan
Recognition of Israel Supportive Opposed
Support to the right of Palestinian self-determination Support on decline Supportive
Support to the PLO–Israeli accord and PLO–Jordanian
agreement (official)
Supportive Partial support
Support to the PLO–Israeli accord and PLO–Jordanian
agreement (popular)
Supportive Hostile
Launching of the Middle East like peace process in South AsiaHostile Less hostile
Support to the methodology of private diplomacy in the
Middle East peace process
Agreement Opposed unless Kashmir
dispute is resolved
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financial support from the Arabs for sustaining PLO operations. Similar economic factors also operate in the
subcontinent. If these realities are accepted by both sides, then accords similar to the one reached between Israel
and the PLO are possible. Otherwise, the Middle East process has no relevance to the India–Pakistan process.90
Indian strategic thinking on the Arab–Israeli peace process reflects its concern about the effective role of
foreign powers, particularly the United States. For years, New Delhi believed in the importance of direct and
bilateral negotiations for resolving conflicts between Israel and its Arab adversaries. The Madrid peace process
proved the significance of external mediation. It is totally unacceptable to Indian policy makers to welcome any
foreign initiative to help resolve conflicts between New Delhi and Pakistan. Indian strategic thinkers, like K.
Subrahmanyam, feel proud of their country’s pre-eminent position in South Asia and assert the fact that they are
capable enough to resolve their conflicts.
The question then arises, when the neighbors of India such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
call upon New Delhi to initiate purposeful dialogue for the settlement of outstanding disputes, why is the
response of India not encouraging? Why is it that India’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh, are
highly critical of New Delhi’s reluctance to negotiate on substantive issues? It is strange that India is not
amenable to foreign mediation but when it is asked by its neighbors to negotiate bilaterally it does not act in a
responsible manner. Such a contradiction in Indian policy is a major source of uncertainty and mistrust in South
Asia and can in no way contribute to a regional peace process. If Indians are confident that they can resolve their
conflicts with their neighbors without any foreign help or assistance, then they should not hesitate to discuss
substantive issues wholeheartedly.
Compared to their Indian counterparts, Pakistan’s strategic thinkers are less suspicious about the Middle
East peace process and a possible U.S. covert objective to initiate a similar process in South Asia. They like the
process (even if not a key participant, Israel) because it may eventually lead to an independent Palestinian
homeland. A segment of Pakistan’s policy makers and intelligentsia consider the Middle East peace process an
opportunity to strike a deal with India on Kashmir. It is India that is under serious pressure from the guerrilla
activities of militants, not Pakistan. (Although it has been pointed out by both Indian and Pakistani writers that
Pakistan is paying a heavy price in Karachi crisis for its support to the Kashmiri Mujahideen.) Therefore, for
Pakistan, any sort of formula close to the one reached between Israel and the PLO in September 1993 will alter
the status quo to the advantage of Pakistan and the Kashmiris and to the disadvantage of India. Pakistan will lose
nothing if the Kashmiris are given self-determination.
Examining the pros and cons of the Middle East peace process and its possible linkage with the
India–Pakistan case, a Pakistani writer comments:
a significant example of the success of the Track Two diplomacy is to be found in the Middle East, where also
the known positions of the Arabs and Israelis appeared to be irreconcilable. Although the success of the
Camp David Accord had the effect of detaching Egypt from the confrontation with Israel, the terrorism and
violence that characterized the relations between the PLO and Israel threatened to keep this area as potential
tinderbox. It also fell to a senior U.S. diplomat, Harold Saunders, who served as Assistant Secretary of State
for the Near East, to try the Track Two approach, by having small groups of Arabs and Palestinians meet
quietly and unobtrusively, over a six to seven year period, to explore ways to end the hostility and violence,
by searching for areas of agreement.91
The PLO–Israeli accord signaled progress toward tranquillity in the Middle East but also served to highlight the
fact that the other major theater of international tension, South Asia, appeared to be totally unaffected by the
post-Cold War quest for a peaceful and secure world.92
Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Jamshed Marker, in an interview with the Cable
Network News (CNN) in the aftermath of the Gulf War called for the resolution of the Middle East and
Palestinian questions as well as the Kashmir dispute. He elaborated his argument by saying that “there should be
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an active political association of the United Nations and that would include not just Iraq and Kuwait, but
certainly the whole issue of the Middle East, Palestine, and leading from that to other unimplemented UN
resolutions on disputes that are really the cause of conflict all over the world, and by what I include, of course,
Kashmir.”93 For Pakistan, any move to settle the Kashmir dispute according to the UN Security resolutions is
acceptable. The PLO–Israel accord does not guarantee an independent Palestinian homeland but it will provide
some sort of statehood to stateless people in the years to come. It also does not take into account the 1947 UN
partition plan that called for the establishment of Jewish and Muslim Arab states in Palestine. Pakistan needs to
modify its approach on Kashmir and consider proposals that rationally support the idea of self-determination for
the people of the area.
The solution of the Middle Eastern problem can also be expected to give an impetus to renewed efforts by
the international community to resolve the long-standing and tortured problem in South Asia, Jammu and
Kashmir, on the basis of universally recognized principles and to implement the resolutions of the United
Nations.94
Addressing the UN General Assembly’s Special Political Committee on 27 November 1991, the Pakistan
delegate called for settling the Arab–Israeli conflict on the basis of relevant UN resolutions and the principle of
“land for peace.” He stated, “the objective to attain peace and stability in the Middle East region should not be
allowed to remain elusive. The hope aroused by the Madrid Peace Conference would alone not suffice for a just
and comprehensive settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Palestine issue. It requires a firm commitment
on part of Israel to negotiate a settlement on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of
1973 and on basis of the land for peace principle.”95
The realistic school of thought in India argues that insurgency in Kashmir could be controlled if meaningful
dialogue with the militant groups is held and maximum autonomy is granted to the area. As with the Israeli
occupied areas, Kashmir is also a disputed territory. In this regard it is suggested that New Delhi should follow
the Israeli policy that promoted moderate elements within PLO and should negotiate with moderate Kashmiri
leaders for a reasonable solution within the framework of the Indian Union.
Pakistan’s perception of Israel is more emotional than rational. Hard-line policy toward Israel is the
outcome of factors such as deep animosity against Israel for occupation of Arab lands, persecution of
Palestinians, reports of an India–Israeli nexus, and the traditional bias against Jews.
Pakistan’s grievances against Israel could be articulated like this: Tel Aviv grabbed by force the Palestinian
lands, made them homeless, and unleashed an unacceptable policy of cleansing Palestinians from the region.
Later on through wars it annexed territories of neighboring Arab countries and occupied Jerusalem.
Consequently, Islamabad supported the Muslim entities in the region. Conversely, it was these and other similar
factors that obliged Israel to turn against Pakistan. Israeli Intelligence agencies have reportedly been keeping a
close watch on Pakistan’s military activities for any potential threat to its security. At a news conference in
Austin, Texas, retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman revealed that six months prior to the 1981 Israeli attack and
destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the United States kept Tel Aviv supplied with spy satellite pictures of
Pakistan, apparently in order to eliminate any possibility of hostile counter-action in the event of the top secret
mission being detected or compromised. As Khalid Hasan, The N tioncorrespondent in Washington, reported
Inman’s disclosure would lend strength to the popular belief in Pakistan that the Kahuta nuclear facility is or
was a potential Israeli target. Indian complicity in this context has also been alleged although New Delhi has
denied it. There is evidence of sometimes close intelligence coordination between India and Israel. The attack by
a Kashmiri freedom-fighter on a group of Israeli agents in Srinagar about a year ago was one overt manifestation
of the understanding that has existed between the two countries because of a Pakistan that both consider
hostile.96 Much of the information available in Pakistan about Israel may not be true but it has contributed
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significantly in building anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli feelings. For Muslim extremist elements in Pakistan, Israel
is as dangerous as India and hence the question of recognizing Israel does not arise.
However, because of the PLO–Israel accord, some circles in Pakistan are questioning the wisdom of not
recognizing Israel. Although Pakistan has no direct conflict with Israel, the public opinion is still charged with
anti-Israeli feelings. It is said that Pakistan will recognize Israel once a final settlement of Jerusalem is reached
and Israel is recognized by other Arab countries, particularly by Saudi Arabia and Syria, by the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC), and by the Arab League.
It is not only from the side of hard-line Palestinian and Arab groups that Pakistan is advised not to
recognize Israel even if it is recognized by the PLO and other Arab states, the public opinion in Pakistan is also
divided on this question. Conservative and right-wing political-religious groups are dead set against granting any
sort of recognition to Israel. Pakistan’s position on the Middle East peace process, namely the PLO–Israel
accord, was discussed in an editorial entitled “Not quite the accord of our dreams” in the Daily Frontier Post in
the following words:
Pakistan has done well at this difficult juncture to clearly indicate its support for the PLO and the peace
process in the Middle East which has more than its share of opponents, not least within the Palestinian and
Israeli camps. Events including the demise of the only other superpower, as well as the outcome of the Gulf
War, heavily tilted the balance, not particularly favorable to start with, against the Palestinian people and
their quest for autonomy and statehood. In this difficult situation, the PLO has clinched an unsatisfactory
deal. But under the circumstances, perhaps the only deal possible. Among others there are those within the
Palestinian ranks, for instance, who content that the Palestinians have been given far too little in exchange
for calling off hostilities against the state of Israel. Externally, Iran is in the forefront of those that regard
the accord as the worst kind of betrayal. What is implicit in the criticism is that there were other, better
options. The more militant line of Hamas and Al Jihad, for instance. But this does not take cognizance of the
changed realities on the ground. Iran should remind itself of its decision, in the end, to negotiate a peace with
Iraq after nearly a decade of unrelenting war. Ayatollah Khomeini linked it to drinking poison. But it had to
be done, given the circumstances, in order not to risk losing more. The PLO leadership too, has determined
that it should accept a deal that fall far short of its dreams, rather than continue with a strategy of armed
struggle and risk having the Palestinians sidelined altogether. Yet, there is the promise in it of the
realization of UN resolutions as well as the homeland for the Palestinians.97
More so an official statement issued in Islamabad on 13 September 1993 “welcomed Israeli–PLO accord as
a first step toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement.” Pakistan called on all parties to address such issues
as the status of occupied Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements and said it hoped that a final deal would conform
to international obligations on these issues. As the chairman of the Islamic Conference of foreign ministers, the
statement said Pakistan would continue to closely consult with OIC members regarding the evolving situation
in the Middle East.98 It has been suggested by some Pakistani writers that the current policy should be
reassessed on realistic basis. As pointed out by one Pakistani writer, “no body would suggest that we
(Pakistanis) rush to recognize Israel after the recent historic PLO–Israel accord. But one finds it necessary to
insist that Pakistan’s approach to the problem must henceforth be pragmatic and geared to its own national
interests rather than to unrealistic goals. We have no common border with Israel and no problems of the kind
that we have, for instance, with India. So why not at least neutralize Israel rather than force it into being a
sworn enemy of Pakistan and a close military ally of India, as is happening these days.”99 He w nt on to says
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that “because of the growing awareness the common man in Pakistan, like his counterpart in the Arab world,
has started to reassess the situation. If anybody has a genuine dispute with Israel it is the Palestinians or the
neighboring Arab countries and if they start modifying their stance toward Israel, very little moral ground is left
for us to continue the old policy.”100
The support for the Arab–Israeli peace process in Pakistan is derived mainly from the feeling that some day
Palestinians will be better off and will be in charge of their destiny. Pakistanis also understand the fact that if
Israel has caused destruction to Palestinians, the Arab countries should also not be absolved of their anti-
Palestinian attitudes and policies. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon have contributed to the ordeals of
Palestinians. Therefore, the PLO–Israeli accord, despite its demerits, gives an opportunity to the Palestinians to
achieve a sovereign status. Since the beginning, Pakistan has supported the Arab–Palestinian struggle against
Israel. This has happened despite the expression of Arab bias in favor of India. When India has changed its Israel
policy without the Arab chagrin, why should Pakistan stick to its anti-Israel stand? Perhaps, when domestic
opposition against Israel declines, Islamabad will be in a better position to adopt a pragmatic approach vis-à-vis
the Jewish state.
The U.S. Role in South Asian Conflict Management
U.S. policy toward South Asia began with a low-profile engagement in the regional affairs during the post-
independence period and obtained a high profile during the Cold War years. Washington’s approach vis-à-vis
Indo–Pak conflicts was based on non-involvement until it was compelled to take sides because of strategic
reasons like Pakistan joining the Western-sponsored security alliance system during the Cold War period and the
warming of relations between New Delhi and Moscow. The New Delhi–Moscow–Kabul axis also shaped the
future role of Washington in South Asia. Unlike the Middle East where the United States consistently
maintained a high-profile engagement for conflict management and resolution, in South Asia it sometimes
maintained its involvement and sometimes abandoned its efforts for rapprochement between India and Pakistan,
particularly on the Kashmir dispute. The recent U.S. policy vis-à-vis South Asia is two-pronged: it is directed to
encourage an India–Pakistan settlement on the Kashmir dispute and is also aimed at supporting an
Islamabad–New Delhi understanding on the nuclear issue. On a broader level, the U.S.–South Asian relations are
also shaped by growing cooperation in economic and commercial fields.
The earliest U.S. initiative for settling the Kashmir dispute was launched during the Eisenhower
administration. The Dixon plan was another step by Washington to help normalize India–Pakistan ties by
settling the core issue, Kashmir. Since then U.S.–South Asian policy has remained inconsistent and has
witnessed interventions and withdrawals; the U.S. agenda for South Asia has also been devoid of clear goals and
objectives. The recent U.S. concern vis-à-vis South Asian security issues is mainly on the question of missile
and nuclear proliferation. It is this issue that has compelled Washington to play some role in South Asia with a
serious agenda.
The post-Cold War era also marked a change in the U.S.–South Asian policy. The special relationship with
Pakistan, which was the outcome of the U.S. policy to contain communism and its support of resistance
movements in Afghanistan against the Soviet military occupation, declined substantially. The suspension of
U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan in October 1990 further strained Pak–U.S. relations. Indo–U.S.
relations, unlike the Cold War years, improved qualitatively.
One basic assumption about the new U.S. policy toward South Asia is that now relations have an
economic agenda as well as military and security considerations. In the case of Pakistan also, the issue is not
reverting to the old-style relations that existed during the Cold War years, but to reorient these on economic and
commercial grounds. Cooperation in the areas of anti-terrorism and controlling drug trafficking is a marked
departure from the traditional mode of Pak–U.S. relations. Yet, the focus of U.S. policy vis-à-vis India and
Pakistan is still on nuclear proliferation and the tension between the two countries over Kashmir. Given the
changing nature of India–Pakistan relations and the looming threat of hostilities breaking out, it is not
unrealistic to expect the United States to play a meaningful role in preventing this from happening. As for U.S.
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mediation for resolving the India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and the nuclear issue, some circles expect to
see the launch of a Middle East type peace process in South Asia. Although, opposed by India and favored by
Pakistan, mediation is still a distant possibility. Table 10 highlights important issues in U.S. policy toward
India and Pakistan.
From the above table two important points are worth discussion. First, there are more areas of harmony
between Islamabad and Washington than between New Delhi and Washington. Curtailment of terrorism,
religious extremism, self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the South Asian missile race,
and opposition to granting a seat to India on the UN Security Council are the issues where to a large extent the
United States and Pakistan share similar perceptions. Second, realizing that the nuclear issue is an effect of the
larger conflict between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute, the United States is not opposed to a linkage
between the two and has suggested that the two countries resolve the dispute.
According to news reports, some Indian circles anticipate that the United States may re-launch the Dixon
plan for Kashmir. Named after its author, Sir Owen Dixon who was the UN representative for India and Pakistan
in 1950, the plan envisages a division of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had
favored the Dixon plan, but it was a non-starter because Liaquat Ali Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan
rejected the proposal. The Dixon plan proposed two ways for implementing a solution to the Kashmir dispute.
The first option envisaged several plebiscites, area by area, in the whole of the disputed territory of Kashmir.
Each designated area would then be allowed to India or Pakistan depending on the outcome of the voting. The
alternative was to allocate parts of Kashmir with known preferences toward India or Pakistan to the respective
countries without holding a plebiscite. A referendum would be limited only to those parts of Kashmir where
both India and Pakistan claimed support in their favor.101
It is suspected in New Delhi that the United States has launched a secret initiative to bring India and
Pakistan to the negotiating table. The objective of this new initiative is to persuade Islamabad and New Delhi to
seriously discuss the future of Kashmir. According to information pieced together by Indian Expr ss from
various highly placed sources, the Dixon plan, proposed 44 years ago, has been revived by the U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms. Robin Raphel. If the Dixon plan is endorsed by leaders in India and
Pakistan as an acceptable basis for negotiations leading to a settlement of the Kashmir problem, the next logical
step would be an “Oslo-type” secret meeting between Islamabad and New Delhi. India is not opposed to such a
meeting. Soon after the Oslo meeting, which resulted in a peace process involving Israel and the Palestinians,
Indian External Affairs Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh told a Gulf newspaper that India favored such a meeting
provided it produced results. However, in view of the extreme sensitivity of the new U.S. initiative, no one in
authority in India, Pakistan, or the United States is, as yet, willing to go on record about what is going on
behind the scenes about Kashmir.102
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TABLE 10 Issues in U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan
Issues United States India Pakistan
Signing of NPT Very supportive Conditional supportConditional support
Self-determination for Kashmiris
according to UN resolutions
Agrees: wants to include
Kashmiris in any agreement
Against Favors
Economic cooperation Agrees Agrees Agrees
Terrorism No longer critical of PakistanCritical of U.S. policy
to absolve Pakistan
Agrees
Religious fundamentalism Concerned Concerned Concerned
Missile race Concerned Disagrees with U.S.
policy
Support for U.S.
policy
UN Security Council for India Opposed Supportive Opposed
Land for peace formula to settle
the Kashmir dispute
Supportive Opposed Supportive
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Voice of America (VOA) reported that Robin Raphel presented a five-point formula of Washington’s policy
regarding Indian occupied Kashmir. According to Raphel, the United States considered Kashmir a disputed
territory and its future should be decided, keeping in view the wishes of the Kashmiris, through a dialogue
between Pakistan and India. Washington urged a negotiated settlement of the dispute and asked Pakistan and
India for resolving their all outstanding problems through dialogue.103
The official U.S. policy on Kashmir was stated at a press conference of regional press correspondents on 1
March 1995 in Washington D.C. by Robin Raphel. She argued:
our view on the status of Kashmir has not changed. We still are of the view that the geographical area of
former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and the entire geographic area is disputed territory. Our view
remains the same. In terms of the U.S. role, we are of the view that the dispute over Kashmir needs to be
resolved by India and Pakistan sitting down at the table and seriously engaging in negotiations on that issue.
We also believe that for any resolution to be stable and long-lasting, the wishes of the Kashmiri people have
to be taken into account. Exactly how you do that. It is not our place to prescribe.
Referring to a question about U.S. mediation to resolve the Kashmir dispute, she said that
if both India and Pakistan wished for a more explicit U.S. role in solving the Kashmir dispute we will be
happy to do that. In Pakistan we have often heard, for example, why don’t you mediate like you have done in
West Asia. I have always replied to that in order to be a mediator, you have to be accepted as such by both
sides. In this case, we do not have that. Pakistan wishes it but India does not for its own reasons. Therefore,
we have not been able to play a role. But we stand willing and, meanwhile, we do what we can to encourage
the two governments to sit down and talk about it.”104
Furthermore, a Pentagon spokesman, Mr. Kenneth Bacon, at a press briefing in Washington D.C. on 18
January 1995 said that
the Kashmir dispute is essentially a bilateral issue although it did not preclude a role for the United States in
solving the same. The visit to India and Pakistan by the U.S. Defense Secretary, Mr. William Perry, has laid
the foundation for talking to the two countries on Kashmir and that while neither had asked the United States
to play a role, they did not reject the idea. Ultimately the Kashmir dispute and other disputes between these
two countries have to be solved by them. It has to be solved with an eye on the will of the people of Kashmir,
but we at least now have a foundation for talking to the two countries that we didn’t have before, and serving
in some role if they ask us to do that, because I do think that we have won the trust of the leaders in both of
these countries.105
The Iranian Foreign Minister is not alone in accusing Washington of taking advantage of the India–Pakistan
standoff on Kashmir. A segment of Indian intelligentsia is very critical of Washington’s role in South Asia. To
these circles, the United States has a secret agenda to accomplish using the Kashmir dispute. An analogy of the
U.S. dealings with the Irish and with the Kashmir conflicts was drawn by an Indian writer saying that
the United States has damaged the cause of peace in Northern Ireland and Kashmir, the two regional conflicts
with some similarities. In another incredible development, Washington has declared that Pakistan is in the
forefront of nations working to combat international terrorism. Less than six months ago Pakistan was on
the U.S. watch-list as a terrorism-sponsoring state. By implication, the United States considers evidence
given for more than five years by Delhi, of Islamabad’s material involvement in Kashmir, as inconclusive
rubbish. This lends credence to the Pakistani claim that terrorism in Kashmir is indigenous. The single
important lesson for Delhi and London is that while Washington talks of allies and cooperative engagements
for regional peace, U.S. foreign policy never looks beyond its national interests and its credibility is low:
much to the displeasure of Britain, the Irish community in the United States got Clinton to jump the gun;
similarly, as America wants Pakistan to extradite convicted terrorists who are hiding there, it has declared
that Islamabad is fighting forces of Islamic fundamentalism.106
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Another aspect of Indian perception of the U.S. role is held by K. Subrahmanyam, who feels that the Clinton
administration has set a secret agenda for an independent Kashmir. Arguing for his contention he says:
there is no doubt that there are sections of the Democratic Party administration that would like to see an
independent Kashmir to use it as a base to pursue their policies in Central Asia, Tibet and Xinjiang. In
addition, there is yet another element in the U.S. policy toward India that appears to induce sections of the
U.S. administration to keep tensions between India and Pakistan alive, the nuclear issue. Pakistan is willing
to play this game and hence the Pakistani linkage between Kashmir and the nuclear issue and their
characterizing the Kashmir issue as the core one.107
Here lies the problem, some of India’s—and also Pakistan’s—strategic thinkers evolve conspiracy theories
for any foreign move supporting CR. The same problem existed and to some extent still exists in the
Arab–Israeli context where some suspicion and mistrust vis-à-vis the U.S. role in the Middle East can still be
found. But to a large extent, the level of suspicion and mistrust held by the Arabs about the United States has
not prevented the United States from playing a major mediator role in the regional peace process. The reason is
that Arabs and Israelis expect more in return from Washington if they seek normal relations under U.S.
auspices, rather than losing everything if they maintain a war-like situation in the Middle East. However, in the
case of India and Pakistan, behind every U.S. move for Indo–Pak amity some conspiracy theory is formulated in
New Delhi and in Islamabad.
There is so much suspicion in U.S.–South Asian relations that a U.S. initiative for peace in the region is
termed a conspiracy to impose a U.S.-supported settlement. Furthermore, unlike Israel which since its inception
has been a staunch U.S. ally, there is no country in South Asia comparable to Israel that could be trusted by
Washington. Pakistan which for economic and security reasons has supported the U.S. policies in the past is
not expected to play the same role because of the changed strategic environment of the region. The Soviet Union
has ceased to exist and its successor state, the Russian Federation is not in a position to play a role comparable
to that of the United States. Because Russia has little clout left in South Asian affairs it is not a target of
domestic criticism and the United States has obtained a position of a whipping boy both in India and Pakistan.
Mindful of these realities the possibility of any tangible U.S. role in the India–Pakistan peace process does not
seem to be forthcoming. Even if some circles push Washington to mediate in the Kashmir conflict, directly or
indirectly, the political environment of South Asia is such that U.S. policy makers will think many times
before agreeing to play a role similar to that played in the Middle East peace process.
The success of the U.S. role in the Middle East is evident, whereas, in the case of India and Pakistan the
possibility is still remote. What the United States can do to reduce the tension between India and Pakistan and
promote a meaningful dialogue between the two adversaries is to continue its encouragement for track-II
diplomacy. Support for peace efforts launched by opinion makers will have far more impact and credibility than
sponsoring a dialogue involving those who are not able to influence popular perception and opinion. Any U.S.
step beyond this area will be counter-productive and harbor further suspicion and mistrust of the United States in
South Asia. Unlike the Arab–Israeli conflict, the road to peace in South Asia does not pass through
Washington.
Other Regional Initiatives. In the past, several countries have offered their assistance for the resolution of
India–Pakistan conflicts. The former Soviet Union, Britain, Iran, and some Arab countries contacted New Delhi
and Islamabad in this regard. Moscow’s mediation led to the signing of Tashkent agreement in January 1966.
Currently, apart from the United States, Iran and China are considered as potential mediators between India and
Pakistan. Islamabad is amenable to third party mediation but such an opportunity is meaningless unless
reciprocated by New Delhi.
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Valayeti during his visit to India in January 1996 advised both
Islamabad and New Delhi to focus on economic cooperation rather than military confrontation. He blamed the
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United States for dividing the two Asian countries so as to accomplish its covert motives. He told the
Confederation of Indian Industry in Bombay on 12 January that “India’s relations with Pakistan, troubled by
arms sales by the United States and always prickly because of two nations’ dispute over Kashmir could be
helped by economic cooperation. If we want to strengthen peaceful relations between India and Pakistan, apart
from solving traditional difficulties, we must develop the positive points. If they (India and Pakistan) have
economic cooperation, certainly the future of relations between the two countries will be more promising.”108
He said the expected gas pipeline being planned from southern Iran via Pakistan to India would help bring
smoother relations between India and Pakistan. Iran’s role for Indo–Pak rapprochement is worth examination.
Because of its neutral posture, Teheran has established good will in New Delhi and in Islamabad.
It has been reported in a section of the Indian press that Saudi Arabia was keen to help mend the bridges
between India and Pakistan and had been making diplomatic efforts aimed at easing the tension over Kashmir.
These diplomatic initiatives had the full backing of the United States. Keeping in mind Saudi Arabia’s friendly
relations with both India and Pakistan, the United States encouraged Saudi Arabia to do all it could to break the
ice between the subcontinent neighbors. Washington was also keen that no impediment come in the way of the
Saudi diplomatic moves. A Kashmiri leader, who was consulted on possible solutions to the issue said,
“Washington meant business and thereafter thought that the involvement of nations like Saudi Arabia would
make things easier for the parties involved.”109 He, however, admitted that very little headway has been made in
this respect. “Leaders of various Kashmiri political parties including the All Parties Freedom Conference, have
disclosed that Washington and Riyadh have been in touch with each other along with the Narasimha Rao and
Benazir Bhutto governments to discuss ways and means of bringing India, Pakistan, and the representatives of
the Kashmiri people to the negotiating table and start tripartite talks aimed at a peaceful, lasting solution to the
problem that has cast such a long shadow in the past.”110 As yet, there has not been any credible evidence of
Saudi interest to resolve the India–Pakistan conflicts and given the fact that Saudi Arabia has consistently
supported Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute, it may not be able to obtain the confidence of New Delhi.
CBMs and Prospects for Track-II Diplomacy between India and Pakistan
Like the Middle East peace process, the methodology for CM and CR between India and Pakistan has important
key features such as the official and non-official dialogue commonly known as track-I and track-II diplomacy, the
adoption of CBMs, and talk for normalization in relations. But the problem with CBMs between India and
Pakistan is that these could be misused. The example is the hotline arrangement between the Directors of
General Military Operations on the two sides. During the Brasstacks military exercises, a lot of
misunderstanding was created by both sides as a result of the inadequate use of the hotline. There were some
grounds to suspect the Pakistanis for the effective use of hotline but they in turn claim that India had been
feeding inaccurate information. What is certain is that mutual suspicions eroded the value of this confidence-
building measure and that Indian military planners quickly took a suspicious view of information coming from
Pakistan.111 Table 11 highlights the official Indo–Pak perceptions on CM, CBMs, and CR as approaches to end
the cold war between New Delhi and Islamabad and to establish working relations between the two countries.
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As with their nuclear policy, where both New Delhi and Islamabad feel proud to adopt ambiguity, their
handling of CBMs is also dubious. While recognizing the merit of CBMs in reducing tension in South Asia,
India and Pakistan are not hesitant to look for reasons that could explain their policies contrary to the practice of
CBMs. For Pakistan unless the Kashmir dispute is settled according to the UN Security Council resolution,
CBMs or CM cannot work in South Asia. India rejects this argument and holds that CBMs can only work with
Pakistan if the latter stops its interference in Indian controlled Kashmir. The Gordian knot of CBMs is the
policy of “negative diplomacy” followed by New Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan is not ready to use diplomacy
for the pragmatic handling of the Kashmir dispute and New Delhi is unwilling to adopt diplomatic perseverance
in settling its major conflict with Pakistan. On the contrary, both India and Pakistan take pleasure in pursuing
propaganda warfare as an instrument of negative diplomacy. The result is stalemate and the appearance of an
uncertain future in South Asia.
The Kashmir dispute has been identified by the world as an important obstacle to the South Asian peace
process and a significant challenge for track-II diplomacy. Parallel to the Palestine problem, the Kashmir dispute
is termed as intricate and complicated for a perpetual state of tension in South Asia. When Egypt under Sadat
realized, no matter how belatedly, that the PLO’s ambition to dismantle Israel and establish a Palestinian state
was unattainable, he embarked on a separate peace process with Israel on the basis of the “land for peace”
formula. In the case of South Asia, Pakistan has rejected every suggestion to normalize relations with India
without the settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions. This has not
happened in the Middle East where the Palestinian problem, although considered a core issue in the Arab–Israeli
conflict, did not block efforts for Israeli–Egyptian normalization in relations. Even in the case of Palestine, the
PLO’s dream to dismantle Israel and establish an independent Palestinian state was considered impractical by
many Arab and Palestinian leaders. As a result, the PLO ended its state of war with Israel, granted recognition to
the Jewish state, and agreed to accept limited autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank as a first step toward
achieving sovereign status.
It is in the context of the Palestinian problem and efforts for peace building between Israel and the Arab
states that India and Pakistan need to learn lessons. It is another story that unlike the Palestine problem, the
Kashmir dispute has not received proper world attention, but is considered by some sources as a high-profile
conflict between India and Pakistan that, if not resolved, could lead to another war in the region. Yet the high-
profile nature of the Kashmir dispute is not contributing much to draw global attention in preventing a
dangerous crisis situation in South Asia.
As pointed out in The Economist (London) after the Kashmir dispute last flared up in 1989 the United
States began quietly sponsoring CBMs to calm things down. The revolt in Kashmir in 1989 looked as though it
might provoke another war. Worried, the United States sent Robert Gates, a senior White House official (and
later head of the CIA), to Islamabad and Delhi. His aim was to produce a more rational relationship between the
two countries. One of his suggestions was to reduce the risk of war by opening lines of communication between
TABLE 11 India–Pakistan Perceptions on CM, CBMs, and CR
Issues India Pakistan
Kashmir as a core issue for the success of CR, CM, and CBMsDisagreement Agreement
People to people contacts Supportive Linked to the settlement of
Kashmir dispute
Adoption of CBMs for avoiding another war in South AsiaAgreement Agreement
Strengthening of SAARC for regional cooperation Optimistic Not very optimistic
Mutual mistrust and suspicion On rise On rise
Hostile propaganda On rise On rise
Lack of confidence to improve relations Applicable Applicable
Relevance of CR, CM, and CBMs for peace between India and
Pakistan
P rtial optimism Pessimism
Support for track-II diplomacy Obvious Less supportive
Seeking foreign assistance for CM and CR Opposed Supportive
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the two armies, another was to promote an “unofficial dialogue” so that the two sides might know each other’s
minds better. Some useful things have happened. Both sides now give notice of military maneuvers and
exercises, a hot line among military commanders is in place, violations of air space have stopped, a treaty
banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons now exists, and lists have been exchanged of nuclear
facilities.112 But there are limited effects of all this. The rise of Hindu extremism in India is running parallel
with the resurgence of Islamic passions in Pakistan which makes rapprochement difficult. Pakistan remains
opposed to the exchange of military delegations because, officials say, it would “create a false sense of
bonhomie.”113
Indo–Pak relations are not a hostage of the Kashmir dispute but are buried under the “enemy image” about
each other. This has led to the erosion of confidence between New Delhi and Islamabad. It is not necessary here
to prove how much damage the “enemy image” has caused to the development and progress of the people of the
two countries but one thing is certainly clear: strong vested interest groups on both sides have not only kept the
“enemy image” intact, but over the years have made it a matter of state policy. An important casualty of “enemy
image” between New Delhi and Islamabad is peace and stability in South Asia. Taking advantage of the
ignorance of the people of the two countries, the so-called custodians of national interests have not drawn any
line to distinguish good and bad people but have in a sweeping manner termed all the Hindus living in India and
all the Muslims living in Pakistan as evil.
A classical example of promoting an “enemy image” in Pakistan is found in the policies of some right-
wing political parties and groups particularly Jama t-e-Islami. Jamaat is vehemently opposed to establishing
normal relations with India unless the Kashmir dispute is resolved to Pakistan’s advantage.
Jamaat is not only a political and religious group in Pakistan; it has strong overseas connections with like-
minded elements and domestically it also has an influence in the army and bureaucracy. It is a staunch opponent
of India and Israel and unlike its past soft-corner for the United States, in the post-Cold War era is dead set
against any U.S. role in the region. Therefore, it represents a school of thought in Pakistan that calls for the
dismantling of the existing order and its replacement with an Islamic system. While addressing a seminar on
“Kashmir, National Interests and Trade with India” in Lahore the Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussain
Ahmad, said “unless the Kashmir issue is solved the agreements of trade relations with India will amount to
hamper the Kashmir movement and concurrently Indian hegemony would be established. Although trade could
not be rejected with any country for financial benefit, economic ties with India would mean to forget the
sacrifices of Kashmir and bargaining on national interests under the new world order, as the Western world wants
to make India an elder brother of South Asian region.”114 The same is true in India where the BJP and Shiv
Sena have left no opportunity to perpetuate the “enemy image” about Pakistan. A large segment of Indian
society is not carried away with the BJP–Shiv Sena crusade against Pakistan but the feelings of hate and malice
propagated by these parties is sufficient to hamper efforts for peace and stability in South Asia. Indeed, Jamaa -i-
Islami and BJP are called obstructionists in the Indo–Pak peace process. Their counterparts in Israel and in the
Arab world are doing the same thing.
Some people believe that the concept of confidence-building, which originated in Europe during the Cold
War, does not travel well to South Asia. The Cold War was a struggle of ideologies whereas historical
experience, especially that of communal conflict, remains at the core of the subcontinent’s animosities. A
premeditated war in Europe, some say, was very unlikely. In the subcontinent, the evidence suggests that all the
three India–Pakistan wars were planned.115 CBMs are considered useful in South Asia only to the extent that
they provide some breathing space to the conflict-ridden countries of the region. Activities held to promote
confidence-building are viewed with suspicion by the officials of India and Pakistan. The biggest challenge faced
by the protagonists of CBMs in South Asia is to enforce the practicality of that concept and to counter the
negative response from the official circles.
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Table 12 illustrates important CBMs reached between India and Pakistan. It shows that despite deep-rooted
mistrust and suspicion between the two countries, a number of steps have been taken to normalize relations.
The CBMs stated above were reached between the governments of India and Pakistan and are considered to
be still in practice despite the high level of tension in their relations. Except for the Simla accord, all the other
CBMs are focused on establishing confidence in military and diplomatic fields. Since 1992 there has been a
stalemate in the area of confidence-building between New Delhi and Islamabad. In the absence of an effective
mechanism for CBMs in non-military areas, it is difficult to predict bright prospects for that approach in South
Asia. The governments of India and Pakistan tend to discourage steps to promote goodwill and amity at the
popular level. The lack of people-to-people interaction has not evolved the process of CBMs in the two
countries.
From time to time, the official response of New Delhi and Islamabad toward non-governmental initiatives
for peace and harmony is hostile. For example, the Pakistan government has criticized the holding of non-
official talks. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali told Dawn that Pakistan had nothing to do
with the so-called “secret” nuclear talks held in the Indian state of Goa in January 1995 where non-governmental
officials from New Delhi and Islamabad reportedly made “unusual progress” on nuclear disarmament in the
region. He also dismissed speculations of Pakistan indulging in a “track-II diplomacy” with India and the United
States over nuclear non-proliferation. However commenting on the similar four-nation unofficial conference on
disarmament held in February 1994 in Shanghai he said that “we sent Pakistan’s ambassador to India, Riaz
Khokhar, to Shanghai where he read out a statement on behalf of the Pakistan government. He however, did not
participate in the proceedings.”116 Pakistan and India remain poles apart at non-official talks too. The non-
official talks between India and Pakistan started in 1987 and since then (March 1995) non-official representatives
from India and Pakistan have met for than thirty-two times to discuss regional security issues such as Kashmir,
nuclear proliferation, and disarmament. The Goa talks focused on the nuclear issue, whereas those at Neemrana
concentrated on Kashmir.117 P agmatic elements in South Asia argue that the entire exercise of CBMs has failed
to produce positive results because of two reasons: first, despite subscribing theoretically to CBMs, in practical
terms the governments of India and Pakistan were and are least serious in building mutual trust and confidence,
promoting people-to-people interaction, preventing hostile propaganda, and resolving conflicts peacefully.
Second, both sides are unwilling to abandon their rigid positions on their disputes. Short of principles, there are
only ego and false sense of conceit involved in the decision-making circle of the two countries. As a result,
when it comes to practice, there is neither mutual confidence nor will to normalize relations. To sum up, the
main players in Indo–Pakistan power politics are the army and politicians. The army in Pakistan and politicians
in India have totally failed to improve things in the two countries and are accused of maintaining status quo to
their advantage.
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TABLE 12 List of Important CBMs
Date Result
Simla accord July 1972 Still considered as the only understanding reached
between New Deli and Islamabad on war-
avoidance and the peaceful resolution of disputes
Non-attack on each other’s nuclear
installations and facilities
December 1988So far successful
Advance notice for military exercises and
maneuvers
April 1991 Successful
Prevention of air and space violationsApril 1991 Successful
Joint declaration on the complete
prohibition of chemical weapons
1992 Successful
Agreement on the conduct of each other’s
diplomats
1992 Unsuccessful
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People-to-People Initiatives. P ople-to-people diplomacy is the core of non-military CBMs. In the absence of
official dialogue and the intensification of propaganda warfare between New Delhi and Islamabad, it is the non-
official interaction at various levels—despite its limitations—that has helped in keeping some of the lines of
communication open. Because track-I diplomacy has so far proved to be a failure in the India–Pakistan peace
process, some aspects of track-II diplomacy are considered to be successful in removing mistrust and suspicion
at the people-to-people contact. The first ever genuine dialogue at the popular level was held in New Delhi in
February 1995 under the auspices of the Pakistan–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy. It was a
follow-up to a meeting of Indians and Pakistanis held in New Delhi in November 1994 and organized by the
same forum. With participation by one hundred Indians and one hundred Pakistanis, the dialogue made a
significant breakthrough in track-II diplomacy. The recommendations of the first ever India–Pakistan People-to-
People Convention held in Delhi on February 24–25 clearly depicted the wishes of one billion people of India
and Pakistan.
The recommendations suggested that Pakistan and India should opt for bilateral nuclear disarmament, reduce
their military strength, stop human rights violations in Kashmir, free their states from religious influences and
introduce a secular curriculum in religious schools.118 Without mentioning the UN resolutions or the Simla
agreement, the joint resolution has asked for a democratic solution of the Kashmir issue. It has recommended
that the Pakistan government take measures to stop the supply of arms to Kashmir and that India should put an
end to human rights violations there. The participants also took into account the multi-lingual and multi-
religious reality of Jammu and Kashmir.119 According to Dr. Mubashir Hasan, one of the Pakistani organizers
of the dialogue, “in order to influence public opinion in favor of our peace initiative, two hundred participants
from different sections of society were invited.”120 As rightly said by an Indian writer, “the basis of people-to-
people dialogue does not lie in pious sentiments and woolly notions of the ‘Hindi–Pakistani Bhai–Bhai’ variety.
Nor does it lie in nostalgic or romantic ideas of a subcontinent confederation, or involve the obliteration of
major differences between the two societies and political systems.”121
In the summary of proceedings and resolutions of the two day convention on peace and democracy held in
New Delhi on 24 and 25 February 1995 all important issues affecting India–Pakistan relations were covered and
pragmatic solutions were outlined For instance, on the issue of militarization, a statement of Prof. Dinesh
Mohan of the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, insisted that “the people must demand war be outlawed.
Between India and Pakistan we have failed to rule out war between us. Repeatedly creating a war psychosis is
very dangerous and can develop a dynamic of its own and result in a war by misperception and miscalculation.
Peace in the subcontinent can only be achieved by giving up the nuclear option.”122
The next round of India–Pakistan people-to-people dialogue was held in Lahore from 10 to 11 November
1995. In an atmosphere charged with mutual hostility, suspicion, and absence of any official peace process, the
holding of an Indo–Pak dialogue—attended by 80 Indians and 120 Pakistanis from a cross-section of
society—can be termed as a great success. Participants in that convention mainly deliberated on four subjects:
Kashmir, demilitarization, religious intolerance, democratic polity and economic cooperation. The Lahore
convention was a follow-up of the Delhi meeting. However, the Lahore Convention was:
significant for its decision to set up action programs to promote the Pakistan–India People’s Forum for Peace
and Democracy’s objectives endorsed at the Delhi Convention. The Forum also resolved to appoint a number
of Indo–Pak joint committees to: a) hold discussions with Kashmiris for a peaceful solution of the issue; b)
monitor the conduct of military and para-military forces with civil population; c) organize the public
campaigns for demilitarization; d) undertake revision of school books; e) organize meetings among various
groups from both countries to demolish prejudices. The most visible feature of the moot was the participants’
                                                
118. See Adnan Adil, “Track-Two Diplomacy Between India and Pakistan Picks Up,” Friday Times (Lahore), 9–15 March 1995, p. 3.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. For Indo–Pak people’s dialogue see Praful Bidwai, “A Détente from Below Relevance of Indo–Pak People’s Dialogue,” Front-
line (Madras), 24 March 1995.
122. Summary of Proceedings and Resolutions of the Two-Day Convention on Peace and Democracy, 24–25 February 1995, p. 1.
48 Moonis Ahmar
strong urge for communication and coordination among various groups of NGOs, women and environment
organizations, trade unions, and business associations of the two countries.123
Some of the Pakistani and Indian participants of that convention have remained in touch with each other and
have sought to involve various local groups in support of their program. It has been suggested by some circles
that one way to reduce India–Pakistan tension is to hold a dialogue between the hard-line leaders of both sides.
Because a major obstacle in the way of peace in South Asia is the attitude of such leaders, a dialogue held at that
level will help them understand different issues in a rational manner. Similarly, fresh dialogue between
opposition parties of the two countries will also reduce tension in the region. Beyond any shadow of doubt the
convention has significantly added to the peace process in South Asia at the non-governmental level. A few
years ago issues discussed and agreed at the convention were inconceivable. Perhaps, the dialogue going on
between Indian and Pakistani participants is reaching the stage of a similar exercise that was going on in the
Middle East peace process two decades ago.
In September 1992, the first ever conference of opposition parties of South Asia was held in Karachi.
Sponsored by Benazir Bhutto, Chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party and the then leader of Opposition in
Pakistan’s National Assembly, the initiative helped in building contacts among political groups and parties of
the region. Similarly, the International Center for Peace Initiatives in Bombay, India, also organized a workshop
for parliamentarians of South Asia in May 1995 in Male, Maldives.124 The meeting focused on resolving
conflicts in South Asia by following track-two diplomacy.
One interesting aspect of the India–Pakistan state of cold war and confrontation was examined by a
Pakistani economist. Speaking on “Pakistan’s economic and political options” at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq a former planning and finance minister of Pakistan, urged the
governments of Pakistan and India “to cut down on their defense spending and divert their resources to banish
poverty and achieve sustainable development in two countries. No sane person would gamble with national
security, but the cost of confrontation between India and Pakistan was undesirable. The two countries were
spending $20 billion to purchase weapons every year at the expense of their starving people. The two countries
can provide clean water, education, health care, and other basic facilities to millions of the poor by cutting down
their spending on the purchase of arms. There are two soldiers to each doctor in the two countries, and their
peoples have a greater chance of dying because of lack of medical facilities than in a conflict.” He agreed with a
suggestion that leaders of the two countries would not dare to take the risk of being dubbed as traitors by
slashing defense expenditure as it would be seen unpatriotic, but, someone will have to take the initiative for the
sake of the poor.125 Dr. Haq’s assertion for a cut in India–Pakistan defense expenditures shows the trend in
South Asia. Will it be possible for hawks to prevent the irreversible process of change? For how long, the
people at the helm of affairs in India and Pakistan can ensure things to their advantage? Much of the hope from
the India–Pakistan peace process is from emerging leaders. The first ever India–Pakistan people’s convention has
given a right sense of direction for peace, namely to the younger generation.126
According to a renowned Indian journalist, Nikhil Chakravartty:
to say that India will settle with other neighbors first, before tackling problems with Pakistan is totally
unrealistic approach which has the danger of creating further disagreement. It is imperative that an earnest
attempt be made toward taking the first steps in building an enduring structure of India–Pakistan
understanding. The experience of the last four decades makes it clear that such a structure of India–Pakistan
understanding can be realizable only when there is some progress toward the solution of the Kashmir
question. And the Kashmir question will always baffle solution if India were to start talking first to Pakistan,
an act which has the danger of generating suspicion among militants in the Kashmir valley that a deal is
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being worked out between the two governments to decide their fate. Rather New Delhi has to start the other
way round. First, talk to the leaders of the more accredited among the militant groups. Second, when some
tangible progress is made toward an understanding, then the Pakistan government could be approached for a
positive attitude toward such an endeavor, toward a settlement based on mutual understanding and goodwill.
Realism, therefore, demands that any meaningful progress toward South Asian regional cooperation has to
begin with improved and enduring understanding between India and Pakistan. The priority issue in this sector
is the settlement of the Kashmir question. And for settling the Kashmir question, there is no other way but to
talk directly to the leaders of the militants.127
How many people in India and in Pakistan belonging to different fields subscribe to the views of Mahbub-
ul-Haq or Nikhil Chakravartty? Or if they subscribe, what steps do they recommend for peace in South Asia? As
happens in situations similar to the protection of “supreme national interests,” hardly any one in India or in
Pakistan who has a key policy position would like to offer unilateral concessions on Kashmir or on the nuclear
issue. Defense expenditures of India and Pakistan reflect the mind set of the establishment that sees the problem
of security as a legitimate pretext for expanding military power at the expense of human development.
Table 13 shows the progress in track-II diplomacy between India and Pakistan. The data is based on the
literature survey and discussion with concerned people on this topic. Track-II diplomacy has been more
successful in areas where delegates from both sides belonged to a wider cross-section of society and had diverse
views about each other. Unlike some cases where former policy makers and people representing the elite strata
of the society participated in various discussions, the dialogue organized by “India–Pakistan People’s Forum for
Peace and Democracy” which was held in New Delhi in February 1995 and in Lahore that same year
accomplished positive results. As a follow-up to the Delhi and Lahore rounds, the people who participated on
those occasions are trying to maintain contact with each other and broaden the message of peace and friendship.
Despite official restrictions imposed on the free movement of people from both sides and the hostile and
chauvinistic attitude of the governments and hawkish elements, those who participated in the Delhi dialogue
succeeded in holding independent discussion with each other on critical issues.
In order to make this dialogue more effective, it has been suggested that conservative elements from both
sides also be invited. Currently, the trend in these types of dialogue is that participants with liberal and moderate
views and with more or less similar perceptions keep on recycling similar ideas that are not accepted by more
conservative elements in their respective societies and therefore these dialogues fail to reduce tension. If
conservative elements, mainly right-wing political groups and organizations and some sections of the vernacular
press, are involved in this process and a dialogue is arranged among them, it will be possible to understand why
hatred between Indians and Pakistanis at the popular level is promoted and how it c ul be reduced.
Two Peace Processes: Similarities and Differences
Is a comparison of an actual Middle East peace process and a hypothetical South Asia peace process possible?
Our brief answer is ye. Based on historical facts, there is an analogy between Arab–Israeli and India–Pakistani
conflicts. Religious, political, psychological, and security factors transcend the conflictual relationship between
Arabs and Israelis and Indians and Pakistanis. Tables 14 and 15 compare issues in the Middle East and South
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TABLE 13 Progress in India–Pakistan Track-II Diplomacy
Issues Progress Results
Interaction among politicians Less frequent Mixed
Interaction among journalists Frequent Positive
Exchange of perceptions among academicians Average Mixed
Interaction among retired servicemen and bureaucrats Frequent Mixed-positive
Interaction at the grass-root level Marginal Poor
Official rejection of the process Frequent Negative
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Asia and factors in Israeli–Palestinian conflicts.
In modern times, most of the wars in the Middle East and South Asia were fought because of unresolved
core conflicts. In the case of the Arab–Israeli peace process, the core conflict—Palestine—is still far from the
final settlement. Both Israel and the PLO had to compromise on the core issue to seek positive results in the
Middle East peace process. In the case of India and Pakistan, Kashmir—the core issue—has not compelled the
two countries to find a middle course and break the gordian knot.
Some points of comparison between the India–Pakistan and Arab–Israeli peace processes are:
• There has been UN involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict and, at one early stage, a similar involvement
in the case of India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.
• The role of third party mediation in resolving Arab–Israeli disputes, especially by the United States after
the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, gave an impetus to the efforts for de-escalation of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In
the case of South Asia, third party involvement began with the U.S. effort for India–Pakistan
reconciliation from 1960 to 1964 followed by the Soviet mediation in Tashkent in January 1966. The
United States has offered to mediate India–Pakistan conflicts which are now centered on the Kashmir and
nuclear issues.
• The adoption of (CBMs) in the Middle East and in South Asia provided an opportunity for the
strengthening of regional peace processes. However, because of deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion at the
governmental and non-governmental levels, CBMs contributed little in achieving a breakthrough in the
TABLE 14 Comparison of Middle East and South Asian Issues
Issues Arabs and Israelis Indians and Pakistanis
Ideological Arab nationalism and Zionism Two nation-theory. Religious extremism
Political Israel’s and PLO’s quest for legitimacy
and recognition
Ambitions of India and Pakistan
to alter status quo
Territorial Arab occupied areas Kashmir and Siachen
Personalities Role of hard-liners Role of hawkish elements
TABLE 15 Common and Divergent Factors in Kashmir and Palestine Conflicts
Factors Kashmir Palestine
Religious factor Applicable Applicable (not very strong)
Nationalism Not very strong Applicable
The role of terrorism Very High High
Reason for war (in the past) Applicable Applicable
Threat of war (in future ) Exists Remote
Involvement of external elements for peace Significant Not yet significant
Domestic pressure for peace Significant Significant
Involvement of external elements in conflict Significant Not as significant
Excessive use of state forces to suppress Palestinian
Intifada and the Kashmiri resistance movements
Applicable Applicable
Quest for independence On the rise On the decline
Quest for autonomy On the decline On the rise
Possibility for a breakthrough Insignificant Significant
Sense of losing options for settlement Not applicable now Applicable
Popular uprising Applicable Applicable
Human rights violations High High
Internationalization of conflicts Not as applicable now Applicable
Effectiveness of guerrilla movements Significant Significant
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Indo–Pakistan peace process. Despite failures, CBMs are considered promising, especially in non-
governmental circles for future peace initiatives.
• The launching of track-I and track-II diplomacy was a significant factor in the Middle East and South Asian
peace processes. While track-I diplomacy has produced positive results in the Arab–Israeli context, such an
exercise has so far failed in normalizing India–Pakistan relations. However, in both the regions, track-II
diplomacy has helped in removing misperceptions and mistrust at the non-governmental level and, despite
failures, such a process should be sustained for the future of peace and cooperation in the two regions.
• A feeling of missed opportunities for peace, the dismissal of war as an option because of the Israeli
military superiority vis-à-vis Arabs, and the promise of benefits if Arabs and Israelis settled their disputes
contributed to the strengthening of the peace process in the Middle East. Such feelings, although absent,
may also help initiate a viable peace process between India and Pakistan. Although, because of the nuclear
factor, a fourth Indo–Pakistan War is considered only a remote possibility, so far there is no evidence to
prove that New Delhi and Islamabad have used the opportunity of war avoidance to resolve substantive
issues. On these grounds, unlike the Arab–Israeli peace process, there doesn’t exist a feeling of missed
opportunities for peace in South Asia.
• There is a growing influence of hawkish elements in Israel and among Palestinians against the Arab–Israeli
peace process. Extremist groups from both sides have condemned the PLO–Israeli accord and demanded its
abrogation. The assassination of Rabin is a recent example in this regard. The same problem exists in
South Asia where hard-line and hawkish elements, on account of their paranoia and negative feelings, resist
any effort for political reconciliation between India and Pakistan and threaten moderate elements with
serious consequences if they continue their efforts for normalization between the two countries.
There are also important differences in the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pak peace processes:
• The question of legitimacy has always remained an obstacle for a peace process between the Arabs and
Israelis. All the Arab states had refused to accept the existence of Israel and had vowed to dismantle the
Jewish state. On the contrary, legitimacy has not been a factor in the India–Pakistan peace process. Both
New Delhi and Islamabad recognize each other (despite the feeling of rejection held by some hawkish
elements in the two countries) and excluding a brief period of suspension in diplomatic relations during the
1965 and 1971 wars, have maintained their ties.
• Unlike the Middle East, South Asia has not remained an area of high priority for outside powers. Given
the U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East—the security of Israel, oil, and commercial
interests—Washington has played a high profile regional role there. Because of strategic reasons the
countries of Western Europe and Asia–Pacific consider the Middle East as an area of considerable
importance. This is not the case with South Asia where the United States, Europe, and Japan all have
marginal interests.
• The “land for peace” formula that became the core of the Middle East peace process is not yet relevant for
South Asia. Although some circles are suggesting the withdrawal of India and Pakistan from
Kashmir—leading to the establishment of an independent, neutralized and demilitarized Kashmir—as a
price for peace in South Asia, this idea has so far not received any serious consideration in New Delhi or
Islamabad.
• In the Middle East there is no regional organization that could help dilute tension and enhance cooperation.
However, in view of recent developments in the Middle East peace process, Israel and some Arab
countries—particularly Egypt and Jordan—are receptive to the idea of viable cooperation in economic and
commercial areas. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres is an ardent advocate of a Middle East Common
Market with no restrictions on the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. Cooperation in
the Middle East is currently bilateral and not regional. In South Asia, the South Asian Association of
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), despite its limitations, has provided a forum to the regional countries for
promoting cooperation in economic and other areas and has recently entered into an agreement for
establishing preferential trade and eliminating poverty from the region by the year 2005.
• In the Arab–Israeli conflicts all the front-line states, except Syria and Lebanon, have entered into peace
agreements with Israel. This has led to a relaxation in the free flow of people. In the case of India and
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Pakistan, there exists a hostile relationship discouraging interaction among the people of the two
countries.
The nuclear factor is another source of diversity in the two peace processes. While Israel has a nuclear
monopoly in the Middle East this is not the case in South Asia. India and Pakistan are believed to have a
nuclear capability. Israel’s nuclear dominance in the Middle East widened the level of “strategic inequality”
between Arabs and Israelis. This factor added to the mechanism of the peace process in the Middle East. In the
absence of a nuclear umbrella, Arab countries saw little reason to maintain a state of war with Tel Aviv.
Whereas, in South Asia, “nuclear deterrence” has removed the factor of “strategic inequality” and allowed New
Delhi and Islamabad to defer the peace process. This is not the case in the Middle East where no Arab country
can hit hack if Israel uses nuclear weapons.
The Role Of Elites. A major difference between the Middle Eastern and South Asian peace processes is that in
the case of the former people may not wholeheartedly be receptive to the peace process but there exists a
political will for peace among the elites and governments of the region. In contrast, in South Asia neither the
people (at least the majority) nor the governments are interested in establishing a conflict and tension-free
environment in the region. The priority for the rulers in South Asia is not CR but the sustenance of
intransigent positions on disputes. The price of confrontation and non-cooperation is not an issue. What is
essential to the regimes in power is the maintenance of status quo to their advantage.
What will happen if India and Pakistan have to curtail their defense forces and slash defense budgets? Will it
not affect those people who have thrived since 1947 by promoting mutual hatred as a justification for heavy
expenditures on defense and denying people the basic necessities of life? The status quo is thus clearly to the
advantage of those people who are at the helm of affairs. A change in the status quo will deprive them of power
and privileges. In the Middle East the peace process has not brought down the governments of the countries
involved in that process. Although in Israel the opposition Likud Party says so much against the peace process,
if it is voted into power it will be reluctant to roll back that process because of the ramifications such as serious
opposition from the outside world, particularly from the United States, and the renewal of violence in the West
Bank and Gaza. In Jordan, Egypt, and in the Palestinian populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza there are
powerful figures who are opposed to the peace process but they have not been able to cause any serious damage
to the peace process. Yet, in India and in Pakistan it is widely claimed that if the status quo is changed to the
detriment of any one country it would put the government of that state in trouble. In order to safeguard their
interests the elites of India and Pakistan see no reason to replace confrontation with cooperation.
Interestingly, in the Middle East, only Israel can claim to have a democratic set-up; the front-line Arab
countries have an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political order. It has been argued that greater political
liberalization and democracy in the Arab world may nonetheless reduce the likelihood of armed conflict between
the Arabs and Israelis, and it may also create a climate in which diplomatic efforts designed to address the
underlying causes of the conflict will have a greater chance of success.128 Yet, political contradictions have not
blocked the peace process. In the Middle East, the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, the PLO–Israeli autonomy
accords, and the Israeli–Jordanian agreement have so far not threatened the regimes in power, although it has cost
the lives of the two architects of peace, Sadat and Rabin.
In the case of India and Pakistan, both are democracies at least procedurally, and yet the road to peace seems
to be more difficult in this context.129 The reason for battering Indo–Pak ties, despite their democratic system,
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is not difficult to gauge: lack of political tolerance and responsibility expressed by the different political groups
in the two countries account for the adoption of an irrational approach in Indo–Pak ties. Democracy in India and
in Pakistan leaves much to be desired. A genuine democratic order in the two countries would facilitate the non-
political handling of the Kashmir or Karachi problems. Likewise, if India and Pakistan express magnanimity and
tolerance in their relations, then prevailing suspicion and mistrust have no justification.
The driving force in the Middle East peace process is the feeling between Arabs and Palestinians ever since
the Israeli attack on Lebanon in June 1982, the Gulf War in 1991, and the Soviet disunion the same year that
they are losing in terms of power and prestige and that the minimum concessions offered by Israel to them
should be accepted. Israel has also realized that it cannot forever remain at a state of war with its Arab neighbors.
The United States succeeded in playing the role of mediator when it bridged (to some extent) the perceptual gap
between Israel and its Arab adversaries. In South Asia, the driving force for peace is a widely shared perception
among the majority of the people in the region that on the basis of a quid pro quoa peaceful settlement of all
major conflicts, including the Kashmir dispute, is possible. There is also a feeling of having lost past
opportunities for peace and the threat of a bleak future if the status quo is not changed.
Six major conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. First, substantial political will exists (at
least in the power corridors) in the Middle East for the concept of “land for peace.” For a long period of time,
Israel was consistently opposed to that concept but with the signing of the Camp David accord with Egypt and
later on with the PLO and Jordan it began to accept such an idea as essential to peace. Although Pakistan
considers Kashmir as a core issue and suggests its settlement as a methodology for peace-building in South
Asia, South Bloc in New Delhi is heavily opposed to such an idea and wants to maintain the status quo to its
advantage. Hence, the idea favoring “land for peace” has not attracted policy makers in India. Furthermore, India
feels that by supporting this idea it will contradict its secular ideology and accept the practicality of the “two-
nation theory.” Rejecting the settlement of Kashmir on religious grounds Indian leaders point out, no matter
how unconvincingly, that it would adversely affect the future of 180 million Muslims in India.
There is also an absence of the “pain factor” in the Indo–Pak case. Unlike the Middle East where the costs
of confrontation had become very high and both the Arabs and Israelis were desperate to seek a solution for their
intractable problems, things in India and Pakistan have not reached the point that could compel the leaders of the
two countries to offer concessions on substantive issues. The Kashmir dispute is a cause of concern and pain for
Pakistan but not as much for India. People at the helm of affairs in New Delhi and in Islamabad are not mindful
of the economic, political, and security implications of their confrontation. Since they are not concerned with
the plight of their people, so noticeable a result of the sustained rivalry between India and Pakistan, the “pain
factor” is not an issue for them.
Second, in the case of CBMs, there have been positive developments in the Middle East. Several
agreements dealing with military and non-military CBMs have been signed and implemented between Israel and
the Arab states. This has not happened in India and Pakistan, where CBMs despite having some theoretical
presence, have not been implemented in the real sense. The problem with CBMs for India and Pakistan is that
these are viewed with wide suspicion and mistrust by their opponents. On the basis of past experience, CBMs
are not considered useful in resolving disputes between New Delhi and Islamabad. But the critics of CBMs have
forgotten that confidence-building measures are not supposed to settle conflicts but help in creating an
environment conducive for dialogue. CBMs give breathing space to the two parties by establishing normal
communication, trust, and goodwill. The problem with India and Pakistan is not the failure of CBMs, but the
inability of the two countries to pass through the process of mutual acceptance and tolerance.
Third, in the Middle East, the U.S. role as a mediator has been very effective. All U.S. administrations
since President Richard Nixon have seriously dealt with the Middle East problem and have utilized different
methodologies for resolving Arab–Israeli conflicts. Apart from the United States many other countries,
particularly Norway and Sweden, played an important role in bringing the PLO and Israel to the negotiating
                                                                                                                                                      
experienced repeated setbacks to democracy. In its half a century of history, the country came under direct military rule three times.
Since the lifting of Martial Law on 31 December 1985 until today, the Pakistan military has not seized power. Therefore, a decade of
democracy in Pakistan, from 1986 to 1996, has helped strengthen democratic institutions despite frequent political crises.
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table. The Oslo process is an example. In the India–Pakistan conflict, although marginally important, neither
the United States nor any other external player has consistently been in the picture.
Fourth, a feeling of losing opportunities and urgency for peace had gained ground between the Arabs and the
Israelis. Among the Palestinians, the feeling of losing influence and time—particularly after the Israeli attack on
Lebanon in 1982, the Gulf War, the cut-off of aid to the PLO by the oil rich Gulf countries, and the Soviet
disintegration—led to a breakthrough in PLO–Israeli relations. Israel’s sense of urgency for peace emanated from
its isolation in the developing world and the Palestinian Intifada. In the case of the Arab–Israeli peace process
incentives were offered by the United States and other powers at every stage. So far the United States has
provided $80 billion in aid to Israel and Egypt since the signing of the Camp David accord. Washington is also
providing some assistance to the PLO for building its self-rule authority in the West Bank and Gaza. In the case
of India and Pakistan, the feeling of losing has not gained ground nor has the United States succeeded in
narrowing the gaps in the positions of the two countries. India and Pakistan have not been offered incentives for
peace by the major powers. As a result, although in the Middle East the peace process has rendered significant
results, such a process has yet to be launched in South Asia.
Fifth, in the Middle East and in the South Asian peace processes, the emerging leaders that belong to the
third generation130 have different views compared to their predecessors in terms of support for the peaceful
settlement of disputes, unrestricted movement of people, goods, capital, and services, and cooperation for mutual
progress and prosperity. Perceptions of the official and unofficial elites in the Middle East and in India and
Pakistan also have a significant impact on the peace processes in the two regions. While official elites (civil and
military establishments) in India and Pakistan have little stake in seeking normal ties, their counterparts in the
Middle East do. There, the official elites have worked seriously to narrow the gaps in the peace process.
Contrary to the perceptions of official elites, non-official elites (traders, businessmen, academicians and
journalists) in India and Pakistan have stakes in CM and CR. Interestingly, in the Middle East non-official elites
are still not that receptive to the peace process and still sustain a high level of mistrust and suspicion against
each other. It is also true in the case of India and Pakistan but the initiatives for peace by the non-official elites
in India and Pakistan surpass than their counterparts in the Middle East.
Sixth, while the Helsinki process of peace and cooperation in Europe—launched in early 1970 and which
reached its peak after the signing of the Helsinki final act by thirty-five European countries, the former Soviet
Union, the United States, and Canada—was and is being studied in the context of peace processes in the Middle
East and India and Pakistan,131 its relevance has been marginally felt more in the Arab–Israeli context and less
in the Indo–Pakistan. In South Asia, as in the Middle East, structural differences132 have mad  it difficult to
practically apply the tools of confidence-building measures used in the Helsinki process. Security issues faced by
the NATO, Warsaw Pact, and the neutral countries of Europe sharply differed than those prevailing in the
Arab–Israeli and Indo–Israeli conflicts. But, differences in the Helsinki process of Europe and between the Middle
East and South Asia should not deter the two regions from learning from the methodology used to reduce
mistrust and tension in Europe during the Cold War years.
CBMs adopted by Israel, the Arab countries, and the PLO made some inroads in the peace process. At least
at the official level mutual trust and confidence replaced decades of suspicion and ill-will. Most of the
agreements and treaties signed by Israelis and Arabs have been honored or are being implemented. In contrast to
the Middle East experience, the Helsinki process in the India–Pakistan context has a long way to go. Most of
the essential requirements of the Helsinki framework have been theoretically adopted by New Delhi and
Islamabad but in practical terms the situation is totally different.
                                                
130. The first generation in South Asia and the Middle East experienced the partition of Palestine and the Indian sub-continent. The
second generation struggled to maintain and change the status quo in both regions and the third generation, which is slowly taking over
affairs in both regions, is bitterly opposed to the negative role played by the first two generations. The third generation also feels that the
mess created by the first two generations could only be cleared by following a tolerant and democratic approach in an adversarial
relationship instead of a confrontational approach. An interesting piece focusing on the role of emerging leadership in South Asia (those
belonging to the third generation) for peace-building and conflict resolution is written by Stephen P. Cohen, “A Generational Change,”
Seminar, 422 (New Delhi) October 1994, p. 20.
131. Moonis Ahmar, “The Applicability of the Helsinki Model for the Task of Confidence-Building and Conflict Resolution in the
Indo–Pakistan Subcontinent,” Contemporary South Asia (Oxford) 3 (3) (1994): 237–256.
132. Ibid., p. 242.
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The reasons the Helsinki process has not been applied in India–Pakistan conflicts and its partial application
in the Middle East are the total lack of understanding between India and Pakistan at the official level to resolve
conflicts peacefully and their failure to comprehend the price of confrontation. The basic principle in the
Helsinki process and in the follow-up Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was building
of confidence among states having adversarial relations. Seen in the India–Pakistan context, such a principle is
missing. As rightly said by Jagat Mehta, “If we have to find a parallel—and no parallel is exact—it is in the
steps envisaged in the Helsinki–Belgrade confidence-building scenarios between Eastern and Western Europe.
The aim must be to cut through the vicious gap of mutual suspicions.”133 The road to the applicability of the
Helsinki model for South Asian peace and amity passes through mutual trust and confidence. No methodology
for resolving conflicts between the two warring states could be successful unless suspicion is replaced with trust
and ill-will with confidence. The Helsinki process was a great process for peace and cooperation in Europe.134 It
paved the way for the holding of fruitful dialogue between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on the reduction of
conventional weapons. But both the power blocs had to pay a price for reducing the shades of mistrust and
hostility in Europe. Are India and Pakistan ready to pay a price for peace in South Asia?
Conclusion
An in-depth study of the peace process in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan has produced some
interesting results. Table 16 highlights the lessons that Indians and Pakistanis can learn from the Arab–Israeli
peace process.
The comparison of the Arab–Israeli and Indo–Pak peace processes brings into picture two important
realities. First, in case of the Arab–Israeli peace process there are three possibilities. Either the process will
succeed, be derailed, or be reversed. As far as India and Pakistan are concerned a peace process has not been
launched in the real sense. The two countries are still not ready to discuss their substantive issues and want to
maintain the status quo. Moreover there exists a perception in South Asia that in most cases leaders involved in
various peace processes primarily think in terms of benefiting their countries. That is not the case in South Asia
where those at the helm of affairs, particularly in India and in Pakistan, want to seek personal benefits from any
deal. Since the ruling strata of India and Pakistan is not receptive to the “pain factor” and is more interested in
assuring personal benefits, the success of any peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad is questionable.
Leaders of India and Pakistan who are honest, clear, perceptive, and concerned about the plight of people can
successfully settle their conflicts as compared to those who are famous for their corruption, greed, lack of
imagination, and negative approach.
India and Pakistan can learn six lessons from the Middle East peace process. First, although the subst ntive
issues are important these should not be allowed to derail the peace process. For a long p riod of time there was
no breakthrough in the Middle East peace process on account of the rigid positions adopted by Israel and the
PLO on the question of an independent Palestinian state. The stalemate was only removed when the PLO
                                                
133. Mehta, p. 300.
134. Moonis Ahmar, “The Applicability of the Helsinki Model,” pp. 237–256.
TABLE 16 Lessons For South Asia
Lessons from the Middle East Peace Process For India For Pakistan
Role of personalities in peace-making, e. g., Sadat, Begin, Arafat, RabinLow Low
Political will for resolving conflicts Low Low
U.S. role Not supportive Partially supportive
Multilateral diplomacy Hostile Supportive
Success of CBMs Low Low
Role of media Adverse Adverse
Secret diplomacy at the official level Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
Track-II diplomacy Partial success Partial success
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recognized Israel and Tel Aviv agreed to grant not independent, but autonomous status to the Palestinians living
in Gaza and the West Bank. Because the Kashmir dispute is a major stumbling block in the New
Delhi–Islamabad normalization process, both parties must seriously concentrate on a pragmatic solution. Like
the Palestine problem in the Middle East, the Kashmir dispute cannot be bypassed in the normalization process
but it should not be allowed to keep the one billion people of India and Pakistan as a hostage. It is primarily a
matter of the approach to be followed by India and Pakistan. Kashmir could be taken up immediately for
discussion or could be examined with other issues. The Kashmir dispute cannot be resolved in isolation. As the
Palestinians were and are the main player in the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Kashmiris have an undeniable role in
the India–Pakistan standoff. Therefore, the involvement of Kashmiris for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute
is essential.
Second, Pakistan’s i istence that no breakthrough in India–Pakistan relations could be achieved unless the
Kashmir dispute is resolved needs to be reconsidered. Pak stan should understand the merit of discussing less
controversial issues first and then moving step-by-step toward resolution of the more difficult issues. Therefore,
learning from the past and present experience of the Arab–Israeli peace talks and other similar exercises, India
and Pakistan need to adopt a flexible approach on all issues, including Kashmir. India needs to work out a deal
with both Pakistan and the Kashmiris, not just the Kashmiris.
Third, the success of multi-lateral diplomacy in the Middle East peace process is another lesson for an
Indo–Pakistan peace process. India has insisted on holding bilateral talks instead of multilateral. Because
Pakistan has lost its faith in the viability of holding bilateral talks with New Delhi it favors the involvement of
a third party for mediation. India may prefer bilateral discussion or secret talks, but with the expertise of an
interested third party the scope of talks could be enlarged to the multilateral level.
Fourth, the success of back channel negotiations between Israel and Egypt, Israel and the PLO, and Israel
and Jordan is another important lesson for India and Pakistan from the Arab–Israeli peace process. Secr t talks
held between Israel and the PLO in London, Rome, and Oslo paved the way for reducing their disagreement on
substantive issues. Moreover, those involved in such talks had the confidence and trust of their governments.
The problem with India and Pakistan is those participating in track-II diplomacy have been disowned by their
ruling leadership. There are many countries who are interested in facilitating the Indo–Pak dialogue, but they are
not getting an encouraging response from New Delhi and Islamabad. When there is stalemate in bilateral talks
(the last round of the Indo–Pak foreign secretaries’ talks was held in January 1994 in Islamabad) then the only
viable option left for the two countries to break the stalemate is by holding secret or back channel negotiations.
The advantage of such an exercise is that if the talks fail there is no source of embarrassment for the parties
involved. The PLO–Israeli back channel negotiations were held near Oslo, Norway, and both parties, despite
sharp differences on substantive issues, succeeded in reaching a Declaration of Principles (DOP). The Oslo
model should be taken seriously by India and Pakistan. There was no U.S. involvement in the Oslo process. It
was simply a process that got started because of the interest expressed by the Norwegians, Israelis, and
Palestinians. India and Pakistan need to demonstrate substantial political will for the resolution of their
conflicts. If they want to embark on a low-key and secret mode of negotiations with each other then the Oslo
model is a relevant example.
Fifth, an important lesson that India and Pakistan can learn from the Middle East peace process is the
exercise of substantial political will at both the public and the official level. The alleviation of mutual mistrust
and suspicion must be a top priority in the India–Pakistan normalization process. As long as Israel, the Arab
countries, and the Palestinians were adamant in their official positions, there was a stalemate in the Middle East
peace process. Nevertheless, the Egypt–Israeli peace talks provided justification for further similar breakthroughs
between Israel and other front-line Arab states, including the Palestinians.
Sixth, considering the Middle East experience, the rol  to be played by the leaders of India and Pakistan is
essential. In India or in Pakistan a dynamic leadership should emerge. It has been suggested in some circles that,
like Sadat or Rabin, if some one from India or Pakistan is willing to shun his or her ego, take a risk, and
embark on a peace mission, it will be a great achievement in the area of CR. As a result, at least the leaders of
both countries can help lower temperature and discourage hostile propaganda. Personalities and their perceptions
are crucial in the success or failures of a peace process. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi were assertive and
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dominant personalities. Both had adopted extreme positions on the Indo–Pak conflicts but despite their
aggressive posture they also took important steps for peace in South Asia—the Simla accord of July 1972. Zia
ul-Haq had a fragile domestic popular base and wanted to seek stable relations with India. However, the Indians
were reluctant to deal with Zia because of his undemocratic rule. Zia did manage to ease off pressure from India
by his unilateral initiatives for war avoidance and cooperation but he couldn’t go far in resolving substantive
issues with New Delhi. Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi had a good equation but both leaders were unable to
neutralize the resistance of hawkish elements for normalization in relations. With Rajiv’s exit from power and
the dismissal of Benazir’s first government the task of peace-building between India and Pakistan became more
and more difficult. Since 1990 the governments in India and Pakistan have been weak and exposed to serious
domestic challenges. They have been unable to launch any serious initiatives to resolve substantive issues. The
evolution of substantial political will is necessary in this regard.
To assure a promising future for the one billion people of South Asia, India and Pakistan need to manage
and then resolve their major conflicts, particularly Kashmir. Failure to do so will further augment the costs of
confrontation. The straightforward application of the methodology used in the Middle East peace process is not
possible under present circumstances. What is feasible is the modification of that methodology to accommodate
the changed conditions noted in South Asia. The process is difficult but the prospects are nonetheless bright. As
the road to peace in the Middle East has passed through Washington, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, and Jerusalem,
in South Asia it must pass through New Delhi, Islamabad, and Srinagar.
59
Appendix
TABLE 17: Similarities in the Arab–Israeli and India–Pakistan Peace Processes
Arab–Israeli Conflicts India–Pakistan Disputes
Britain played a key role during the creation of Israel
and the emergence of the Palestinian problem in part by
withdrawing before the nascent dispute was resolved
Britain’s role in the partition of Indian subcontinent
leading to outbreak of territorial disputes between India
and Pakistan, particularly of Jammu & Kashmir
Creation of Israel on the basis of religion that exacer-
bated hostility between Muslims and Jews
Creation of Pakistan on religious grounds accentuated
Hindu–Muslim animosity
Wars were fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors
in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982
Wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971
Insecurity among Israelis about the Arab rejection of
their state
Pakistan’s sense of insecurity, fear of Indian
domination, reinforced by New Delhi’s past role in the
creation of Bangladesh
Unsettled territorial disputes between Israel and its Arab
neighbors on Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon
India–Pakistan territorial conflicts, particularly on
Jammu & Kashmir and Siachen
Refugee problem in the aftermath of the partition of
Palestine and wars
Refugee problem in India and Pakistan after the
partition of subcontinent in 1947. More recently refugee
influx, both in India and Pakistan is from the Indian
controlled parts of Jammu & Kashmir
Conflict over water resources Conflict over water resources
UN involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflicts since the
Palestine partition plan in 1947
UN involvement in the settlement of the Kashmir
dispute since the outbreak of first India–Pakistan War in
1947–48
The role of third party mediation in resolving
Arab–Israeli disputes especially after the 1973 War
Third party involvement o prevent another war
between India and Pakistan, by the United States
(1960–64), by the Soviet Union after the 1965
India–Pakistan War and then by the United States to
prevent the predictable use of nuclear weapons in the
event of another Indo–Pak War in 1990s
Possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. Israel is not
a signatory of NPT
I dia and Pakistan have not signed the NPT; covert
nuclear weapons may lead to a nuclear war in South Asia
The influence of hawkish elements and the upsurge of
extremist forces to derail the Middle East peace process
Marginal role of moderate elements to abate ill-will
and confrontation between the two countries
Strengthening of enemy image at the popular and state
level
S rengthening of enemy image at the popular and state
level
Negative role of the elites in CR and peace-building Elites of India and Pakistan have consistently impeded
efforts for CM, resolution and confidence-building
Persecution of minorities like Palestinians in Israel and
in its occupied areas and Kurds in Iraq and Syria
Persecution of minorities like Muslims and Sikhs in
India and Hindus, Christians and Ahmadis in Pakistan
Superpower involvement during the Cold War years Superpower involvement during the Cold War years
Adverse role played by a section of media harming the
peace process
Att mpts made by large sections of media to block
efforts for normalization
Track-I diplomacy for building trust and goodwill Track-I diplomacy for building trust and goodwill
Track-II diplomacy successful to some extent Track-II diplomacy, although not very successful, has
been useful. Because of the s al mate in some of the
initiatives in track-II diplomacy, some circles are
suggesting the holding of track-III diplomacy composed
of the third generation leaders of India and Pakistan
Continued
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TABLE 17 (Continued)
Arab–Israeli Conflicts India–Pakistan Disputes
Holding of secret talks Non-official talks held in Goa and elsewhere did not
break the ice
Sense of frustration and betrayal among Palestinians
leading to the launching of Intifada in December 1987
Sense of frustration among Kashmiris resulting into
their revolt for self-determination in 1990
Non-political handling of domestic conflicts by anti-
status quo forces
Non-political handling of domestic conflicts by anti-
status quo forces
Attempts made by the parties in conflict to change and
maintain status quo
Attempts made by the parties in conflict to change and
maintain status quo
Power imbalance among the parties in conflict Power imbalance among the parties in conflict
Israel’s sense of insecurity has deepened because of its
lack of territorial depth
Paki tan’s sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India also
emanates from its lack of territorial depth
Holding of Arab–Arab, Arab–U.S., Arab–Russian,
Israeli–U.S. and Israeli–Russian dialogue for peace in the
Middle East
Holding of Pak–Chinese, Indo–Chinese,
I do–Russian, Pak–Russian, Indo–Iran, Pak–Iran,
Indo–U.S and Pak–U.S. dialogue for the management and
resolution of conflicts in South Asia
Dismissal of war as an option to settle disputes Because of the nuclear factor between New Delhi and
Islamabad, the possibility of the fourth war is remote in
South Asia
Adoption of military and non-military CBMs to avoid
war and to promote cooperation
Adoption of military CBMs to avoid war
Demand for “Land for Peace” has gained ground in the
Middle East
Demands are being made by certain circles in India and
Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute on the basis of
“Land for Peace” formula
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TABLE 18 Differences in the Two Peace Processes
Issues Middle East India and Pakistan
U.S. involvement for CM and CR Very obvious Marginal
Strategic interests of Big powers High Low
Strategic importance of the region High Low
Land for peace formula Applicable Not yet considered seriously
Track-I diplomacy Successful Unsuccessful
Track-II diplomacy Successful (Partially) Unsuccessful so far
Confidence-Building Measures Partially successful in military
and non-military areas
Partially successful in
military areas
Secret diplomacy Successful Not yet tried successfully
The role of personalities for peace buildingSignificant Insignificant
The role of leadership for peace-building Partially negative Negative
The role of third generation for peace Less Reasonable Reasonable
Authoritarian political system Relevant in most of the Middle
Eastern countries
Not applicable. Semi-Demo-
cratic political system in
India and in Pakistan
Role of media Partially negative Very negative
People-to-people contacts in tourism and
business
Being promoted Discouraged
Talks for arms reduction Some breakthrough No progress
Economic cooperation Being promoted Discouraged
Domestic pressures for peace building Significant Marginal
Tradeoffs and concessions Applicable Not yet applicable
Breakthrough at the official level for peaceApplicable Not yet applicable
Sharing of past experiences and fears Not Applicable Applicable
Experience of the Helsinki process in EuropePartially applicable Not yet applicable
Role of personal ego as an impediment to the
peace process
Partially applicable Applicable
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TABLE 19 Comparison of Middle East and South Asia: Conflict and Cooperation
Date
Evolution of Arab–Israeli
Conflict and Cooperation
Evolution of Indo–Pak
Conflict and Cooperation
1947 UN partition plan for Palestine Partition of the Indian subcontinent into two
sovereign states, India and Pakistan
1948 Creation of Israel; first Arab–Israeli War First Indo–Pak War on Kashmir
1949 India offers No-War Pact to Pakistan
1950 Dixon plan on Kashmir
1956 Suez War breaks out between Israel and Egypt
1960 Indus Water Treaty
1962 Sino–Indian border War
1965 Second Indo–Pak War
1966 Tashkent agreement signed
1967 Arab–Israeli War; Israel occupies Sinai,
Gaza, Golan Heights, and the West Bank
including the city of East Jerusalem. UN
Security Council passes resolution 242
calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops
from Arab-occupied territories
1969 Rann of Kutch boundary accord signed
1971 Third Indo–Pak War leads to dismemberment of
Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh
1972 Simla Accord signed
1973 Arab–Israeli War; Egypt breaks Israel’s
invincibility; UN Security Council passes
Resolution 338 reaffirming Resolution 242
1974 Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy brings about a
Egyptian–Israeli and Syrian–Israeli agree-
ment on disengagement of forces
1975 Egypt and Israel sign Sinai II agreement Agreement reached between Indian Prime Minster
Indira Gandhi and Kashmiri leader Sheikh
Abdullah; Pakistan protests
1977 Historic visit by Sadat to Israel Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Bajpai visits
Pakistan; talks of normalizing relations with
Islamabad
1978 Camp David accord signed
1978 Salal Dam agreement signed
1979 Egypt–Israeli peace treaty signed
1982 Pakistan offers No-War Pact; India’s offers Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation
1982 Israeli occupation of Beirut and expulsion of
PLO military contin-gents from the city
1982 Fez peace plan presented; implicit recog-
nition of Israel conditioned by the with-
drawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and the
West Bank
1983 Reagan peace plan presented; limited
autonomy offered to Palestinians subject to
recognition of Israel and renunciation of
terrorism Continued
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TABLE 19 (Continued)
Date
Evolution of Arab–Israeli
Conflict and Cooperation
Evolution of Indo–Pak
Conflict and Cooperation
1983 Formation of Indo–Pak joint commission
1984 Jordanian–Palestinian confederation plan
proposed
Indo–Pak conflict on Siachen
1985 SAARC launched; Pakistan’s President General
Zia ul-Haq and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
agree on non-attack of each other’s nuclear
installations
1986 Military exercise “Brasstacks” launched by India,
escalating Indo–Pak tension
1987 Intifada launched Zia visits India, Indo–Pak tension de-escalates
1988 Rajiv visits Pakistan for fourth SAARC summit;
agreement on non-attack of each other’s nuclear
installations signed by India and Pakistan
1989 Rajiv’s visit to Pakistan in July 1989 leads to the
signing of a cultural agreement, agreement on the
avoidance of double taxation and a meeting of the
Indo–Pak joint commission
1990 Iraq’s occupies Kuwait; PLO’s support for Iraq
leds to the termination Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) aid to the PLO
1990 Popular uprising in Indian controlled parts of
Jammu and Kashmir; relations with Pakistan
worsen; hard-liners on both sides talk of war;
possibility of nuclear war averted in summer 1990
1991 Gulf War; U.S. led coalition defeats Iraq India and Pakistan sign agreements on noti-
fication of military exercises and agreement on
preventing air and space violation
1991 The Gulf War and disintegration of Soviet
Union weakens the PLO’s position
Five-nation conference on nuclear proliferation in
South Asia proposed by Pakistan; India rejects
proposal
1991 Middle East Peace talks held in Madrid
1993 Secret talks between Palestinians and Israelis
in Sarpsborg, Norway, lead to a breakthrough
in the Middle East Peace Process
Indo–Pak agreements reached on banning
chemical weapons and on diplomatic conduct
1993 PLO–Israeli autonomy accord signed in
Washington
Indo–Pak relations worsen after the Babri Mosque
incidents, bomb blasts in Bombay, and
maltreatment of diplomats
1994 Jordan and Israel sign peace accord Indo–Pak Foreign Secretaries hold talks in
January; Indo–Pak normalization process later
becomes stalemated; Pakistan asks India to close
Karachi consulate and accuses New Delhi of
interfering in Karachi disturbances
1994 Israel begins withdrawal from Gaza and the
West Bank town of Jericho; Israeli hard-line
elements reject PLO–Israeli accord; Hamas
threatens violence in Israel and criticizes
Arafat for signing accord
1995 Israel offers conditional withdrawal from
Golan Heights if Syria recognizes Israel
Insurgency in Kashmir worsens Indo–Pak ties
Continued
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TABLE 19 (Continued)
Date
Evolution of Arab–Israeli
Conflict and Cooperation
Evolution of Indo–Pak
Conflict and Cooperation
1995 PLO and Israel sign the second stage of
autonomy accord in Washington in October.
Rabin assassinated in November
1995 India’s Narasimha Rao announces “autonomy
formula” and elections for Kashmir; rejected by
Pakistan and Kashmiri resistance groups
1996 Tel Aviv and Jerusalem suffer suicide
bombing attacks; Israel suspendes
Israeli–Syrian peace talks; Middle East
conference held at Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt
1996 Indo–Pak border clashes in Kashmir; nuclear arms
race draws world attention; BJP emerges as the
single largest party in Indian elections.
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Acronyms
APHC, All Party Hurriyat Conference
AIR, All India Radio
BJP, Bharatiya Janata Party
CBMs, Confidence-Building Measures
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CM, Conflict Management
CNN, Cable News Network
CR, Conflict Resolution
IDF, Israeli Defense Forces
JKLF, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
MQM, Mohajir Quami Movement
NGOs, Non-Governmental Organizations
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
OIC, Organization of Islamic Conference
PLO, Palestinian Liberation Organization
RAW, Research And Analysis Wing
SAARC, South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
UN, United Nations
VOA, Voice of America
